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The U.S. Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
 
By David A. Koplow∗ 
 
 The United States is violating a multilateral arms control treaty.  Russia is, 
too.  It’s not just some minor accord at stake; it’s the 1993 Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC),1 the critical, near-universal undertaking to banish the 
centuries-old scourge of chemical warfare.  And it’s not just some trivial misstep; 
it’s a blatant transgression of one of the treaty’s most fundamental provisions, 
requiring the timely destruction of the massive inventories of chemical weapons 
(CW) that the planet’s erstwhile superpowers had laboriously constructed and 
assiduously maintained throughout the Cold War.  And it won’t be a near-miss; 
each country will fall years beyond complying with the treaty’s April 29, 2012 final 
deadline for accomplishing the total dismantling of this noxious ordnance -- the 
United States now figures to eclipse that mandatory mark by at least 11 years. 
 
                                            
∗      Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  The author gratefully thanks the 
following individuals who provided insights, advice, and edits on prior drafts of this article:  G. 
Thomas Cataldo, Karl S. Chang, Robert E. Dalton, David S. Jonas, Barry Kellman, David J. 
Luban, Jeffery G. McCoy, Sean D. Murphy, and James B. (Bart) Wager, Jr., and the participants 
in the Georgetown Law research workshop, as well as the dedicated research assistance of 
Nicole Stillwell and Mabel Shaw. 
1      Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, April 29, 1997, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, 32 I.L.M. 800, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 103-21, (1993). 
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 How did we get into this mess?  How did the United States, the leading 
exponent of the rule of law and a prime mover in negotiating and implementing 
the CWC, fall into such conspicuous violation?  What can be done at this point to 
extricate ourselves and the Russians from this grisly political and legal 
predicament?  And what can we do in the future to avoid other similar 
international law train wrecks? 
 
 This article parses the problem of noncompliance with the CWC’s 
dismantling obligations as a case study in the operation (or non-operation) of 
international law.  Section 1 provides the essential background on chemical 
weapons and the treaty, highlighting the CWC’s vital role in reining in a horrific 
global threat and outlining the treaty’s provisions regarding the safe, clean, and 
verified elimination of chemical stockpiles.  The CWC is one of the most 
ambitious and one of the most successful multilateral arms control regimes in 
history, but it is hardly without controversy.   
 
Section 2 focuses on the U.S. chemical weapons program: its history, 
current status, and, especially, the convoluted program for incinerating or 
chemically neutralizing the lethal agents – and details why it has fallen so far 
behind the legally-required schedule.  Section 3 presents the comparable portrait 
for Russia and other countries, describing how Moscow, too, despite significant 
outside financial assistance, has been blatantly unable to comply with the CWC’s 
negotiated timetables.  The declared inventories of Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, 
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and South Korea pale in comparison to those of the United States and Russia, 
but their travails have been similar; some have succeeded in timely elimination in 
conformity with the treaty, but there are some interesting precedents of treaty 
breach here, too. 
 
 Section 4 describes the political remediation efforts that the United States 
has undertaken to date, in the largely successful effort to manage the violation on 
a low-key political plane, through increased transparency and a renewed 
commitment to the ultimate goal of a CW-free planet.  These efforts have surely 
been helpful, and are worth retaining, but they are hardly sufficient to solve the 
overall legal and political problem.  Section 5 then turns to international law, 
concluding that the ostentatious failure places the United States and Russia into 
a position of “material breach” of the CWC, even if their violations are not the 
result of bad faith or deception and even if the retained CW inventories carry little 
true military significance.  This section also argues that international law’s 
putative excuses for non-performance of a treaty obligation (such as 
impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure) are unavailing in this 
case, and it evaluates the effects of a peculiar tension between competing types 
of CWC obligations.  This section also inspects the array of remedies that 
international law affords to innocent parties aggrieved by these ongoing 
violations (such as suspension or termination of counter-performance, suit in the 
International Court of Justice, and invocation of the specialized procedures 
created by the CWC itself.) 
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To put this specific CW case study into a larger context, Section 6 asks 
how previous arms control treaties have managed to resolve this sort of dilemma 
in the past, and how future accords could handle cognate challenges better.  On 
those rare occasions when the international political stars align in favor of a 
disarmament measure, we do want the legal documents to exert pressure on the 
weapons-holding states to eliminate their newly-banned inventories as soon as 
practicable, but we do not want to again demand the impossible, or to jeopardize 
the treaty structure if an unavoidable delay crops up.  New treaties regulating 
anti-personnel land mines and cluster munitions already implicate these same 
dismantling concerns, and others may someday do likewise. 
 
Returning to the CWC, Section 7 next surveys an array of possible 
responses to the 2012 deadline crisis – it evaluates a roster of options that the 
United States, Russia, the other CWC parties, and various international 
institutions may be able to exercise to mitigate the problem.  None of these 
alternatives is perfect (and there may be something of an inverse relationship 
between the options that would be “best” in some sense and the options that 
would be most attainable), but consideration of the full cadre of possibilities may 
be illuminating. 
 
 Section 8 offers some recommendations.  Despite the fully-
understandable and remarkably-successful U.S. government efforts to finesse 
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this issue, missing this treaty deadline is a big deal.  Rarely has the international 
community been compelled to confront such an open-and-shut case of an 
important violation of an important arms control treaty – and by the planet’s 
leading players, no less.  It may not be possible to avoid all the damage from this 
collision, but perhaps some principles of value can still be salvaged. 
 
Finally, Section 9 offers some concluding thoughts.  What is at stake here 
is not merely conformity with a single international obligation.  Instead, each 
occasion where international law is, or is not, adhered to constitutes an 
expression of support or rejection of the global rule of law – and when the 
planet’s leading military powers fail to perform as they have promised, the entire 
fabric of the legal order is called into question.  This is an occasion to set an 
important precedent -- when the United States, in particular, should take the 
opportunity to “model” for the rest of the world how an honorable country should 
behave, if it finds itself in the unfortunate situation of violating a solemn 
international agreement.     
 
Overall, the animating force behind this article is an argument that the 
long-term interests of the United States lie in validating the importance of full, 
timely compliance with treaties – especially arms control agreements.  Even if, in 
a particular case, it might be possible to “finesse” an act of U.S. non-compliance 
with a treaty, achieving by skillful diplomacy an agreement to a muted and non-
punitive global response, that short term accomplishment disserves the bigger 
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picture.  Instead, the United States should publicly own up to its breach, take its 
medicine, and thereby demonstrate in the most powerful manner that compliance 
with international law really is an enduring U.S. principle, applicable even to 
ourselves, even when it comes with some pain. 
 
 
Section 1: The Problem of Chemical Weapons and the Solution in the CWC 
 The story of chemical weaponry is long, sad, and convoluted.  Throughout 
the centuries and around the world, armies have regularly attempted to employ 
poisons of varying formulae against their enemies; sometimes this scientific zeal 
has resulted in telling battlefield advantage; even more often it has inspired 
indiscriminate pain, horror and public revulsion.2 
 
                                            
2     See generally: John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biological  
Weapons Through World War II, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and  
Disarmament, 1993, vol II, p. 657; Charles C. Flowerree, Chemical and Bilogical Weapons and  
Arms Control, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament,  
1993, vol II, p. 999; Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms Against Chemical and Biological  
Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 Journal of Conflict And Security Law No. 2, 2003, p. 391;  
Frederick J. Vogel, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Strategic Implications for the United  
States, January 8, 1997, available at  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=322; Paul F. Walker, 
 Abolishing Chemical Weapons: Progress, Challenges, and Opportunities, 40 Arms Control  
Today No. 9, November 2010; Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World 
War I to Al-Qaeda, 2006; U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition and Technology, The Militarily Critical Technologies List Part II: Weapons   
of Mass Destruction Technologies (ADA 330102), "Chemical Weapons Technology",  
February 1998, available at http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/production.html  
(describing CW production technology, military applications, and foreign state capabilities);  
Senate Executive Report 104-33, The Chemical Weapons Convention, Senate Committee on  
Foreign Relations, September 11, 1996, p. 12-13 [hereinafter Report 104-33]; Federation of  
American Scientists, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, and Types of Chemical Weapons, 2011,  
available at http://www.fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/; Organization for the Prohibition of  
Chemical Weapons, Basic Facts on Chemical Disarmament, http://www.opcw.org/news- 
publications/publications/history-of-the-chemical-weapons-convention [hereinafter, Basic Facts]; 
Russian Munitions Agency, Chemical Disarmament, Chemical Weapons website, 
http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/zapasho.html, History of CW Development.  
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 Pre-biblical literature from India (1500 B.C.), Greece (429 B.C.) and Rome 
(150 B.C.) as well as subsequent lore from other combatants carry sagas of 
fulminating gases wafted toward an adversary’s encampment, lethal potions 
strategically dumped into enemy wells or rivers, contaminants insinuated into 
foreign food supplies, and arrows and artillery shells laced with toxins.3  World 
War I married modern chemistry with that longstanding lethal intent, and 125,000 
tons of mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite, cyanide and other insidious concoctions 
polluted the European trenches, inflicting 1.3 million casualties and nearly 
100,000 deaths.4   
 
In contrast, the central battlefields of World War II were remarkably CW-
free, despite the fact that partisans on both sides were armed to the teeth with 
enormous arsenals of much more deadly generations of nerve gases – 
apparently primitive deterrence drove both sides toward mutual (if uncomfortably 
unsteady) self-restraint.5  A handful of notorious episodes of CW use after 1945 -
- especially the large-scale invocation of poisons by both sides in the 1980-1988 
Iran-Iraq conflict, and by Iraq against its own Kurdish minority in 1987-1988 -- 
                                            
3      Moon, supra note __, p. 657-58; Zanders, supra note __, p. 392-93; Adrienne Mayor, Greek 
Fire, Poison Arrows, and Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World, 
2003. 
4      Moon, supra note __, p. 659-62; Zanders, supra note __, p. 395; Basic Facts, supra note __; 
Robert Noyes, Chemical Weapons Destruction and Explosive Waste/Unexploded Ordnance 
Remediation, 1996, p. 3-6. 
5      Moon, supra note __, p. 668-70.  Chemical weapons were used by Italy in Ethiopia in 1935-
1936, and by Japan in China in 1937-1945, as well as by Germany in many of the concentration 
and death camps.  Moon, supra note __, p. 666-68; Frederick J. Vogel, The Chemical Weapons 
Convention: Strategic Implications for the United States, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub322.pdf 
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kept the issue in the world’s attention, even if massive casualties and decisive 
military victories were not necessarily achieved by this form of attack.6  
 
 The counterpoint to the use of chemicals – the widespread public loathing 
of this form of combat – provides a parallel history.  Ancient civilizations recorded 
their antipathy toward these invisible, insidious toxins,7 and the public rejection of 
the scourge of CW prompted some of the earliest arms control treaties: the St. 
Petersburg Declaration of 1868,8 the Brussels Declaration of 1874,9 and the 
Hague Conventions of 189910 and 190711 reflected the participants’ visceral 
rejection of “asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”12   
                                            
6      Flowerree, supra note __, p. 1002-04; Walker, supra note __ (reporting that “[c]hemical 
weapons have been used in warfare and terrorist attacks a dozen times or more in the last three 
decades”); J.P. Perry Robinson, Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Morel and 
Olson, supra note __, p. 37, 42-43 (listing dozens of instances after World War I in which CW use 
was alleged); Report 104-33, supra note __, at 163, 169 (noting that in 1996, “[s]ome 20 nations 
are now suspected of having chemical weapons or developing a chemical weapons capability.”); 
Vogel, supra note __; Hearing 103-869, supra note __, p. 8 (statement of John D. Holum) (stating 
that “Approximately 25 nations are now suspected of either possessing chemical weapons or 
having the ability to produce them.”)  In the 1980s, the United States alleged that the Soviet 
Union and its allies used “yellow rain” chemical and biological weapons in Laos, Cambodia, and 
Afghanistan; these reports were subsequently largely discredited.  See U.S. Department of State, 
Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update, Special Report No. 104, 
November 1982. 
7      Moon, supra note __, p. 657-58. 
8     Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive   Projectiles, Nov. 
29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297. 
9      Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War, signed in 
Brussels, August 27, 1874 (never entered into force), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/135?OpenDocument.  
10     Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), concluded 
July 29, 1899, entered into force September 4, 1900, Annex to the Convention, article 23 (“it is 
especially prohibited…To employ poison or poisoned arms) and Declaration 2, Declaration on the 
Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases (“The 
Contracting Powers agree to abstain from the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion 
of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”), 32 Stat. 1803, TS 403, 1 Bevans 247, 187 CTS (1898-
99), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/dec99-02.asp. 
11     Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, concluded October 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539, 1 Bevans 631, Annex, article 23 (“it is especially forbidden…To 
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 The first modern arms control treaty, the Geneva Protocol of 1925,13 
placed the train of CW control firmly onto a steadier international track.  That 
accord (which is still in force and has attracted 137 parties14) binds countries to 
abjure “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices.”15  This treaty now constitutes essentially 
a ban only against the first use of CW; it does not restrict countries’ possession 
of lethal arsenals nor their application in retaliation for an enemy’s opening 
chemical salvo.16 
 
 The diplomatic process therefore continued unsated toward a more 
comprehensive CW accord, but the post-World War II efforts largely succumbed 
to Cold War politics and other distractions.17  Three related international 
agreements did help fill part of the void: the multilateral 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC)18 dealt with the related issue of disease-causing agents (as 
                                                                                                                                  
employ poison or poisoned weapons”), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp. 
12    1899 Hague Declaration No. 2, 1899, supra note __.  
13      Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare [hereinafter, Geneva Protocol], June 17, 1925, 
available at http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf. 
14      See http://unhq-appspub-01.un.org/UNODA/TreatyStatus.nsf.  The United States did not 
join the Geneva Protocol until April 10, 1975. 
15      Geneva Protocol, supra note __, second preambular paragraph. 
16      See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 164; Moon, supra note __, p. 664; Flowerree, supra 
note __, p. 1000-02. 
17      See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 165-66; Flowerree, supra note __, p. 1011-14; Victor 
A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective, 1991. 
18      Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 UST 
583, TIAS 8062, 1015 UNTS 163 [hereinafter BWC]. 
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partially contrasted with pure poisons19); the bilateral 1989 Wyoming 
Memorandum of Understanding20 provided an interim U.S.-U.S.S.R. mechanism 
for exchanging data and inspection visits in anticipation of a forthcoming broader 
multilateral CW treaty; and the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement reflected 
the two superpowers’ consensus to initiate promptly the process for destroying 
most of their CW, even prior to the conclusion of a universal treaty.21 
 
 That long-sought comprehensive treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition 
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and 
                                            
19      The precise distinction between “chemical” and “biological” agents is elusive.  Essentially, 
the concept of a biological weapon focuses upon living microorganisms that cause diseases in 
humans, animals or plants.  A chemical weapon operates through poison, rather than disease.  A 
“toxin” is a sort of middle ground, containing some of the characteristics of both CW and BW, and 
being regulated by both the BWC and the CWC.  See Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical and 
Biological Weapons, in Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner (eds.), Combating Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy, 2009, p. 74; Krutzsch and 
Trapp, supra note __, at 31-32. 
20      Memorandum of Understanding Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data 
Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Sept. 23, 1989, United States-U.S.S.R., 
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1438 (1989) [hereinafter Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding].  This 
agreement inaugurated a two-phase program of data exchanges about chemical weapons stocks 
and reciprocal on-site visits.  The contemplated exchange program was never fully implemented, 
as U.S. authorities were unsatisfied with the accuracy and completeness of the data provided by 
Soviet officials.  U.S. Department of State, U.S.-Russian Wyoming Memorandum of 
Understanding on Chemical Weapons, fact sheet,  
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/wmd/cw/cwmou.html; United States General 
Accounting Office, Report, Arms Control: Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements and the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, GAO/NSIAD-94-136, March 1994 [hereinafter, Status of U.S.-Russian 
Agreements]; Report 104-33, supra note __, at 26-28, 166-67, 203-04. 
21     U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on 
Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention, June 1, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 
934, 1990; 56 Fed.Reg. 25,404 (1991) [hereinafter, Bilateral Destruction Agreement].  This 
agreement called for each party to begin destroying most, but not all, of its CW and CW 
production facilities, subject to verification inspections conducted by the other side.  The 
agreement was never operational, and was superseded by the CWC.  Federation of American 
Scientists, Bilateral Destruction Agreement, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/bda/index.html; 
Report 104-33, supra note __, at 26-28, 166-67, 203-04. 
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on Their Destruction (CWC),22 finally ripened in 1993.  It has now attracted 188 
parties; two more states (Israel and Myanmar) have signed, but not yet ratified; 
and only six countries (Angola, Egypt, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, and the 
recently-formed South Sudan) have shunned the document altogether.23   
 
 As its title suggests, the CWC aims to erect a permanent, all-
encompassing prohibition on chemical weapons.  It exceeds the accomplishment 
of the Geneva Protocol by banning all production, acquisition, retention, use, 
preparation for use, and assistance to others for the use of chemical weapons;24 
and it establishes an elaborate mechanism for data exchanges, inspection by an 
international organization, and dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure verified 
compliance with the underlying obligations.25  The treaty defines the prohibited 
items expansively – it covers active chemical weapons agents and substances 
that could be their “precursors”;26 it likewise regulates even “non-lethal” tear gas 
                                            
22      CWC, supra note __.  The authoritative interpretative source regarding the CWC is Walter 
Krutzsch and Ralf Trapp, A Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1994 
[hereinafter, Krutzsch and Trapp]. 
23      Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, website page, OPCW Member 
States, http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/member-states/; http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/non-
member-states/.  See also Daniel Feakes, Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC 
Universality, 38 Arms Control Today No. 2, March 2008 (discussing challenges of achieving 
universal adherence to the CWC). 
24      CWC, supra note __, art. I.1. 
25      CWC, supra note __, arts. III (Declarations), VIII (the Organization), and IX (Consultations, 
Cooperation and Fact-Finding).  The OPCW has undertaken more than 4680 inspections of 195 
chemical weapons-related sites and 1103 chemical industry sites in 81 countries.  OPCW 
Website, statistics column, http://www.opcw.org/; Walker, supra note __; OPCW, Executive 
Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction in 2011, EC-69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 7-12 (reporting numbers of different types of 
inspections conducted by OPCW in 2011). 
26      CWC, supra note __, art. II.3.  The treaty establishes three main categories of toxic  
 chemicals.  Schedule 1 includes the most dangerous materials, those that have previously been 
 used as weapons; Schedule 2 includes substances that pose risks as weapons, but that are also 
 used in the civilian economy; Schedule 3 covers those of lesser, but still noteworthy risk.  The 
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and other riot control agents;27 and it embraces even old, obsolete, and 
abandoned chemical munitions that failed to detonate in combat or were 
discarded carelessly in test ranges.28  It requires dismantling or conversion of 
facilities formerly used to produce CW,29 and it regulates international commerce 
in substances and equipment that could be diverted for weapons purposes.30   
The CWC may be the longest, most detailed, most elaborately-crafted 
multilateral arms control agreement in history.  It has properly been hailed by UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon as “one of the greatest achievements in the 
history of multilateral efforts to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation” and 
“a fundamental pillar of international peace and security.”31 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 treaty’s provisions regarding declarations of inventories, destruction of weapons, international 
 commerce, and verification of compliance vary according to which schedule covers the specific  
 chemical.  This article concentrates on the provisions relevant to Schedule 1, the most salient 
 problem.  See generally, CWC, supra note __, Annex on Chemicals.  See also Ralf Trapp, 
 Advances in Science and Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 38 Arms Control 
 Today No. 2, March 2008. 
27      CWC, supra note __, arts. I.5, II.7.  See also Kyle M. Ballard, Convention in Peril? Riot 
Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Ban, 37 Arms Control Today No. 7, September 2007. 
28      CWC, supra note __, arts. I.3, II.5, II.6, and Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part 
IV(B).  See John Hart, Looking Back: The Continuing Legacy of Old and Abandoned Chemical 
Weapons, 38 Arms Control Today No. 2, March 2008; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, 
Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 
2010, C-16/4, November 30, 2011, para. 1.14 (noting that ten countries reported new discoveries 
of old or abandoned CW during 2010.) 
29      CWC, supra note __, arts. I.4 and V. 
30      CWC, supra note, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.B, VII.C, and VIII.C. 
31      “We Cannot Rest Until We Destroy All Chemical Arms,” Secretary-General Tells Meeting of 
States Parties to Chemical Weapons Convention, UN Department of Public Information, 
SG/SM/13974, DC/3316, November 28, 2011.  See also OPCW, Conference of the States 
Parties, Note by the Technical Secretariat, Review of the Operation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Since the First Review Conference, RC-2/S/1, March 31, 2008, para 2.1 (noting that 
the CWC “is widely appreciated as a unique multilateral agreement that, alone among treaties of 
a similar nature, effectively bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, for all 
countries and in a non-discriminatory fashion and under strict international control.”) 
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 In support of those aspirations, the CWC creates an implementing body, 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),32 sitting in 
The Hague and consisting of a Conference of the States Parties (comprising all 
treaty members),33 an Executive Council (composed of 41 member states)34 and 
a Technical Secretariat (the professional staff, headed by a Director-General).35  
The organization’s 2012 budget is approximately 70.6 million Euros (about $93 
million).36 
 
 Adjunct to the basic bans on production, stockpiling, and use of CW, the 
treaty also requires each party to destroy all the chemical weapons it owns or 
possesses or that are located at any place within its jurisdiction or control,37 and 
to do so “in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of 
chemical weapons.”38  The CWC further specifies an “agreed rate and sequence 
of destruction,” known as the “order of destruction.”39  Specifically, each party is 
obligated: 
                                            
32      CWC, supra note __, art. VIII; OPCW Basic Facts, supra note __. 
33      CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. B.  The Conference of the States Parties is the “principal 
organ” of the OPCW, authorized to consider any questions and to make recommendations and 
decisions on all matters related to the CWC, including setting the budget, selecting members of 
the Executive Council, appointing the Director-General, and taking “the necessary measures to 
ensure compliance” with the Convention.  Id. at article VIII.19, 21. 
34      CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. C.  The Executive Council is the “executive organ” of the 
OPCW; it is to “promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with,” the Convention.  
Id. at article VIII.31. 
35      CWC, supra note __, art. VIII. D.  The Technical Secretariat assists the other OPCW organs 
in carrying out their functions, by preparing draft budgets, programs and reports, and conducts 
the Convention’s verification measures.  Id. at article VIII.37, 38. 
36      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Programme and Budget of the OPCW 
for 2012, C-16/DEC.12, December 2, 2011.  The approved 2012 figure (EUR 70,561,800) 
represents a 5.4 percent decrease from the 2011 budget.  Id. at Annex p. 9.  See also OPCW 
Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 2012, p. 10. 
37      CWC, supra note __, art. I.1.2. 
38      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.12. 
39      CWC, supra note __, art. IV.6. 
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 -to commence destruction operations within two years after the treaty 
enters into force for it;40 
 -to submit detailed annual plans for the destruction process;41 
 -to destroy not less than one percent of its chemical weapons within three 
years after entry into force;42 
 -to destroy not less than 20 percent of the inventory within five years;43 
 -to destroy not less than 45 percent within seven years;44 and  
 -to destroy all its chemical weapons not later than ten years after entry into 
force.45 
 
 If a party, “due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control,”46 will be 
unable to achieve any of these benchmarks in the order of destruction, it may 
propose a modification of the timetable.  In the extreme case, a party may submit 
to the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties a request for 
an extension of the ten-year completion requirement, but “in no case shall the 
deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be 
extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention.”47  The 
CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997, so that ultimate, non-renewable 
deadline for the destruction of all CW was April 29, 2012. 
 
                                            
40      CWC, supra note __, art. IV.6. 
41      CWC, supra note __, art. IV.7. 
42      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(i). 
43      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(ii). 
44      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(iii). 
45      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.17(a)(iv). 
46      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.21. 
47      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26. 
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 The request for an extension is to include: the duration of the proposed 
continuance, a “detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension,” 
and the party’s detailed plan for pursuing the destruction operations.48  In 
granting a prolongation, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States 
Parties may set conditions, including specifying additional verification measures; 
the party is to meet the costs of verification during the extension period.49 
 
 The treaty leaves to each party the determination of what mechanism or 
technique to employ for destroying its CW inventory,50 subject to the conditions 
that: a) each “shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people 
and to protecting the environment”;51 b) each will avoid the simple but intolerable 
precedents of ocean dumping, land burial, or open-pit burning of the detritus;52 c) 
each shall bear the costs of its destruction process;53 and d) the entire operation 
must be undertaken in a transparent fashion, accessible to the international 
inspectorate.54 
 
                                            
48      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.25.  A detailed 
annual plan for destruction is to include: the quantity of each type of chemical weapon to be 
destroyed at each destruction facility and the dates of operation; a detailed site diagram of each 
facility; and a schedule of activities at each facility, including design, construction, installation of 
equipment, operator training, scheduled periods of inactivity, etc.  Id. at C.29. 
49      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26. 
50      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.13. 
51      CWC, supra note __, art. IV.10.  Similar provisions, requiring parties to assign the highest 
priority to ensuring the safety of people and protecting the environment, are included in articles 
V.11 and VII.3.  Notably, both art. IV.10 and art. V.11 specify that the destruction operations shall 
be conducted “in accordance with [the party’s] national standards for safety and emissions.” 
52      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.13. 
53      CWC, supra note __, art. IV.16. 
54      CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).D. 
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 Unsurprisingly, a treaty of this ambitious scope and prominence – despite 
its bipartisan origins -- attracted considerable political controversy in the United 
States and elsewhere.55  The U.S. Senate pondered its advice and consent to 
ratification of the CWC for four years, ultimately endorsing the instrument on April 
24, 1997,56 subject to 28 conditions.  These provisos addressed issues such as 
mandatory detailed reporting to Congress about other parties’ compliance with 
the treaty; enhancement of U.S. chemical defenses; and the level of dues and 
other voluntary contributions to the OPCW that the United States would pay.57  
But none of the Senate’s expressed limitations concerned the obligation for 
destruction or the accompanying timetable – on that point, at least, there was a 
clear consensus both within the United States and internationally.58 The treaty 
                                            
55      Report 104-33, supra note __, at 173 (discussing issues addressed in the CWC ratification 
debate).  See Thomas Moore, Six Faulty Reasons for Supporting the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, April 23, 1997; Kathleen C. Bailey, Problems 
with the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (eds.), Shadows and 
Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993, p. 17.  The Convention had been 
negotiated and signed under President George H.W. Bush; President Bill Clinton won the advice 
and consent of the Senate and ratified the Convention. 
56      United States Senate Conditions to Ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, S. 
75, 105th Congress (1997).  In addition, the CWC implementing legislation, contained in the 
Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Public Law 
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, October 21, 1998, provides the authority for domestic implementation of 
the CWC’s provisions. 
57      Resolution of advice and consent, supra note __, condition 10 (“Monitoring and verification 
of compliance”), condition 11 (“Enhancements to robust chemical and biological defenses”), and 
condition 22 (“Limitations on the scale of assessment”). 
58      See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 186 (noting that “The administration anticipates that 
the United States will be able to meet the 2004 deadline, provided that environmental issues can 
be resolved in a ‘timely manner.’”), 187 (“the present program can ensure environmentally safe 
destruction within the 10-year timeline of the [Convention.]”), 189 (discussing the possibility that if 
the United States became unable to destroy the stockpile within 10 years, it would be possible to 
seek a 5-year extension, but cautioning that “Any delay on the part of the United States would 
probably result in an equal or greater delay on the part of Russia….In addition, in the eyes of 
many, the status of the United States as a major proponent of the Convention and arguably the 
most technologically advanced Nation places a greater responsibility on its adherence to 
Convention provisions.”), and 227 (concluding “Meeting the destruction schedule laid out in the 
CWC will be a major challenge.  Important political, environmental, and economic barriers lie 
ahead.  If the destruction effort does not keep pace with implementation of other provisions of the 
CWC, however, the credibility of the entire Convention will be undermined.”)  
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entered into force for the United States (and simultaneously for all the other 
original parties) on April 29, 1997.59 
 
 Finally, it must be noted that even a comprehensive, near-universal treaty 
cannot by itself irrevocably solve the problem of CW.  Indeed, rumors and 
allegations persist of covert evasions, attempts to sneak something past the 
OPCW inspectorate, or sputtering intentions to sustain a clandestine military CW 
program on behalf of renegade countries.60  The United States has publicly 
charged China, Iran, Russia and Sudan with violating the CWC,61 and similar 
                                                                                                                                  
The Senate did attach conditions that required the president to explore “alternative 
technologies” for the destruction of U.S. CW, “in order to ensure that the United States has the 
safest, most effective and environmentally sound plans and programs for meeting its obligations” 
and to consult with Congress about whether to submit a request to the OPCW Executive Council 
for an extension of the deadline for destroying the CW stocks, if “the President determines that 
alternatives to the incineration of chemical weapons are available that are safer and more 
environmentally sound but whose use would preclude the United States from meeting the 
deadlines of the Convention.”  Resolution of advice and consent, supra note __, condition 27.  
That condition also extended until April 29, 2007, the prior 2004 statutory deadline (established 
by the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1986, Public Law 99-145, sec. 1412, 99 Stat. 
583, 50 U.S.C. 1521) for destroying U.S. CW.  Condition 27 (B).  




er%5D=0.  The treaty entered into force for Russia on May 12, 1997.  Id. 
60      U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, July 2010 [hereinafter, State 
Compliance Report], p. 37 (general), 43 (China), 45 (Iran), 50 (Russia); U.S. Department of State, 
Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2010; 
U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011; Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements, supra note __ 
(reporting that in 1994, “[t]he number of countries suspected of having or developing [chemical] 
weapons has increased to 24.”); Jonathan B. Tucker, The Future of Chemical Weapons, New 
Atlantis, Fall 2009/Winter 2010, p. 3. 
61     Jonathan B. Tucker, Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements, 37 Arms 
Control Today No. 1, January/February 2007; Stephen G. Rademaker, “National Statement to the 
First Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” April 28, 2003, 
http://www.cwc.gov/outreach_industry_speeches_004.html; U.S. Department of State, Adherence 
to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and 
Commitments, August 2005, p. 50-62. 
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apprehensions have been raised regarding CWC non-parties North Korea and 
Syria.62 
 
Additionally, the threats of non-state actors – terrorist groups from Aum 
Shinrikyo63 (the Japanese cult that unleashed sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo 
subway in 1995, killing 12 and injuring scores more) to al Qaeda64 – were not at 
the forefront of the CWC negotiators’ minds, but have come to loom large in 
evaluating CW dangers and the treaty today.65  Chemical (and biological) 
                                            
62     Global Security Newswire, U.N. to Investigate North Korean Attempt to Export Reagents to 
Syria, January 6, 2012; Joby Warrick, Syrian Unrest Raises Fears About Chemical Arsenal, 
Washington Post, August 28, 2011; Major Ground Force Likely Needed to Guard Syrian 
Chemical Arms: Pentagon, Global Security Newswire, February 23, 2012 (U.S. Department of 
Defense estimates Syria has 50 CW manufacturing and storage facilities).  Syria’s CW arsenal 
became a special concern in the spring of 2012, as the ongoing insurgency there raised 
apprehension that a sudden collapse of the government might leave a substantial quantity of 
weaponized CW vulnerable to theft or seizure by terrorists.  Joby Warrick, U.S., Allies 
Accelerating Plans to Secure Chemical Arsenal as Syrian Crisis Worsens, Washington Post, May 
19, 2012; Global Security Newswire, Syrian Resistance Develops Plan to Protect Chemical 
Arsenal: Report, May 29, 2012. 
63     Richard Danzig, et.al., Aum Shinrikyo: Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and 
Chemical Weapons, Center for a New American Security, July 2011 (describing Aum Shinrikyo’s 
program for developing a CW capability); Martin Martishak, Report: Cult Demonstrates Chemical 
Terrorism Threat, Global Security Newswire, July 29, 2011 (concluding that CW is a more viable 
and accessible option than biological weapons for terrorists). 
64     Global Security Newswire, Al-Qaeda Magazine Urges Chemical, Biological Strikes Against 
Foes, May 3, 2012 (describing recent article by the Yemen affiliate of al-Qaeda, recommending 
the use of chemical and biological weapons for the mass killing of nonbelievers); Rolf Mowatt-
Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction  Threat: Hype or Reality? Belfer Center, 
January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf (arguing that the 
al Qaeda leadership is more interested in acquiring nuclear or biological weapons, leaving 
chemical weapons to the initiative of individual cells; citing examples of prominent small-scale 
CW terrorist activities); Rene Pita, Assessing al Qaeda’s Chemical Threat, Athena Paper Vol. 2, 
No. 2, April 17, 2007; Chris Quillen, Three Explanations for al-Qaeda’s Lack of a CBRN Attack, 5 
Terrorism Monitor No. 3, February 21, 2007. 
65      U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, The Global 
Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, Country Reports on 
Terrorism 2010, August 18, 2011 (noting that “preventing chemical terrorism is particularly 
challenging”); Walker, supra note __ (noting that Iraqi insurgent forces have employed crude 
chemical weapons, by affixing improvised explosive devices to vehicles carrying tanks of chlorine 
gas); Report 104-33, supra note __, at 209-11 (assessing the CWC’s likely impact on anti-
terrorism efforts); Global Security Newswire, Israel Concerned Syrian Chemical Arms May Be 
Proliferating to Extremists, January 3, 2012; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraphs 114-
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weapons have frequently been referred to as “the poor man’s atomic bomb” -- 
but with the bonus factor of greater accessibility, since as many as 70 different 
compounds have been stockpiled as weapons by various countries.66  The allure 
of CW as an inexpensive, obtainable “equalizer” in international conflict has held 
a great appeal.67 
 
Section 2:  The U.S. Chemical Weapons Program 
 Just as American weaponeers have pursued virtually every other form of 
possible military advantage over the years, so, too, did they explore the realm of 
chemistry for hostile applications.  Before and during World War II, the United 
States manufactured untold quantities of varying chemical concoctions, which it 
thankfully never applied in combat.68  After the war, batches of the excess 
chemicals were unceremoniously disposed of (often via insanely hazardous 
techniques such as dumping in shallow waters or burial in unmarked trenches),69 
                                                                                                                                  
117; Jonathan B. Tucker, The Future of Chemical Weapons, New Atlantis, Fall 2009/Winter 2010, 
p. 3. 
66      Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
2009, p. 80. 
67     Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., CBW: The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb, 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, National Security Paper 1, February 1984. 
68      In 1943, President Roosevelt, speaking about chemical weapons, declared, “I have been 
loath to believe that any nation, even our present enemies, would or would be willing to loose 
upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons…Use of such weapons has been outlawed 
by the general opinion of civilized mankind.  This country has not used them.  I state categorically 
that we shall in no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by 
our enemies.”  Quoted in Leonard A. Cole, Clouds of Secrecy: The Army’s Germ Warfare Tests 
Over Populated Areas, 1990, p. 12. 
69      U.S. Centers for Disease Control, History of U.S. Chemical Weapons Elimination, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/demil/history.htm (noting Operation CHASE (an acronym for “Cut Holes 
And Sink ‘Em,” a 1960s program for loading unwanted CW onto obsolete ships which were then 
scuttled). 
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but an enduring inventory of nearly 30,000 metric tonnes of lethal chemicals was 
retained, and research persisted on new and better agents.70 
 
 By 1993, the stockpile consisted of some 3.3 million chemical weapons of 
three general types: a) rockets, land mines, projectiles, and cartridges, equipped 
with “energetic” components such as fuzes, propellants, or bursters; b) bombs, 
which lack energetics; and c) bulk storage drums, especially ton containers and 
spray tanks.71  The two major categories of lethal CW are nerve agents 
(denominated GA or tabun, GB or sarin, and VX), which are colorless, odorless, 
and tasteless organophosphorus compounds that attack the central nervous 
system, with even a tiny amount proving lethal; and vesicant or blister agents 
(including mustard gas and lewisite), which kill via inhalation or infiltration through 
exposed skin.72 
 
 These apocalyptic devices and materials were stored at nine star-crossed 
locations: Aberdeen, Maryland; Lexington, Kentucky; Newport, Indiana; Anniston, 
                                            
70      CDC, supra note __.   
 Measurements of the quantities of chemical weapons are expressed inconsistently – 
sometimes in metric tonnes (1000 kg or approximately 2200 pounds) and sometimes in tons 
(2000 pounds).  For example, in many sources, the original U.S. CW inventory is stated as 
containing approximately 31,500 tons of agent.  Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Chemical Weapons: Better 
Management Tools Needed to Guide DOD’s Stockpile Destruction Program, General Accounting 
Office, GAO-04-221T, October 30, 2003, p. 1. 
71      United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, Chemical 
Weapons and Materiel: Key Factors Affecting Disposal Costs and Schedule, GAO/NSIAD-97-18, 
February 1997 [hereinafter, Key Factors], p. 25. 
72      Claudine McCarthy and Julie Fischer, Inching Away From Armageddon: Destroying the U.S. 
Chemical Weapons Stockpile, Henry L. Stimson Center report, April 2004, p. 21-30; Report 104-
33, supra note __, at 167-69 (describing the various chemical weapons, their destructive effects, 
and their utility); FAS, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, and Types of Chemical Weapons, 
supra note __; Noyes, supra note __, p. 2 (noting that 3000 chemicals have been studied for use 
as possible CW agents; 45 have seen widespread application in combat; and about a dozen have 
been used in quantity.) 
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Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Pueblo, Colorado; Tooele, Utah; Umatilla, 
Oregon; and Johnston Atoll in the Pacific.73  Most of the ordnance remained in 
reasonably stable condition, but the United States had stopped producing new 
chemical weapons after 1969,74 so by 1993, the inventory was seriously aging, 
and deterioration of some of the components became inevitable.  Leakage, 
especially from the corroded 40-year old M55 rockets, became a recurrent 
problem.75   
 
 In addition to those components of the “active stockpile,” a vast quantity of 
abandoned and obsolete “non-stockpile materiel” must also be accounted for 
under the CWC.  Nobody really knows how much noxious chemical waste was 
inconspicuously dumped or buried over the decades, or where and when it might 
                                            
73      McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 3-19 (noting that each of the nine locations 
provides its own mixture of types of chemicals and containers: Aberdeen, for example, held only 
1625 tons of CW, almost all of it in the form of mustard agent in ton containers; Pine Bluff 
contained 3850 tons, including sarin in rockets, VX in rockets and land mines, and mustard in ton 
containers; Umatilla housed 3717 tons including sarin and VX in projectiles, rockets, bombs, land 
mines and spray tanks, as well as mustard in ton containers.) 
74      Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 185.  Between 1987 and 1990, the United States 
manufactured a small quantity of “binary” chemical weapons – devices in which two relatively 
less-toxic chemicals are produced and handled separately, and they are combined to create a 
lethal agent only when the shell or bomb is in flight en route to its target.  These weapons were all 
destroyed by 2007.  U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, Binary Chemical Weapons, 
http://www.cma.army.mil/completedmissions.aspx; FAS, Introduction to Chemical Weapons, 
supra note __. 
75      McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 33, 49-54 (listing dozens of incidents involving 
leaks, shutdowns and malfunctions at the CW storage and disposal sites); Global Security 
Newswire, Pueblo Chemical Neutralization Plant Almost Finished, September 28, 2011 (reporting 
101 documented instances of mustard agents leaks at the Pueblo arsenal alone); Amy E. 
Smithson, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and 
Recommendations, Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 13, September 1994, p. 15; U.S. 
Department of Defense, Annual Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile 
of Lethal Chemical Agents and Munitions for Fiscal Year 2011, September 30, 2011, p. 2, B-1 
(noting five leaking CW munitions discovered in 2011; listing 5,183 incidents since 1980); Noyes, 
supra note __, p. 31-34 (discussing leaks, especially from M55 rockets).  See also Thousands of 
Sites Could Be Altered to Produce Chemical Weapons, Expert Says, Global Security Newswire, 
March 5, 2012 (noting that Russia, too, has experienced problems with leaking CW; in September 
2010 four people at the Kirov destruction facility exhibited symptoms of nerve gas poisoning.) 
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turn up – an Army survey in 1993 suggested that as many as 215 sites in 33 
states might contain hidden repositories.76  Some of the chemicals can retain 
their lethality for decades, so whenever a potential deposit is revealed by an 
unlucky construction crew’s backhoe, a farmer’s plow, or a fishing trawler’s net, 
emergency response teams must immediately don their HAZMAT gear for a 
delicate recovery and disposal operation.77 
 
 The United States, with the Army in the lead role, had initiated efforts to 
whittle down the CW arsenal in the 1970s, long before the CWC began to require 
it.  American authorities had already concluded that much of the weaponry was 
so unstable, so unusable on the battlefield, and so undesirable strategically that 
the United States should proceed with dismantling and destruction unilaterally, 
                                            
76      U.S. Army, Guide to Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel, October 2003; Walker, 
supra note __ (citing 224 burial sites in 38 states); National Research Council, Committee on 
Reivew of the Conduct of Operations for Remediation of Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel 
from Burial Sites, Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel, 2012 (considering 
approximately 250 sites in 40 states); Key Factors, supra note __, at 40-54 (describing issues 
affecting destruction of non-stockpile CW items); Milton E. Blackwood, Jr., Beyond the Chemical 
Weapons Stockpile: The Challenge of Non-Stockpile Materiel, 28 Arms Control Today No. 5, 
June/July 1998; U.S. Army, Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project, Guide to Non-Stockpile 
Chemical Warfare Materiel, October 2005. 
77      Walker, supra note __ (reporting that the most conspicuous such cleanup operation, in 
Spring Valley, an upscale section of Washington, D.C., near American University, has cost more 
than $250 million, recovering “dozens of buried chemical munitions, related toxic materials, and 
unexploded ordnance over the last 17 years, all dumped after World War I.”); H.Q. Le and S.J. 
Knudsen, Exposure to a First World War Blistering Agent, 23 Emergency Medicine Journal p. 
296, 2006 (reporting serious injury to a U.S. military male who had suffered a short, small 
exposure to decades-old mustard agent.) 
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independent of what other states might eventually do.78  In 1985, Congress 
mandated and funded the destruction operations.79 
 
Significant efforts to “neutralize” some of the toxins via chemical reactions 
were undertaken during the 1970s and 1980s, but these proved slow, expensive, 
and hazardous – and they generated even larger quantities of non-weaponized, 
but still parlous, byproducts.80    
 
 Attention next turned to incineration of the ordnance, and in the mid-1980s 
the Army undertook to construct a series of state-of-the-art combustion chambers 
at the nine sites where the weapons were housed.81  The first such facility, on 
                                            
78      McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, at 45, Report 104-33, supra note __, at 187 (noting a 
Congressional Research Service report that in the early 1980s, the U.S. Department of Defense 
had declared 90% of the U.S. CW stockpile to be obsolete); U.S. Army, Chemical Materials 
Agency, Fact Sheet: Milestones in U.S. Chemical Weapons Storage and Destruction, August 
2009.   
79     The National Defense Authorization Act for FY1986, H.R. 3616, Public Law 99-145, § 1412 
(a), 99 Stat. 583, 50 USC 1521, November 8, 1985; Report 104-33, supra note __, at 185. 
80      Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, National Research 
Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions, 1993, p. 
54-62 (noting that between 1973 and 1976, the Army destroyed nearly 4,200 tons of CW via 
chemical neutralization (also referred to as “hydrolysis”), but concluded that the process was too 
complex and too expensive, and produced too much hazardous waste); Key Factors, supra note 
__, at 11; CDC, supra note __, Methods Used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents; Thomas 
Stock, Chemical Weapon Destruction Technologies for the Russian CW Stockpile, in Hart and 
Miller, supra note __, at 75, 78-83 (identifying neutralization campaigns to destroy CW stocks); 
J.F. Bunnett, Some Problems in the Destruction of Chemical Munitions, and Recommendations 
Toward Their Amelioration, 67 Pure and Applied Chemistry No. 5, p. 841, 1995; U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-
BP-ISC-115, December 1993; Ronald Sutherland, The Destruction of Chemical Weapons and 
Chemical Weapons Production Facilities, in M. Bothe, N. Ronzitti and A. Rosas (eds.), The New 
Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation and Prospects, 1998, p. 185. 
81      Key Factors, supra note __, at 18 (reporting that the Army, based upon a 1984 study by the 
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, concluded that incineration was 
a more desirable mechanism for CW destruction, because neutralization was more expensive 
and produced larger quantities of toxic byproducts); CDC, supra note __, Incineration.  The 
incinerators burn the CW at 2700 degrees Fahrenheit, with additional treatment in a 2000 
degrees Fahrenheit afterburner, destroying 99.9999 percent of the agent.  OPCW Website, 
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Johnston Atoll, was erected in 1988 and began operating in 1990; larger versions 
were then to be erected at most of the stateside locations, beginning with Tooele, 
Utah, which retained the largest CW inventory.  Some 1436 tonnes of CW (5 
percent of the U.S. total) had already been destroyed in that fashion before the 
CWC entered into force in 1997.82  The original 1985 expectation was that the 
destruction process could be efficiently completed within nine years, at a cost of 
$1.7 billion.83  Although that initial time frame quickly became obsolete, U.S. 
government officials were again willing to stick out their collective necks on this 
point during the 1994 Senate ratification hearings for the Convention, saying, 
“We are confident that we can complete the destruction within the 10-year 
timeline of the CWC.”84 
                                                                                                                                  
Destruction Technologies, http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/destruction-
technologies/.  
82      Walker, supra note __. 
83      McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 39. 
84      Hearing 103-869, supra note __, p. 61 (statement of Harold P. Smith, Jr.), p. 66 (in 
response to questioning about whether the destruction could be completed within the allowed ten 
years, Smith responded, “Yes, sir, it can.  One can never predict the effects of obtaining permits, 
the effects of litigation, et cetera.  But if the program proceeds on the path that it is now 
embarked…we can, indeed, meet the timetable for the CWC.  It is technically well within our 
grasp.  Our planning and budgeting is realistic.”), 20 (statement of John D. Holum) (legislation 
could inhibit the process of destroying the CW, but “we have some cushion there.”) 
 Administration officials were less sanguine regarding Russia’s ability to complete the 
destruction process within ten years, even with U.S. assistance and advice.  Hearing 103-869, 
supra note __, at 37 (statement of Stephen Ledogar) (recounting that during the CWC 
negotiations, “the Russians noted there would be problems in meeting this deadline, making it 
difficult for the Russian federation to ratify.  Therefore, a compromise was struck, whereby the 
ten-year destruction period was retained, with extension an unlikely, but not entirely impossible 
event.”), 67 (statement of Walter B. Slocombe) (in addressing the likelihood of Russia meeting 
the Convention deadlines, “I do not say unequivocally that they can meet the deadline.  But it is a 
far more optimistic, realistic situation than people may have thought.”), p. 84 (statement of Donald 
Mahley) (“The official statements by the Russian federation to us, which we, of course, have no 
formal way to refute, indicate that they can, with the appropriate priorities and the appropriate 
resources, complete their destruction program within the 10-year period.”), p. 185 (questions for 
the record for Stephen Ledogar) (“We believe that despite the political and economic situation in 
Russia, there is sufficient administrative ability to get a CW destruction program functioning to 
meet the CWC’s destruction deadline, given U.S. financial and technical assistance.”)  See also 
Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 63 (CWC negotiators included the possible five-year 
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 Those sanguine projections, however, soon proved illusory.  Delays in 
obtaining the portfolio of required federal and state permits and in drafting and 
finalizing a series of programmatic and site-specific environmental impact 
statements led to slippage of the timetable.85  Those delays, in turn, drove 
inflation in the budget estimates, especially when coupled with the erratic 
adjustments compelled by the need to incorporate new features of the cutting-
edge destruction technologies.86  Whistle-blower charges of insufficient attention 
to safety threw further spotlight on the problem, as did occasional accidents in 
the construction and operations processes -- even while the continuing incidence 
of weapon leakage demonstrated that simply maintaining the status quo was not 
a viable course.87 
                                                                                                                                  
extension of the CW deadline in recognition of the special economic and other problems Russia 
was facing). 
85      See United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, 
Chemical Weapons: Sustained Leadership, Along with Key Strategic Management Tools, Is 
Needed to Guide DOD’s Destruction Program, GAO-03-1031, September 2003 [hereinafter, 
Sustained Leadership], p. 20 (destruction operations at several facilities were delayed due to 
environmental permitting issues, sometimes due to “unanticipated engineering changes related to 
reprogramming software and design changes that required permit modifications”); Key Factors, 
supra note __ (concluding that due to lack of consensus about the destruction method to use, the 
cost and schedule for the CW disposal program were uncertain.) 
86      One chronology of cost and time overruns in the CW destruction process charts the 
following coordinates relating the date that an official estimate was made, the projected cost (in 
billions of dollars), and the anticipated time of completion: 1985: $1.7, 1994; 1989: $3.0, 1997; 
1990: $3.4, 1997; 1992: $7.9, 2000; 1993: $8.6, 2003; 1994: $10.0, unspecified; 1995: $11.9, 
2004; 1996: $12.0, 2004; 1997: $12.4, 2004; 1998: $12.7, 2007; 2000: $15.3, 2007; 2001: $24.0, 
2011; 2002: $24.0, 2016; 2003: $25.1, 2007.  McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 39.  See 
also Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 10. 
87      See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 20 (CW destruction operations at the Tooele 
facility (the largest in the system) were suspended between July 2002 and March 2003 because 
of an incident involving a plant worker who accidentally came into contact with nerve agent while 
performing routine maintenance; even after a corrective action plan was instituted, several 
temporary shutdowns occurred); Chemical Weapons Convention (Treaty Doc. 103-21), Hearings 
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 103rd Congress, 2nd session, March-June 1994, 
S.Hrg. 103-869 [hereinafter, Hearing 103-869], p. 9 (statement of John D. Holum) (stating that the 
dangers of leakage and contamination from continuing to hold CW in storage outweigh any 
potential risks from destroying the weapons), 53 (statement of Walter B. Slocombe (risks of 
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Two crucial political decisions then intervened, further complicating and 
delaying the CW destruction process.  The first negated a plausible efficiency 
option, to concentrate the CW inventory into fewer locations, so fewer expensive 
new incinerators would have to be constructed.  The Army at one point had 
contemplated erecting only three stateside incinerators, in centralized sites, but 
Congress, responding to constituents’ NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) concerns 
about the safety and security of transporting the huge quantities of such lethal 
and sometimes fragile materials via truck or rail, forbade the executive branch 
from pursuing relocation options.88  This fateful decision, to construct multiple, 
arguably redundant facilities, in order to avoid hazardous interstate transfers of 
                                                                                                                                  
delaying the destruction of the aging stockpile are greater than the advantages of developing an 
alternative technology other than incineration).  See also Key Factors, supra note __, at 33-34 
(concluding that the CW stockpile would be basically stable through 2013); Hinton, supra note __, 
at 2 (judging that the U.S. CW demilitarization program “has suffered from several long-standing 
and unresolved leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issues.”)  See also several 
reports of conflicting episodes of high regard for safety – but also conspicuous violations of basic 
codes – at CW destruction facilities: U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, News Release: Pine 
Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Achieves Safety Milestone – 1,000,000 Safe Work Hours 
without a Recordable Injury, July 17, 2009; Utah Chemical Depot Clinic Wins Safety Award, Salt 
Lake Tribune, January 26, 2011; Global Security Newswire, Umitilla Contractor Fined Over Nerve 
Agent Monitoring, July 25, 2011; URS Fined for Violations at Umatilla Chemical Depot, Tri-City 
Herald, November 30, 2010; Global Security Newswire, Anniston Chemical Weapons Disposal 
Plant Operator Fined, September 15, 2010; Global Security Newswire, Umatilla Contractor Fined 
Over Permit Breaches, February 2, 2012. 
88      National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995, Public Law 103-337, sec. 143, 108 Stat. 
2663 (1994), 50 U.S.C.A. 1512a (prohibiting transport of a chemical weapon outside the state in 
which it was located on October 5, 1994); Key Factors, supra note __, at 11, 35-36; Amy E. 
Smithson, The U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and 
Recommendations, Henry L. Stimson Center Report No. 13, September 1994; John Norton, 
Pueblo’s Chem Demil Program Hits $3.6 Billion and Rising, Pueblo Chieftain, April 3, 2012.  By 
2010, the Department of Defense concluded that transportation of the remaining CW stockpiles to 
existing incineration sites (instead of proceeding with construction of two neutralization facilities) 
was “the only option with any reasonable probability of success” to achieve the destruction of the 
stockpile by 2017, “however, this option is currently precluded by law.”  U.S. Department of 
Defense, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Chemical 
Demilitarization Program, Semi-Annual Report to Congress, September 2010. 
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the noxious products, eventually came to carry momentous, irreversible 
implications for the overall destruction timetable. 
  
 Second, simultaneously, some of the communities surrounding the eight 
continental U.S. CW storage sites became especially interested in alternative 
technologies, demanding consideration of options other than incineration, to seek 
mechanisms that would not emit even the tiniest quantities of hazardous 
byproducts from a smokestack.89  The Army, relying upon determinations by the 
National Academy of Sciences that incineration was a fully safe mechanism,90 
                                            
89      Committee on Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies, National Research 
Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and Munitions, 1993; 
Robert F. Durant, The Greening of the U.S. Military: Environmental Policy, National Security and 
Organizational Change, 2007, p. 179-83; Alfred Picardi, Paul Johnston and Ruth Stringer, 
Alternative Technologies for the Detoxification of Chemical Weapons: An Information Document, 
Greenpeace, May 24, 1991; Citizens’ Solution for Safe Chemical Weapons Disposal, Chemical 
Weapons Working Group, April 29, 2007, www.cwwg.org/citsol.07.html; Greenpeace Report 
Finds Serious Health Hazards Linked to Waste Incinerators, www.cwwg.org/gppr.html, Triana 
Silton, Out of the Frying Pan…Chemical Weapons Incineration in the United States, 23 The 
Ecologist No. 1, January/February 1993, p. 18; U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
Background Paper, Disposal of Chemical Weapons: Alternative Technologies, OTA-BP-O-95, 
June 1992; Pat Costner, Chemical Weapons Demilitarization and Disposal: Johnston Atoll 
Chemical Disposal System, GB and VX Campaigns, Greenpeace, May 12, 1993. 
90      National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Disposal of Chemical Munitions 





d%20agents%22%201984&f=false.  See also National Academy of Sciences, National Research 
Council, Evaluation of Chemical Events at Army Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities, 2002, 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10574&page=2; National Academy of Sciences, 
National Research Council, Alternative Technologies for the Destruction of Chemical Agents and 
Munitions, 1993, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2218&page=1; National Academy 
of Sciences, National Research Council, Recommendations for the Disposal of Chemical Agents 
and Munitions, 1994, http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=2348&page=2; National 
Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Review and Evaluation of Alternative 
Technologies for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons, 1999, 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=9660&page=1; Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 
186-87; CDC, supra note __, fact sheets on Incineration, Incinerator Air Emissions – Inhalation 
Exposure Perspectives, and Safe Disposal of Chemical Weapons; Amy E. Smithson, The U.S. 
Chemical Weapons Destruction Program: Views, Analysis, and Recommendations, Henry L. 
Stimson Center Report No. 13, September 1994. 
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resisted.  Again, Congress waded into the fray, mandating non-incineration 
methods at two of the locations housing the smallest inventories (Lexington and 
Pueblo),91 despite the fact that no chemical neutralization or other alternatives 
had been demonstrated to be safe, effective and affordable on anything like the 
requisite scale and cadence of the treaty-required operations.92 
 
                                            
91      In a series of enactments, Congress directed the U.S. Army to pursue alternatives to 
incineration.  First, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Public 
Law 100-180, 101 Stat. 1019, sec. 125, December 4, 1987, required the Department of Defense 
to evaluate non-incineration technologies and present to Congress “an alternative concept plan” 
by March 15, 1998.  Then, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Public 
Law 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315, sec. 173-75, October 23, 1992, required additional study of 
alternatives to incineration.  Next, the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 
1997, Public Law 104-201, 110 Stat. 2422, October 1996, sec. 142, required further study and 
demonstration of alternatives.  Then, the 1997 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Public 
Law 104-208, sec. 8065, required pilot funding for two non-incineration alternatives.  The Strom 
Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999, Public Law 105-261, sec. 142, 
reorganized the Army’s chemical demilitarization apparatus and underscored the pursuit of 
alternatives to incineration.  The Military Construction Appropriations Act of 2000, Public Law 
106-52, sec. 131 and the Fiscal Year 2000 Supplemental Appropriations, Public Law 106-246, 
114 Stat. 511 (2000), prohibited construction of any CW destruction facility at Lexington until six 
different alternatives to incineration were demonstrated.  The Floyd D. Spence National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2001, Public Law 106-398, sec. 151, limited the operations at Pueblo to 
incineration and the alternative technologies that had been demonstrated by May 1, 2000.  
 The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008, Public Law 110-116, sec. 8119, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Public Law 110-181, sec. 922, and the Ike 
Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011, Public Law 112-383, sec. 1421 all 
directed the Department of Defense to destroy all U.S. CW by the deadline established by the 
CWC, or in no circumstances later than December 31, 2017. 
In 1994, the Army decided to use nonincineration technologies at Aberdeen and Newport, 
because each of those sites housed only a single chemical agent, stored only in ton containers, 
making the demilitarization process simpler.  In 1997, pilot testing of neutralization technology 
was approved for those two facilities.  Sustained Leadership, supra note __, at 5; Durant, supra 
note __, at 182. 
92      Noyes, supra note __, p. 40 (reporting that the National Academy of Sciences had 
concluded in 1984 that neutralization processes would be more expensive and generate large 
quantities of toxic wastes), p. 58-70 (critically assessing other alternative technologies); Key 
Factors, supra note __, at 35 (concluding that “alternative technologies may not reduce costs or 
shorten disposal operations”). 
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 Eventually, a patchwork of five incinerators (at Johnston, Tooele, Umatilla, 
Anniston, and Pine Bluff) and four neutralization facilities (at Newport, Aberdeen, 
Pueblo, and Lexington) was created.93 
 
 The United States succeeded in meeting its initial CWC deadlines, 
destroying one percent of the CW inventory by September 1997 and 20 percent 
by July 2001.94  In October 2003, the United States solicited and received a 
three-year extension of the original April 2004 deadline for destroying 45 percent 
of the stocks.95   
 
By 2003, it had also become abundantly clear that the mandate to 
eliminate the entire CW legacy by the 10-year point – April 2007 – could not be 
satisfied, and concerns were rising about the program’s compatibility with even a 
2012 target.96  The United States therefore took advantage of the CWC 
procedure to request the single allowable five-year extension of the original 
                                            
93      Walker, supra note __; Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, fact sheets on 
Hydrolysate Overview, Neutralization Followed by Supercritical Water Oxidation, and Chemical 
Weapons Destruction at Blue Grass (describing the destruction technology to be used in 
Kentucky).   
At each site, some “reject” weapons are destroyed using alternative technologies, such 
as the Detonation of Ammunition in a Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH), an explosive 
mechanism applicable to units that have leaked, are unstable, contain solidified residues, or are 
otherwise unsuitable for routine processing. U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons 
Alternatives, Information Sheet: DAVINCH Overview, December 2009, 
https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/DAVINCH_fact_sheet.pdf.  
94      Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 6; Statement by U.S. Ambassador Robert P. 
Mikulak at the 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, OPCW, C-16/NAT.31, 
November 29, 2011 [hereinafter, Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement], p. 1 (the United States 
also met the treaty deadline for destroying all of its prior CW production facilities). 
95      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final 
Deadlines for the Destruction by the United States of America of Its Category 1 Chemical 
Weapons, C-8/DEC.15, October 24, 2003 
96      Hinton, supra note __, at 2, 7-8.  See also Semi-Annual Report, supra note __, at 4 (noting 
2008 assessments of options for destruction). 
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milestone.97  Pursuant to a recommendation from the OPCW Executive Council, 
the Conference of the States Parties granted the request on December 8, 2006, 
fixing the firm final date for completion of the destruction as April 29, 2012.98 
 
 Even that 2006 extension was addressed with tongues firmly planted in 
cheeks: the United States estimated, and the other CWC states heard, that only 
about 2/3 of the existing American CW inventory would, in fact, be destroyed by 
April 29, 2012.99  In a series of presentations over the succeeding years, the 
United States made clear (typically in “informal,” but quite authoritative, 
statements) that it was not on a pathway that would get close to full, timely 
compliance with the treaty’s basic obligation.100 
 
 In an unusual bit of good news since 2007, a variety of corrective 
measures (based on “learning the lessons” from the initial incinerator 
experiences, adopting risk mitigation efforts, and providing additional financial 
                                            
97      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Extension of the Intermediate and Final 
Deadlines for the Destruction by the United States of America of Its Category 1 Chemical 
Weapons, C-8/DEC.15, October 24, 2003; Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its Activities in the Period from 2 July 
2005 to 7 July 2006, EC-47/3, C-11/2, November 8, 2006, para. 2.17. 
98      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision, C-11/DEC.17, December 8, 2006. 
99     Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 
65th Session of the Executive Council, EC-65/NAT.8, July 12, 2011, [hereinafter, Mikulak July 12, 
2011 Statement]; Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Miss Chemical Weapons Disposal Deadline, Army Times, 
April 13, 2006. 
100      See, e.g., Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 1, 5; Statement by 
Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 64th Session of the 
Executive Council, EC-64/NAT.5, May 3, 2011, p. 1; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. 
Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 63rd Session of the Executive Council, 
EC-63/NAT.16, February 15, 2011, p. 1; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United 
States Delegation to the OPCW at the 15th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-
15/NAT.3, November 29, 2010, p. 4; Statement by Andrew C. Weber, U.S. Delegation to the 
OPCW, at the 14th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-14/NAT.7, November 30, 
2009, p. 5. 
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performance incentives to the construction and operations companies) produced 
a significant acceleration in the destruction timetable.101  Exploiting those 
benefits, a major milestone was reached on January 21, 2012: the incineration of 
the last CW munition stored at the Tooele site.  With that accomplishment, all five 
of the incineration sites and the first two of the neutralization sites had finished 
their demilitarization work, totaling almost 90 percent of the U.S. treaty-required 
destruction; only the last two alternative technology sites now linger past the 
treaty deadline.102   
 
But those two locations will be drawn much further “to the right” on the 
timeline: Pueblo, which contained 8.5 percent of the original U.S. inventory 
(some 2371 tonnes of mustard variants HD and HT in 4.2 inch mortars, 105mm 
projectiles and 155mm projectiles) will commence operations in 2015 and finish 
in 2019.  Lexington, which is home to 1.7 percent of the original stockpile (475 
                                            
101      Among the tactics adopted to accelerate the timetable have been recruiting experienced 
operators from the sites that have completed operations, to retain their expertise; using small-
scale systems (such as mobile explosive chambers) to destroy individual munitions that are in 
such weakened or deteriorating condition that standardized handling operations would be 
hazardous; off-site treatment or disposal of energetics, contaminated wastes and filters; and 
development of improved systems to lessen the impact of mercury contamination from certain 
weapons. 
102      U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, CMA News, February 2012; U.S. Army Element, 
Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, Information sheet, Quick Facts: ACWA Program 
Certification 2011 [hereinafter, Quick Facts].  Cleanup work, such as destroying the infrastructure 
of the incineration facility, including the incinerator itself, will continue for some additional years at 
each site, even after the CW stocks are eliminated. 
 Pursuant to statute, the executive branch reports frequently to Congress regarding 
progress in CW demilitarization.  The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008, Public 
Law 110-116, sec. 8119; the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Public Law 110-
181, sec. 922 (c).  See Semi-Annual Report, supra note __.  The United States also provides 
regular reports to the OPCW and its subsidiary bodies.  See Mikulak November 29, 2011 
Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (noting the pattern of reporting every 90 days on progress); 
Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Note by the Director-General, 
Status Report on the Progress Made by Those States Parties That Have Been Granted 
Extensions of Deadlines for the Destruction of Their Chemical Weapons, EC-58/DG.11, October 
7, 2009. 
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tonnes of agents GB, VX and H in M55/56 rockets, 155mm projectiles, and 8 inch 
projectiles) will begin destruction operations in 2020 and not finish until late 
2023.103  Thus, even with an expenditure now pegged at over $38 billion, the 
United States is not projected to complete the task of destroying all its CW until 
the fourth quarter of 2023, more than 11½ years after the treaty’s absolute 
deadline.104 
 
Multiple factors account for the protracted delays.  First, the job itself is 
simply very difficult and complex.  The weapons are old and extremely 
                                            
103      U.S. Army Element, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, News Release, 
Department of Defense Approves New Cost and Schedule Estimates for Chemical Weapons 
Destruction Plants, April 17, 2012 [hereinafter, New Cost Estimates]; Global Security Newswire, 
Pentagon Pushes Back Chemical Weapons Disposal Schedule, April 17, 2012; Quick Facts, 
supra note __; Kentucky Chemical Weapons Disposal Facility Half Finished, Global Security 
Newswire, May 22, 2012 (construction of the CW destruction plant is slightly more than 50 
percent complete; four of the 11 major technical systems are still being built or undergoing trials). 
 Note that this schedule also introduces two “gap” periods, when the United States will not 
be undertaking any ongoing CW destruction operations at all, despite being in violation of the 
CWC: from the conclusion of the incineration operations (January 2012) until the start of 
neutralization operations at Pueblo (2015) and from the conclusion of operations at Pueblo (2019) 
to the beginning of operations at Lexington (2020).  These gaps do not legally worsen the treaty 
breach, but they do look bad to the international community, aggravating the adverse political 
impression.  See Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the 
OPCW at the 69th Session of the Executive Council, EC-69/NAT.15, July 11, 2012, p. 1 
(characterizing the U.S. CW “destruction” program as currently being a “construction” program, 
because the United States is building, but not yet operating, new facilities).  
104      Chris Schneidmiller, U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Slippage “No Surprise,” Expert 
Says, Global Security Newswire, April 18, 2012 (noting that the United States has spent or 
committed $28 billion for the destruction of CW at the first several sites, and expects to spend an 
additional $10.6 billion for operations at the final two locations); Mikulak November 29, 2011 
speech, supra note __, p. 2 ($23.7 billion spent so far); Quick Facts, supra note __; Ahmet 
Uzumcu, address to 15th Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow, United 
Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 2 (noting a September 2023 projected completion date). 
Note that not only is there a mismatch between the U.S. destruction program and the 
CWC, there is a similar disconnect between the reality of the program’s timetable and the 
applicable U.S. statutory law.  Congress has not yet adjusted the legislated 2017 date for 100 
percent completion of the destruction program, even while approving Army plans that are 
considerably in excess of that date.  The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2008, 
Public Law 110-116, sec. 8119, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008, Public Law 
110-181, sec. 922, and the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2011, Public 
Law 112-383, sec. 1421 all directed the Department of Defense to destroy all U.S. CW by the 
deadline established by the CWC, or in no circumstances later than December 31, 2017. 
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hazardous (both because of the toxic chemicals themselves, and because of the 
explosives in most units); some of them are quite fragile, corroded or already 
leaking; and in some instances, the liquid chemical has partially solidified into 
congealed “heels” that resist ordinary treatment algorithms.  The disassembly 
and destruction processes must be conducted under rigidly controlled conditions 
in a hermitically sealed environment, to preempt any unwarranted excursions by 
lethal agents.  The various destruction technologies are all novel, not previously 
proven (or even invented) and few firms are qualified to undertake the massive 
design, construction and operation requirements.  In many instances, there is 
simply no way to “bake this cake faster,” because the construction of the 
necessary facilities is an intricate, multi-step process, and is followed by a 
lengthy “systemization” phase, involving the progressive testing of all 
components, systems and subsystems and a working demonstration that the 
plant and its personnel are ready to commence agent operations.105 
 
Of special interest, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 also imposed unforeseen 
disruptions on the CW demilitarization effort.  Previously, factors such as the type 
of weapons, the size of each local stockpile, and the difficulty of the particular 
destruction operation had been the principal drivers in determining the priority of 
operations among the various sites and within each site.  After 9/11, however, 
the assessed vulnerability to terrorist attack or seizure also became an overriding 
consideration, triggering a significant reallocation of resources toward the 
relatively small inventories housed at Aberdeen and Newport.  There, bulk 
                                            
105      See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 30 (describing the systemization process). 
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mustard agent was held in voluminous container tanks, which were judged to be 
at greater risk than the warheads or artillery projectiles stored elsewhere.  
Responding well to that increased sense of urgency, the program succeeded in 
eliminating those two repositories relatively quickly (almost two years ahead of 
the original schedule, in the case of Aberdeen106), but the sudden reorientation of 
the planned sequence imposed some costs and delays.107 
 
Moreover, the U.S. CW destruction program did itself no favor by creating, 
and too-frequently revising, a rickety bureaucratic apparatus that provided 
inconsistent oversight, poor coordination, and unclear goals, seriously 
undercutting performance.  The U.S. General Accounting Office (now the 
Government Accountability Office) has issued dozens of reports on various 
aspects of the CW program, concluding as early as May 2000 that “Effective 
management of the Chemical Demilitarization Program has been hindered by its 
complex management structure and ineffective coordination among program 
offices and with state and local officials.”108  The GAO amplified that judgment in 
2003, scolding that “the program remains in turmoil, affecting management 
performance because of long-standing and unresolved leadership, 
organizational, and strategic planning issues.”109   
                                            
106     McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, p. 4. 
107     Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 5, 22-23. 
108     U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Weapons Disposal: Improvements Needed in 
Program Accountability and Financial Management, Report to Congressional Committees, May 
2000, GAO/NSIAD-oo-80, p. 15. 
109     Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 3.  See also McCarthy and Fischer, supra note __, 
at 45-47 (presenting a time line highlighting organizational changes in oversight of the CW 
demilitarization program); Alexander Kelle, Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline Missed, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2012 (citing drastic budget cuts in 2006 as impeding 
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The GAO critiques focused on management and bureaucratic 
weaknesses, shifting leadership, changes in oversight responsibilities, and 
ineffective reorganizations, as well as safety incidents during operations, delays 
in environmental permitting, and insecurities about community protection – all of 
which contributed to plagues of schedule delays and cost overruns.110  Even the 
Department of Defense concurred in those harsh judgments.111 
 
The most recent programmatic introspection, a six-month assessment 
culminating in June 2011, was occasioned by the mushrooming cost projections 
at the final two neutralization sites.  Under the Nunn-McCurdy Act, a searching 
federal review is required when a major defense program exceeds its projected 
budget by 25 percent.112  For Pueblo and Lexington together, the estimates 
surged 33% from the previous (April 2007) $7.9 billion to $10.6 billion.113  The 
                                                                                                                                  
development of the last two CW destruction sites); Rumsfeld: U.S. Will Miss Chemical Weapons 
Disposal Deadline, Army Times, April 13, 2006. 
110     Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 12, 18, 20.  See also Durant, supra note __, at 
178-79. 
111     Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 36.   
In 1997, Congress established the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program 
(later renamed as Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives), which assumed responsibility for 
destruction of the CW at the Pueblo and Lexington sites.  CDC, supra note __, fact sheet on 
Methods used to Destroy Chemical Warfare Agents.  The Army Chemical Materials Agency 
remained responsible for destroying the larger quantity of U.S. CW at the incineration sites. 
112      Continued Financing of Government Operations, Public Law 111-123 § 206, 123 Stat. 3483 
(2009), May 22, 2009, codified at 10 U.S.C.A. 2433a.  A “significant” Nunn-McCurdy breach 
occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of 15 percent in 
budgeted costs; these must be notified to Congress.  For the chemical destruction program, that 
notification was provided on July 21, 2010.  A “critical” Nunn-McCurdy breach occurs when the 
program’s costs exceed the baseline estimates by 25 percent.  Any such programs must be 
terminated unless the Department of Defense makes specified findings and notifies Congress.  
Quick Facts, supra note __. 
113       Chris Schneidmiller, U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Slippage “No Surprise,” Expert 
Says, Global Security Newswire, April 18, 2012; New Cost Estimates, supra note __; Quick 
Facts, supra note __; Ji S. Byun, Caolionn L. O’Connell, and Patricia F. Bronson, Chemical 
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Department of Defense therefore reviewed and restructured these final aspects 
of the CW destruction program, certifying to Congress that: 
--continuation of the program is essential to the national security; 
--there are no alternatives to the program that can meet the requirements 
at less cost; 
--the new estimates of total program costs are reasonable; 
--the program has a higher priority than other programs whose funding 
must be reduced in order to accommodate the increases here; and 
--the program’s management structure is adequate to control costs.114 
 
Concluding that the main cause of the Nunn-McCurdy violation had been 
the unrealistic earlier budget and risk profiles, rather than a fundamental problem 
with the CW destruction program itself, the Department of Defense did not 
impose significant changes in the activities or plans at Lexington or Pueblo, but 
grafted on some additional options for responding to future difficulties, and 
                                                                                                                                  
Demilitarization—Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA): Root Cause Analysis, 
Institute for Defense Analysis Paper P-4677, July 2011, p. iii, 9 (reporting that the revised cost 
overrun reaches 39.22 percent from the 2007 estimate); U.S. Department of Defense, Annual 
Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile of Lethal Chemical Agents and 
Munitions for Fiscal Year 2011, September 30, 2011, p. 4 (citing a 37 percent increase); 
Chemical Demilitarization Work at Blue Grass Estimated to Cost $5.3B, Global Security 
Newswire, June 18, 2012. 
114      Letter dated June 14, 2011 from Under Secretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter to President 
of the Senate Joseph R. Biden, Jr.  The letter addresses the five elements that must be resolved 
in a Nunn-McCurdy justification, arguing a) that the destruction of the remaining CW arsenal was 
essential to U.S. security because it was necessary to comply with the federal law and the CWC; 
b) that detailed metrics were examined to determine that no other program could accomplish the 
mission more successfully; c) that the adjusted cost estimates were based on a 50 percent 
confidence level; d) that the high priority for this program had been affirmed by both Congress 
and the executive branch; and e) that the management structure was evaluated in eight primary 
areas to facilitate evaluation.  See also Byun, et. al., supra note __, p. 9 (noting that the CW 
destruction program had triggered a previous Nunn-McCurdy violation in 2006). 
 37 
inserted a more realistic set of estimates.115  Most significantly, these revisions 
included prolonging the previously-announced timetable by the additional two 
years, to culminate in 2023.116 
 
With the adjustments, the Pueblo facility will employ a chemical 
neutralization (hydrolysis) operation, followed by secondary bio-treatment of the 
hydrolysate (the byproduct of neutralization).117  In (partial) contrast, Lexington 
will use neutralization followed by supercritical water oxidation.118  Although 
these two sites contain only a small fraction of the original U.S. CW inventory, 
they include some of the most troublesome types of munitions (always more 
difficult to deal with than bulk containers, because of the presence of the 
explosive components), and the risks of designing, erecting and operating first-
of-a-kind systems and equipment are profound. 
 
                                            
115      For example, if, following the neutralization operations at Pueblo or Lexington, problems 
are encountered in the on-site treatment of the hydrolysate, the restructured program could turn 
to off-site treatment or disposal.  Likewise, a supplementary Explosive Destruction Technology 
could be employed at Lexington to deal with selected problematic mustard munitions.  Quick 
Facts, supra note __. 
116      New Cost Estimates, supra note __. 
117      U.S. Army, Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, Fact Sheet: Neutralization 
Followed by Biotreatment, June 18, 2008, 
https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/pcapp_neut_bio_18june08.pdf. In this process, the first 
stage uses hot water to neutralize the agent, destroying the mustard molecules; the second stage 
uses bacteria to consume the remaining organic components.  
Some of the weapons at Pueblo will be destroyed by controlled detonation in a portable 
chamber, because they are so unstable that the standard method is unsuitable (and also to 
speed up the process).  Global Security Newswire, Pentagon Trims Plan for Detonating Pueblo 
Mustard Munitions, September 14, 2010; Associated Press, Army Cuts Back Plan to Blow Up 
Colo. Chemical Arms, Denver Post, September 14, 2010. 
118     U.S. Army, Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant, Fact Sheet: Neutralization 
Followed by Supercritical Water Oxidation, March 2010, 
https://www.pmacwa.army.mil/info/dl/BG_neut_scwo_FINAL_2010.pdf.  In this process, hot water 
first neutralizes the agent, and then the resulting material is exposed to very high temperatures 
and pressures, breaking it down into common compounds. 
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In sum, by April 29, 2012, the U.S. CW demilitarization program had 
accomplished a heroic task, completing the destruction of 24,923.671 tonnes of 
CW -- all the inventory held at the incineration sites – some 89.75 percent of the 
original total American inventory.119  Moreover, progress in the construction of 
the final two facilities (the neutralization sites at Lexington and Pueblo) has been 
proceeding apace, and full financial support for the operation has been retained 
to date, despite the national economic difficulties.120  Still, the United States will 
run well past the CWC’s full obligation – 100 percent destruction of the inventory 
– by at least 11 years.   
 
 
Section 3:  Soviet, Russian, and Other Parties’ Chemical Weapons Programs 
 The story of the rise and fall of the chemical weapons program in the 
Soviet Union (and Russia) is distressingly similar to that described above.121  
                                            
119     Ahmet Uzumcu, address to 15th Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow, 
United Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 2; U.S. Army, Chemical Materials Agency, CMA News, 
February 2012; Global Security Newswire, Army Agency Wraps Up Chemical Weapons Disposal 
Campaign, January 24, 2012. 
120     Chris Schneidmiller, Pentagon Eyes $1.6B for Chemical Weapons Disposal Amid Budget 
Tightening, Global Security Newswire, February 22, 2011; Rachel Oswald, Last Two U.S. 
Chemical Weapons Disposal Sites Funded at $550M, Global Security Newswire, January 26, 
2010; Global Security Newswire, Budget Gives Major Boost to U.S. Chemical Agent Disposal 
Effort, February 15, 2012.  But see Greg Kocher, Work Is Temporarily Halted on Plant to Destroy 
Chemical Weapons at Blue Grass Army Depot, Lexington Herald-Leader, May 3, 2012 
(construction activity was halted after several incidents and “near misses,” to review safety 
procedures and practices.) 
121     See generally, John Hart and Cynthia D. Miller (eds.), Chemical Weapon Destruction in 
Russia: Political, Legal and Technical Aspects, SIPRI, 1998 [hereinafter, Hart and Miller]; Nikita 
Smidovich, The Russian and Other Perspectives, in Morel and Olson, supra note __, p. 55; 
Russian Munitions Agency, Chemical Disarmament, Chemical Weapons website, 
http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/zapasho.html. 
Russia joined the CWC on May 12, 1997, two weeks after the United States.   






Like the United States, the U.S.S.R. willingly invested time, technology, talent, 
and treasure in developing, refining, and producing a massive, varied CW 
armada.  In fact, by the 1990s, Moscow commanded an unparalleled CW 
infrastructure, having developed even more types of chemical weapons and 
having integrated them into the national military planning and training even more 
fully than did the United States.122  In 1989, the U.S.S.R. declared an inventory of 
40,000 metric tonnes of lethal CW, including the nerve agents sarin, soman and 
VX, as well as mustard, lewisite, phosgene, and other horrors, at seven sites.  It 
estimated at that time that $5-6 billion would be required to destroy that 
inventory.123 
 
 The fact that Soviet and Russian military forces had not used modern 
chemical weapons in combat did not mean that it was easy to surrender that 
capability.  Indeed, defectors alleged that even in the era of Presidents Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, secret research and development continued 
unabated, to create entire new categories of novel chemical agents, possessing 
increased lethality and the ability to circumvent existing Western detection and 
                                            
122      U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, Soviet Chemical Weapons 
Threat, DST-1620F-051-85, 1985; U.S. Department of Defense, Continuing Development of 
Chemical Weapons Capabilities in the USSR, October 1983; Amoretta M. Hoeber, The Chemistry 
of Defeat: Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet Chemical Warfare Postures, Institute for Foreign 
Policy Analysis, Special Report, December 1981; Joachim Krause and Charles K. Mallory, 
Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine: Military and Historical Experience, 1915-1991, 
1992. 
123      Status of U.S.-Russian Agreements, supra note __, at 14; Walker, supra note __; 
Alexander Chimiskyan, Russia on the Path Towards Chemical Demilitarization, in Hart and Miller, 
supra note __, p. 14.  See also Russia CW Disposal Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, 
Global Security Newswire, May 29, 2012 (Russia estimates it has spent $5.7 billion to date to 
prepare and operate its seven CW disposal facilities). 
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protection equipment.124  Moreover, severe national financial restrictions in the 
immediate post-Cold War era hobbled Russia’s ability to undertake the 
expensive operations necessary to destroy its mountainous CW stockpiles and 
the associated production and storage facilities.125 
 
 To help mitigate the continuing threat posed by this looming Russian CW 
legacy, the United States and other developed Western nations volunteered 
significant financial, technological and managerial assistance.  The U.S. Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program provided the most substantial 
support, totaling $1 billion in aid toward the planning and construction of a CW 
neutralization plant at Shchuch’ye.126  Others in the Global Partnership Against 
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (established by the 
Group of Eight at Kananaskis, Canada in 2002) also contributed greatly: 
                                            
124      See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 200-02 (discussing the revelations of Russian 
scientist Vil Mirzayanov regarding ongoing CW work in Russia); Vil S. Mirzayanov, State Secrets: 
An Insider’s Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program, 2009; Bill Gertz, Russia 
Dodges Chemical Arms Ban, Washington Times, February 4, 1997, p. 1; Ken Alibek and Steven 
Handelman, Biohazard: (1999), The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons 
Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, 1999; Jonathan B. Tucker, War 
of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda, 2006, p. 315-24. 
125      See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 189-90 (noting the financial difficulties and 
inadequate management structures that inhibit Russia’s ability to meet the CWC timetables), 205 
(commenting that “The administration believes that Russia will have trouble meeting the 10 year 
destruction deadline.  The Russians made it clear to the United States during the final months of 
chemical negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament that this might be the case.  Therefore, 
the Convention contains provisions that allow for a State Party to request and have approved 
under certain conditions, an extension of the destruction period of up to five years.”); Natalya 
Kalinina, The Problems of Russian Chemical Weapon Destruction, in Hart and Miller, supra note 
__, p. 1, 3 (noting that the main obstacle to Russia’s initial implementation of the CWC was the 
country’s severe economic deterioration following the dissolution of the USSR). 
126      Walker, supra note __; Amy E. Smithson, US Assistance to Russia’s Chemical Weapon 
Destruction Programme, in Hart and Miller, supra note __, p. 122; Statement by Andrew C. 
Weber, U.S. Delegation to the OPCW, at the 14th Session of the Conference of the States 
Parties, C-14/NAT.7, November 30, 2009, p. 6. 
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Germany ($475 million), Canada ($82 million) and the United Kingdom ($39 
million).127 
 
These cooperative ventures were not without perturbations; controversies 
about the relative size of the respective contributions by Russia and its partner 
nations, about allocation of legal liabilities for possible mishaps, and about the 
continuing Russian penchant for secrecy in the demilitarization operations were 
continuous irritants.128  Still, funding for Russia’s CW destruction program now 
seems to have stabilized at last, and progress toward complete destruction has 
accelerated.129  
 
                                            
127      Walker, supra note __; Chimiskyan in Hart and Miller, supra note __, at 26-28; Germany to 
Contribute $26.1M for Eliminating Russian Chemical Arms, Global Security Newswire, March 14, 
2012 (reporting that Germany has spent $443.7 million to assist Russian CW destruction over the 
past ten years, and has committed $26.1 million more for 2012.)  But see Russia CW Disposal 
Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, Global Security Newswire, May 29, 2012 (Russia 
estimates that other countries have provided a total of only $970 million in assistance to its CW 
destruction operations, roughly 48 percent of the amount previously pledged.) 
128      United States General Accounting Office, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional 
Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, 
GAO-03-482, March 2003, passim and p. 12 (describing U.S. programs to assist Russia in 
securing its nerve agents and in constructing a destruction facility, but observing that some 
aspects of the program “face significant resistance and lack of cooperation from the Russian 
government”), p. 6 (estimating that it may take 40 years to completely destroy Russia’s CW 
stockpile); Martin Matishak Russia Restricts Transparency at Major Chemical Weapons Site, 
Group Says, Global Security Newswire, August 14, 2009. 
129      See OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Opening Statement by the Director-General 
to the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-2/DG.2, April 7, 2008, para. 46 (opining that “in the 
Russian Federation destruction has gained momentum and the plan concerning new destruction 
facilities is well on track.”)  See also Additional Cooperation Needed, supra note __, p. 62 
(reporting “good access and cooperation from the Russian government” in implementing security 
upgrades at CW storage sites); Global Security Newswire, Work on Sixth Russian CW Disposal 
Site Almost Done, September 28, 2010 (reporting progress in constructing and operating the CW 
destruction facilities); Russia CW Disposal Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, Global Security 
Newswire, May 29, 2012 (Russia estimates it has spent $5.7 billion to date to prepare and 
operate its seven CW disposal facilities). 
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 Unlike the United States, Russia avoided incineration as a disposal 
mechanism, considering it a “primitive” solution – unsafe, costly and politically 
unsustainable – and opted instead for a variety of chemical neutralization 
processes.130  These technologies generated their own controversies, including a 
debate about how much chemical processing of the lethal agent would be 
required to meet the CWC standard of destroying the CW “in an essentially 
irreversible way,”131 to ensure that the residue could not readily be “reverse 
engineered” back into chemical weapons form.132 
 
 The current status of the Russian CW destruction program depicts an 
enterprise that is still running well behind that of the United States on the track 
toward total elimination of the stockpiles, but that is projected to catch up and 
surpass the American level of success in the coming years.  Seven destruction 
facilities have been built (again, as with the United States, one at each of the CW 
storage sites, to minimize transportation.)  Russia did not begin CW destruction 
                                            
130      Walker, supra note __.  Essentially, Russia will chemically neutralize the lethal agents and  
then dispose of the reaction biproducts through incineration or bituminization (converting it into a  
tar-like mass).  OPCW Website, Destruction Technologies, http://www.opcw.org/our-
work/demilitarisation/destruction-technologies/; Russian Munitions Agency, Chemical  
Disarmament, Chemical Weapons website, http://www.munition.gov.ru/eng/zapasho.html, CW  
Destruction Technologies; Irian P. Beletskaya, The Russian-US Joint Evaluation of the Russian 
Two-Stage Process for the Destruction of Nerve Agents, in Hart and Miller, supra note __, p. 103; 
Vladislav Sheluchenko and Anton Utkin, The Role of GosNIIOKhT in the Russian Chemical 
Weapon Destruction Programme, in Hart and Miller, supra note __, p. 113. 
131     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.12.  See 
Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 343 (commenting that the implication of the irreversibility 
criterion is that the process of reconverting the residual products back into functional chemical 
weapons must be at least as costly and difficult as a new synthesis of new CW from raw products 
would be).  
132     See State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 50 (noting that the United States and 
others are concerned that even after the first step in Russia’s planned two-step process for 
destroying some of its nerve agent stocks, it might be possible to recapture useable chemical 
agent); U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011, p. 13-16. 
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operations until December 2002, and the country reached the CWC’s first 
milestone (for eliminating one percent of the inventory) in April 2003, almost 
three years late.133   
 
On October 26, 2001, Russia requested, and on December 8, 2006, the 
OPCW Conference of the States Parties granted, the single treaty-allowed five-
year extension of the original 10-year deadline for complete destruction of the 
stockpile, creating for Russia the parallel April 29, 2012 deadline applicable for 
the United States.134  On May 30, 2011, Russia declared that it had destroyed 50 
percent of its inventory,135 and at the April 29, 2012 deadline, it announced that it 
had reached the 62 percent level, having destroyed 24,961 tonnes of CW.136   
 
Russia also projected that it would reach complete destruction by the end 
of 2015, some three years later than permissible, but still eight years ahead of 
                                            
133     Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 7. 
134      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.18, December 8, 2006 (granting 
Russia’s request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to April 29, 2012); Status 
Report, supra note __, paras. 12-25; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Extension of the 
Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction by the Russian Federation of Its Category 1 
Chemical Weapons, C-8/DEC.13, October 24, 2003.  
 Like the United States, Russia has hosted OPCW visits to its CW destruction sites, to 
confirm its progress toward CWC obligations.  OPCW Website, OPCW Executive Council and 
Director-General Visit Russia to Review Chemical Weapons Destruction Activities, March 23, 
2012, http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-executive-council-and-director-general-visit-russia-
to-review-chemical-weapons-destruction-acti/; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, 
Decision: Visits by Representatives of the Executive Council, C-11/DEC.20, December 8, 2006; 
Global Security Newswire, Russia Touts Progress in Chem-Weapon Disposal, March 22, 2012. 
135     Russia Eliminates 50% of Chemical Arsenal, Global Security Newswire, May 31, 2011 
136     RIA/Novosti, Russia Destroys 62% of Its Chemical Weapons, April 29, 2012, available at 
http://en.ria.ru/russia/20120429/173121387.html; ITAR-TASS News Agency, Russia Destroys 
Over 60 PRC of Chemical Weapons, March 21, 2012, http://www.itar-
tass.com/en/c154/371949_print.html; Global Security Newswire, Russia Touts Progress in Chem-
Weapon Disposal, March 22, 2012; Ahmet Uzumcu, address to 15th Chemical Weapons 
Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow, United Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 3. 
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the current U.S. timetable.137  However, some doubt those projections, predicting 
that Russia’s program may require until 2017 or 2018 to finish the task.138   
 
 In addition, it is instructive to note that five other countries, too, have 
contributed their own lethal drops into the CWC bucket of chemical weapons 
destruction.139  South Korea eliminated its modest declared inventory of 
approximately 2000 tonnes by July 2008 (having received an extension of its 
original deadline).140  Likewise, India destroyed its 2000 tonnes by March 16, 
2009, pursuant to an extension.141  Both those states have been quite secretive 
regarding their CW activities, and little is known about the size, composition, or 
location of their inventories, or about the process through which they were 
eliminated.  In fact, South Korea is so sensitive about this whole matter that at its 
insistence, in all official OPCW documents, South Korea is not even identified by 
                                            
137     Daniel Horner, Russia Revises Chemical Arms Deadline, 40 Arms Control Today No. 6, 
July/August 2010; Global Security Newswire, Russia Authorizes $1.5 Billion More for Chemical 
Arms Destruction, June 29, 2012. 
138      Walker, supra note __; Thousands of Sites Could Be Altered to Produce Chemical 
Weapons, Expert Says, Global Security Newswire, March 5, 2012 (quoting Russian scientist 
Alexander Gorbovsky as estimating that Russia will not complete its CW destruction until 
between 2017 and 2019); Chris Schneidmiller, U.S. Chemical Weapons Disposal Slippage “No 
Surprise,” Expert Says, Global Security Newswire, April 18, 2012 (quoting Paul Walker as 
estimating that the Russian CW destruction program “might drag out to 2017-18”); Russia CW 
Disposal Delay Linked to Curtailed Foreign Aid, Global Security Newswire, May 29, 2012. 
139      See generally OPCW, Executive Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on the Implementation 
of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2011, EC-69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 5-6; OPCW, 
Conference of the States Parties, Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on Their Destruction in 2009, C-15/4, November 30, 2010; OPCW, Conference of the States 
Parties, Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 
2010, C-16/4, November 30, 2011. 
140      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.12, December 8, 2006 (granting 
South Korea’s anonymous request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to December 
31, 2008); Walker, supra note __. 
141      OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.16, December 8, 2006 (granting 
India’s request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to April 28, 2009); Walker, supra 
note __. 
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name as having possessed and destroyed CW, but is referred to obliquely as “a 
State Party.”142 
 
 Albania experienced more difficulty; it initially possessed only 16 tonnes of 
CW, the smallest of any declared national inventory, and a destruction deadline 
was set for April 29, 2007.  In the two months before that date, however, Albania 
indicated that it would have difficulty meeting the schedule, and on April 27, 
2007, it formally notified the OPCW Executive Council that it would be unable to 
complete the task on time – but it never submitted an actual request for an 
extension.  Albania did continue to make frequent reports to the OPCW about its 
progress in destroying the weapons, and the Executive Council noted that the 
country was quite close to finishing the process.  The Conference of the States 
Parties did not address the issue.  On July 4 and 11, 2007, the Technical 
Secretariat notified the Executive Council that Albania had accomplished the 
destruction – about ten weeks late, with no formal extension or other legal 
approval from the OPCW.143  Albania thereby became the first country to 
                                            
142     See, e.g., OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-11/DEC.12, December 8, 2006 
(granting South Korea’s anonymous request for an extension of the final destruction deadline to 
December 31, 2008); Walker, supra note __. 
143     Albania was an early adopter of the CWC, ratifying the treaty on May 11, 1994, but the 
government there apparently did not realize, until 2003, that it possessed any chemical weapons.  
When the undocumented cache (mustard agent, lewisite, and other toxins, probably supplied by 
China in the mid-1970s) was discovered in a small, remote nondescript bunker in the mountains, 
Albania and its international partners quickly moved to secure the site and commence 
incineration operations.  The original intention was to complete the task by the April 29, 2007 
deadline, but a technical error prevented timely completion.  Joby Warrick, Albania’s Chemical 
Cache Raises Fears About Others, Washington Post, January 10, 2005, p. A1; Walker, supra 
note __; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Extensions of the Intermediate 
Deadlines for the Destruction by Albania of Its Category 1 Chemical Weapons, C-11/DEC.19, 
December 8, 2006 (establishing deadlines for Albania’s CW destruction); OPCW: Executive 
Council, Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its Activities in the Period from 8 
July 2006 to 29 June 2007, EC-50/3, C-12/3, September 26, 2007, paras. 2.14-17.  But see 
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complete the destruction of its CW inventory,144 and the first to violate its 
obligations – and there was no overt, formal OPCW response to this tardiness. 
 
Libya, too, presents a somewhat anomalous situation: Under Muammar 
Gaddafi, Libya had attempted to construct a significant indigenous CW 
production infrastructure, and it had succeeded in acquiring a noteworthy arsenal 
of weaponized and bulk mustard agent.  Following a major reversal of its foreign 
policy in 2003, Libya joined the CWC in 2004, and declared a CW inventory of 23 
tonnes.145  Libya was then largely on track for timely destruction (pursuant to an 
extension from the OPCW), until the “Arab Spring” outbreak of fighting in the 
country in February, 2011 froze the operation.146  The OPCW immediately 
                                                                                                                                  
Matthew V. Tompkins, Albania’s Chemical Weapons Con, 16 Nonproliferation Review No. 1, p. 
65, March 2009 (arguing that Albania’s leadership probably knew about the hidden CW stockpile, 
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144     OPCW, Albania the First Country to Destroy All Its Chemical Weapons, July 12, 2007, 
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/albania-the-first-country-to-destroy-all-its-chemical-weapons/ 
145     Jonathan B. Tucker, The Rollback of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Program, 16 
Nonproliferation Review No. 3, November 2009, p. 363.  Libya also declared 1300 metric tonnes 
of precursor chemicals and 3563 unfilled aerial CW bombs.  A U.S.-Italy partnership undertook to 
assist Libya in destroying these items.  Walker, supra note __; Status Report, supra note __, 
paras. 6-11; State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 46-49; Global Security Newswire, Libya 
Seen Delaying Chemical Agent Destruction, February 2, 2011; Arthur Max, Watchdog Says Libya 
Destroys Chemical Weapons, Washington Post, February 23, 2011; Jean Pascal Zanders, 
Destroying Libya’s Chemical Weapons: Deadlines and Delays, WMD Junction, May 19, 2011; 
Jean Pascal Zanders, Uprising in Libya: The False Specter of Chemical Warfare, WMD Junction, 
May 19, 2011; Sharon A. Squassoni and Andrew Feickert, Disarming Libya: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RS21823, April 22, 2004. 
146     OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, C-14/DEC.3, December 2, 2009 
(revising an earlier extension granted to Libya by C-11/DEC.15, December 8, 
2006, and fixing May 15, 2011 as the final date for destruction of all Libyan CW).  
Libya’s CW destruction operations began in October 2010; they were temporarily 
halted in February 2011 because of the failure of a heating component in the 
plant’s mobile neutralization unit.  The outbreak of violence, and the enforcement 
of subsequent United Nations sanctions, then prohibited the delivery of 
necessary replacement parts.  Daniel Horner, Accord Reached on CWC’s 2012 
Deadline, 42 Arms Control Today No. 1 (January/February 2012), p. 38; DG 
2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraph 34; OPCW, Executive Council, Draft Report 
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underscored Libya’s continuing responsibility for safeguarding the CW stocks 
during the insurrection and for resuming verified destruction procedures as soon 
as possible, and the organization extended the country’s deadline for 
destruction.147   
 
When the fighting abated, the new government of Libya suddenly 
discovered and announced that the Gaddafi regime had acquired and retained 
several hundred additional, undeclared CW munitions loaded with sulfur mustard 
agent and hundreds of kilograms of additional agent stored in plastic containers 
that it had illegally secreted away from OPCW authorities.148   
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Libyan authorities and response from the Director-General of the OPCW); OPCW website, The 
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 During this period there was also significant concern that the Gaddafi regime might 
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148     Chris Schneidmiller, Libya Sets Schedule for Eliminating Chemical Weapons, Global 
Security Newswire, May 31, 2012; Daniel Horner, Libya Sets Date to Destroy Chemical Arms, 
Arms Control Today, June 2012; Global Security Newswire, Details Emerge About Undeclared 
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 48 
The original CW destruction facility has now been repaired, and additional 
work on improving the infrastructure and security arrangements is underway; 
destruction operations should resume in March 2013, to deal with both the 
original residual and the newly-discovered detritus, under OPCW monitoring. But 
it is clear that the April 29, 2012 deadline was not met, and the current 
projections indicate that the new government of Libya will not finish the job until 
December 2016.149 
 
 Finally, Iraq, which did not join the CWC until February 12, 2009, declared 
possession of an unspecified quantity of CW, entombed in two large 
underground bunkers at Muthanna that had been bombed by U.S. and coalition 
forces during the 1991 Gulf War.  Because of the highly unstable condition of the 
bunkers, no inventory of the CW remains has been undertaken, and it is still 
undetermined how, when, or even whether, orderly excavation, recovery and 
destruction operations may be safely initiated.150 
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2011, p. 32; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2017, October 31, 2011, S/RES/2017 
(2011) (calling on Libyan authorities to coordinate with the OPCW to destroy CW); DG 2011 
Statement, supra note __, paragraph 13 (reporting that OPCW inspectors reentered Libya in 
November 2011 and that all declared CW stocks were secure.) 
150    Jonathan B. Tucker, Iraq Faces Major Challenges in Destroying Its Legacy Chemical 
Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Features Stories, March 4, 2010 (Bunker 13 
contains thousands of sarin-filled rockets, which are damaged, unstable, and leaking; Bunker 41 
is in better condition; it was used to entomb contaminated materials and artillery shells; there are 
no complete records about exactly what is contained in the two bunkers, and any assessment 
and destruction operations would be difficult, expensive, and hazardous); John Hart and Peter 
Clevestig, Reducing Security Threats from Chemical and Biological Materials, SIPRI Yearbook 
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 In addition, U.S. and United Kingdom forces in Iraq recovered 4,530 olden 
(pre-1991) Iraqi chemical weapons during the interval between the end of major 
combat operations in 2003 and Iraq’s accession to the CWC in 2009.  These 
included degraded artillery projectiles loaded with sarin and mustard, which the 
occupying forces took custody of, examined, and destroyed, in order to preclude 
their use by insurgents or terrorists.  These operations were eventually disclosed 
to the Iraqi authorities and to the OPCW, but the CWC provisions for 
transparency in CW destruction operations were not followed – the U.S. position 
was that the treaty was simply inapplicable to combat-related recovery 
operations of this sort undertaken on the territory of a non-party.  Iran, on the 
other hand, has charged the United States and United Kingdom with violating 
their treaty commitments – citing a party’s obligation to declare CW “located in 
                                                                                                                                  
2011, p. 389, 397; Walker, supra note __; Global Security Newswire, Chemical-Weapon 
Destruction Plan Proceeding in Iraq, September 8, 2011; Global Security Newswire, Iraq to 
Receive British Aid in Eliminating Chemical Arms Leftovers, July 31, 2012; OPCW, Conference of 
the States Parties, Statement by H.E. Ahmed Bamerni, Head of the Department of International 
Organisations and Cooperation in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the 16th Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties, C-16/NAT.26, November 28, 2011; DG 2011 Statement, supra 
note __, paragraphs 48-49; U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011, p. 9-10; OPCW, Executive Council, 
Draft Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 
2011, EC-69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 5; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 
OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2010, C-16/4, 
November 30, 2011, para. 1.7. 
 Because Iraq joined the CWC after the treaty’s initial 10-year destruction period had 
expired, it is obligated to destroy its CW “as soon as possible,” pursuant to an order of destruction 
determined by the Executive Council.  CWC, supra note __, article IV.8; Robert P. Mikulak, 
Statement to the Executive Council, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 56th 
Session, April 21, 2009, p. 1 (referring to the “uncharted territory” the Executive Council must 
enter, in establishing a destruction timetable for Iraq’s CW). 
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any place under its jurisdiction and control”151 -- and has invoked the CWC’s 
procedures for clarification and dispute-resolution.152 
 
 Beyond all this, it should be noted that other CWC-related chemical 
weapons destruction operations are ongoing, but are beyond the scope of this 
article.  Old, abandoned, obsolete and deteriorated chemical weapons and their 
components routinely turn up in unrecognized land and water dump sites in 
Europe, Australia, the United States, and elsewhere and are disposed of as toxic 
waste.153  Likewise, Japan has accepted the responsibility for finding, recovering, 
and destroying hundreds of thousands of chemical weapons it abandoned in 
                                            
151     CWC, supra note __, articles III.1.a.i.; IV.1; IV.9. 
152     OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, The Islamic Republic of Iran’s View and Concern 
Over the Discovery and Destruction of Chemical Weapons by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in Iraq, C-15/NAT.1, November 29, 2010; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, 
Statement by Iran at the 15th Session of the Conference of the States, C-15/NAT.15, November 
29, 2010; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, United States of America, Response to the 
Communication of a Member State, C-15/NAT.7, November 30, 2010; Statement by Ambassador 
Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 69th Session of the Executive 
Council, EC-69/NAT.15, July 11, 2012, p. 3; Jonathan B. Tucker, Iraq Faces Major Challenges in 
Destroying Its Legacy Chemical Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Features Stories, 
March 4, 2010; Letter from Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte to the Honorable 
Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of 
Representatives, providing declassified "Key Points" from a National Ground Intelligence Center 
report on the recovery of chemical munitions in Iraq, dated June 21, 2006; Mikulak July 12, 2011 
Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (noting that Iran has alleged that the U.S. and UK actions were 
inconsistent with the CWC, but in the U.S. view, the prompt seizure, analysis and destruction of 
these weapons were necessary to support the object and purpose of the Convention.  Extensive 
exchanges of communications between Iran and the United States and United Kingdom have not 
resolved the issue); U.S. Department of State, U.S. Exercises the Right of Reply to Iran Regarding the 
Recovery and Destruction of Pre-1991 Chemical Weapons in Iraq, December 23, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/179692.htm; John Hart and Peter Clevestig, Reducing Security Threats 
from Chemical and Biological Materials, SIPRI Yearbook 2011, p. 389, 398. 
153     Walker, supra note __ (noting that in 2009, 13 states had reported recovery of 87,000 old 
chemical weapons awaiting destruction); Bob Drogin, Digging Up Chemical Weapons in D.C., Los 
Angeles Times, May 10, 2010, p. 1 (World War I era chemical weapons unearthed in the Spring 
Valley area of Washington, D.C.); Stuart Cumming, Mustard Gas Shells to Be Destroyed, The 
Chronicle, June 9, 2010 (144 mustard gas shells recovered near U.S. military base in Australia); 
Paul Walker, Sea-Dumped Chemical Munitions, briefing slides for United Nations Second 
Committee, November 11, 2010 (describing tons of CW dumped after World War II in ocean 
areas around the world). 
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China during and after World War II.154  This is an undertaking of monumental 
scope, and China has complained that Japan has fallen far behind the promised 
schedule155 – and disquiet over this unfulfilled commitment may become 
politically linked to any OPCW resolution of the U.S. and Russian CW destruction 
deadline.156  However, because the CWC treats these two kinds of issues 
separately157 – the obligation to destroy current inventories of functional chemical 
weapons is an even more urgent task than the obligation to deal with old and 
abandoned weapons, which pose a serious safety and environmental danger, but 
not a risk of use in chemical warfare – this article will not substantively address 
the latter set of issues. 
 
 In sum, the CWC’s global “box score” to date indicates that as of April 29, 
2012, about 51,128 metric tonnes of CW agent stocks had been destroyed, 
                                            
154     Walker, supra note __ (calling Japan’s actions in China “the most serious case of 
abandoned chemical weapons”); Status Report, supra note __, paras. 31-36; OPCW, Executive 
Council Decision: Arrangement for the Destruction at the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Mobile 
Destruction Facility of Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan on the Territory of the People’s 
Republic of China, EC-61/DEC.2, June 29, 2010; OPCW Website, Ceremony Marks Start of 
Destruction of Chemical Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China, September 8, 2010, 
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/ceremony-marks-start-of-destruction-of-chemical-weapons-
abandoned-by-japan-in-china/; DG 2011 Statement, supra note __, paragraphs 50 (noting that 
Japan has destroyed 35,203 chemical weapons abandoned in Nanjing, China, 74.6% of the total 
identified there). 
155     Ahmet Uzumcu, address to 15th Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow, 
United Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 5-6; Mike Brombach, Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China: 
The Unresolved Japanese Legacy, Global Green, May 2011, 
http://globalgreen.org/docs/publication-183-1.pdf;  
Shari Oliver and Stephanie Lieggi, Program to Clean-up Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China 
Moves Sluggishly, WMD Insights, June 2008; China Presses Japan on Abandoned Chemical 
Weapons, Global Security Newswire, January 23, 2009; OPCW Council Backs Deadline 
Extension for Destroying Japanese Chemical Weapons in China, Global Security Newswire, 
February 16, 2012. 
156     Brombach, supra note __, p. 25. 
157     See CWC, supra note __, article I.2 (obligation to destroy all CW a party owns or possesses 
or located at a place under its jurisdiction and control) and I.3 (obligation to destroy CW 
abandoned on the territory of another party) and Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part 
IV(A) (destruction of chemical weapons) and Part IV(B) (destruction of  old and abandoned CW). 
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reaching 73.64 percent of the worldwide goal.  This also amounts to 3.95 million 
of the 8.67 million declared CW muntions and containers subject to the treaty 
(45.56 percent).158  Three of the seven declared “possessor states” had 
completed the process of destroying their inventories (two of them doing so on 
time); the other four are, and will continue for some time to be, in arrears. 
 
 
Section 4: Political Remediation Efforts to Date 
 For several years, the basic U.S. strategy for dealing with the “2012 
problem” was fairly low-key; the effort was generally to deflect attention from the 
forthcoming inevitability, and to display the ugly projections about the future CW 
destruction timetable mostly via “unofficial” or “informal” presentations.159  Some 
of this modesty in public affairs sprang from a simple desire not to trigger 
international political controversy before it was unavoidable (why deal with 
tomorrow’s problems today?) and some of it emerged from apprehension that 
premature clarity about the coming failure to meet the 2012 deadline could be 
                                            
158     Ahmet Uzumcu, address to 15th Chemical Weapons Demilitarization Conference, Glasgow, 
United Kingdom, May 22, 2012, p. 2; http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation/; OPCW, 
Executive Council, Draft Report of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction in 2011, EC-69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 48 (summarizing, by type of chemical agent, 
the amount of CW destroyed by the end of 2011).  
159     Supra note __ (citing U.S. statements to OPCW organs regarding the anticipated timetable 
for U.S. CW destruction operations in 2006 and thereafter.)  The June 28, 2011 letter from 
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates was the first “official” top level statement of the U.S. 
inability to meet the 2012 deadline.  See Gates letter, supra note __. 
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interpreted as an “anticipatory breach”160 of the treaty, immediately triggering 
other parties’ responsive rights, as elaborated in Section 5 below.   
 
 More recently, in more overt recognition of its plight, the United States has 
instituted several noteworthy efforts at political course correction (or at least 
transparency), to reassure its treaty partners of its continuing good faith and 
principled commitment to the CWC,161 including:  
 --accelerating the destruction process, by leveraging the successful 
experiences from the earliest sites and applying them to the latter locations, and 
by providing additional financial incentives to corporations that are building and 
operating the facilities; 
 --sustaining full funding for the construction of the final two sites, even in 
an era of extreme financial austerity, enabling the program to proceed apace;162 
 --providing frequent, detailed reporting to the OPCW about the progress 
and problems in the demilitarization process, including quarterly presentations in 
                                            
160     The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, discussed infra, text accompanying notes 
__, does not explicitly employ the concept of “anticipatory breach,” but includes within the 
definition of “material breach” a “repudiation” of a treaty.  Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention], article 60.3.a.  It is 
unclear whether under international law, a treaty party’s announcement of a forthcoming inability 
to perform the obligations of a treaty, accompanied by a commitment to pursue the treaty’s 
ultimate objective, would amount to a “repudiation” of the agreement.  See Mohammed M. 
Gomaa, Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach, 1996, p. 26-28, 123 
(arguing that article 60 “does not accommodate preemptive or preventive measures,” so only any 
actual breach, not a potential breach, is relevant); Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (2011) [hereinafter, Corten and Klein], p. 1358. 
In domestic U.S. contract law, the cognate concept of anticipatory breach by repudiation 
does include a statement by the obligor that it will not or cannot perform the contract without 
breach, or a voluntary act that renders the obligor unable or apparently unable to perform without 
breach.  American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 250. 
161     See generally, Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (outlining U.S. 
practices over the prior five and one-half years in keeping the OPCW and CWC parties aware of 
its progress and difficulties in meeting the destruction obligations); Mikulak July 12, 2011 
Statement, supra note __, p. 2. 
162     Quick Facts, supra note __; Carter letters, supra note __. 
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The Hague by U.S. governmental officials responsible for oversight of the 
activities;163 
 --hosting OPCW visitors (including the chair and selected members of the 
Executive Council, the Director-General, and representatives of the Technical 
Secretariat) for briefings and tours at the sites where CW destruction was 
occurring and at the sites where construction of the final two facilities was 
underway, to display first-hand the immense challenges, the efforts to overcome 
them, and the engagement of local Citizens Advisory Committees in the 
process;164 and 
 --reaffirming at the most senior levels the absolute U.S. commitment to 
achieving complete destruction of the CW inventory.  Secretary of Defense 
Robert M. Gates,165 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton,166 and other 
senior officials167 have made this point with crystalline clarity. 
                                            
163     Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Mikulak July 12, 2011 
Statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Executive Council, Note by the Director-General, 
Modalities for Implementation of the Obligation of States Parties to Report on Their Destruction 
Activities During the Extension Period After 29 April 2007, EC-49/DG.1, March 8, 2007 (requiring 
reports to the Executive Council every 90 days). 
164     OPCW Website, OPCW Delegation Visits U.S Chemical Weapons Destruction Facilities 
and Holds High-Level Meetings in Washington DC, March 4, 2011, 
http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-delegation-visits-us-chemical-weapons-destruction-
facilities-and-holds-high-level-meetings-in/; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: 
Visits by Representatives of the Executive Council, C-11/DEC.20, December 8, 2006 
(establishing the program for OPCW officials to visit the Russian and U.S. CW destruction 
facilities).  See also National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1993, Public Law 102-484, sec. 
172 (legislation directing the Army to establish Citizens’ Advisory Commissions). 
165     Robert M. Gates, letter to Ahmet Uzumcu, Director-General of the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, June 28, 2011. 
166     Hillary Rodham Clinton, United States’ Commitment to the Complete Destruction of U.S. 
Chemical Weapons Stockpiles, press statement, October 3, 2011. 
167     Remarks by Ambassador Kennedy at the IISS Global Strategic Review Meeting, September 
12, 2010, http://geneva.usmission.gov/2010/09/12/remarks-by-ambassador-kennedy-at-the-iiss-
meeting/; Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Mikulak July 12, 2011 
Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States 
Delegation to the OPCW at the 66th Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.19, October 4, 
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 The United States has explained that its inability to meet the treaty 
deadline is due to the delays (perhaps foreseeable in principle, but impossible to 
circumvent nonetheless) in incorporating the novel, untried neutralization 
technologies at the final two sites.168  Compounding the difficulty, the United 
States adds, is the CWC’s completely appropriate insistence that a party’s 
chosen destruction methodology must “assign the highest priority to ensuring the 
safety of people and to protecting the environment,”169 and must be undertaken 
in full international transparency, with punctilious monitoring by OPCW 
experts.170  Despite a commitment of over $38 billion, developing a viable 
method for solving that multi-variant equation has simply taken longer than 
anticipated, and now, unfortunately, cannot reasonably be accelerated sooner 
than 2023. 
 
 To date, the strongest resistance to the U. S. approach has come from 
Iran.  Iranian authorities have not blinked at labeling the United States and 
Russia as moving into “non-compliance” and “blatant contradiction with the 
                                                                                                                                  
2011, p. 1-2; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the 
OPCW at the 64th Session of the Executive Council, EC-64/NAT.5, May 3, 2011, p. 1. 
168     Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2, 5; Mikulak July 12, 2011 
Statement, supra note __, p. 2; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States 
Delegation to the OPCW at the 15th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-15/NAT.3, 
November 29, 2010, p. 3-4. 
169     CWC, supra note __, art. IV.10.  The importance of this provision is underscored by the fact 
that the treaty essentially repeats it two more times: in article V.11 (regarding destruction of CW 
production facilities) and article VII.3 (concerning national implementation of CWC obligations).  
Notably, the CWC specifies that in conducting the destruction operations, each party is to 
conform to “its national standards for safety and emissions.”  CWC, supra note __, arts. IV.10, 
V.11.  See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 119 (summarizing numerous CWC provisions 
regarding environmental protection).   
170     CWC, supra note __, article IV.3,4,5. 
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obligations” of the CWC, and have argued that those countries “should be held 
accountable.”171  Teheran has asserted that it is not acceptable to conclude 
simply that those CW possessor states are “well-intentioned”; the rest of the 
treaty parties cannot “take it lightly, and forget about recognizing non-
compliance.”172  Iran has rejected the effort to resolve the problem through a low-
key “political” process, but insisted upon invoking the “legal” remedies of the 
CWC, including the judgment that such a “breach” of the convention should be 
brought formally to the attention of the United Nations Security Council and 
General Assembly.173 
 
Iran has reminded the parties that it was the victim of widespread CW use 
not that long ago (during its 1980s war with Iraq), and warned that, “The 
continued existence of even one chemical bomb will compromise the 
international peace and security and the nightmare of employment of such 
destructive and lethal weapons will be perpetuated.”174  Iran calls its position one 
of “principle,” founded in respect for the credibility and integrity of the CWC.175  
                                            
171     Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the OPCW at the 64th Session of the Executive Council, EC-
64/NAT.10, May 3, 2011.  See also OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem 
Gharib Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
OPCW at the 65th Session of the Executive Council, EC-65/NAT.13, July 12, 2011. 
172     Abadi statement, supra note __, p. 2; OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Statement 
by Iran at the 15th Session of the Conference of the States, C-15/NAT.15, November 29, 2010 
(asserting that timely destruction of the CW stocks could be accomplished, if the United States 
and Russia allocate “required funds, good will and strong determination,” because “As the saying 
goes, if there is a will, there is a way.”)  See also Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra 
note __, p. 5 (rejecting Iran’s accusation that the United States is deliberately violating the CWC.) 
173     Daniel Horner, CWC Parties Wrestle with 2012 Deadline, 41 Arms Control Today No. 8, 
October 2011, p. 38; Global Security Newswire, U.N. Should Address Chemical Weapons 
Disposal Deadline Busting: Iran, October 6, 2011. 
174     Abadi statement, supra note __, p. 2. 
175     Abadi Statement, supra note __, p. 2. 
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Similar critical sentiments – although perhaps more muted rhetoric – might also 
be expected from countries such as India, Pakistan, China, and Cuba, although 
observers anticipated that Iran would be “quite isolated” if it sought to impose 
meaningful sanctions.176 
 
 One important climax to these debates came in the November-December 
2011 meeting of the Conference of the States Parties, which adopted a 
“Decision” regarding the impending April 29, 2012 deadline.177  That instrument 
failed to attract “consensus,” the Conference’s preferred mode of decision-
making, but won a 101-1 vote, with Iran as the sole nay-sayer.178  It followed 
more than two years of intense consultations under the aegis of successive 
                                            
176     Horner, supra note __ (quoting Paul Walker).  Notably, Iran’s statements on this point do 
not mention Russia or Libya, but focus entirely on the United States.  See also OPCW, Executive 
Council, Statement by Kenya on Behalf of African Group of States at the 66th Session of the 
Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.9, October 4, 2011, and OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by 
Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the 66th Session of the 
Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.15, October 4, 2011 (generally endorsing what became the 
December 1 Decision). 
177     OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Decision: Final Extended Deadline of 29 April 
2012, C-16/DEC.11, December 1, 2011 [hereinafter, December 1 Decision]; OPCW, Conference 
of the States Parties, Report of the 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, 28 
November – 2 December 2011, C-16/5, December 2, 2011. 
178     Daniel Horner, Accord Reached on CWC’s 2012 Deadline, 42 Arms Control Today No. 1 
(January/February 2012), p. 38; Alexander Kelle, Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline 
Missed, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2012.  See Explanation of Vote on the Draft 
Decision on Final Extended Deadline of 29 April 2012, Statement by H.E. Mr. Kazem Gharib 
Abadi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
Sixteenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC, 28 November – 2 
December 2011 (no OPCW document designator yet issued) (expressing Iran’s opposition to the 
December 1 Decision, explaining that Iran is “profoundly doubtful of the political will of the US 
administration,” urging that the OPCW document should recognize “the situation of non-
compliance,” and contending that the Conference’s decision will undermine the credibility of the 
CWC.)   
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chairs of the Executive Council, with informal negotiations and punctilious 
wordsmithing to balance the competing national interests and perspectives.179 
 
 The December 1 Decision: 
 --recalled the evolution of the problem, with some states timely meeting 
their treaty obligations for destruction of the CW stocks, but the United States, 
Russia and Libya not meeting even the extended final April 29, 2012 deadline;180 
 --noted statements from those three possessor states “underlining their 
unequivocal commitment to their Obligations” under the Convention, and “taking 
note that the inability to fully meet the final extended deadline of 29 April 2012 
would come about due to reasons that are unrelated to the commitment of these 
States Parties to the General Obligations for the destruction of chemical 
weapons established under Article I of the Convention”;181 
 --decided that the destruction of the remaining CW “shall be completed in 
the shortest time possible,”182 in accordance with the Convention’s provisions, 
                                            
179     In October 2009, the Executive Council requested its chair “to engage in informal 
consultations with interested delegations on how and when to initiate discussion by the Council 
on issues related to meeting the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical weapons 
and to keep the Council informed of these consultations.”  Subsequent Conference sessions 
welcomed these discussions and urged that they continue.  OPCW, Conference of the States 
Parties, Report of the 14th Session, December 4, 2009, C-14/5, paragraph 9.7 (welcoming the EC 
request “to engage in informal consultations on how and when to initiate discussion by the 
Council on issues related to meeting the final extended deadlines for the destruction of chemical 
weapons”); OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 15th Session, December 3, 
2010, C-15/5, paragraph 9.10 (encouraging the EC to continue the informal consultations).  See 
also OPCW, Executive Council, Statement by Kenya on Behalf of the African Group of States 
Parties at the 66th Session of the Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.9, October 4, 2011 (African 
parties to the Convention largely endorse negotiations on what became the December 1 
Decision.) 
180    December 1 Decision, supra note __, preamble. Notably, the document does not employ the 
terms “violate,” “breach,” or even “fail to comply.” 
181     December 1 Decision, supra note __, preamble. 
182     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para. 3(a). 
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and that the costs of verifying the destruction shall be borne by the possessor 
states;183  
 --decided that each possessor state will submit a detailed plan for the 
destruction of its remaining CW, specifying a planned completion date, a 
schedule for destruction, and a description of the destruction facilities, and that 
each state shall report quarterly to the Executive Council in closed session on its 
progress;184  
 --decided that the Conference of the States Parties will undertake annual 
reviews of the implementation of this agreement, with a special session at the 
annual meeting in 2017;185 
 --decided that the Director-General will prepare written reports about the 
destruction process to the Executive Council and the Conference, based on 
independent information obtained by the Technical Secretariat from OPCW 
inspectors;186 
 --decided that the issue will be comprehensively addressed at the next 
Review Conference for the Convention;187 and 
 --decided that the possessor states will invite OPCW leadership officials to 
conduct biannual on-site visits at the destruction facilities and to meet with 
parliamentarians and government officials in capitals.188 
                                            
183     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para. 3(b). 
184     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(c) and (d). 
 Notably, the key provisions of paragraph 3 of the December 1 Decision do not employ the 
verb “shall” (which is normally used in connection with legally binding provisions) in describing the 
forthcoming actions of the possessor states, but uses language that is less rigorous, stating what 
those parties “will” do. 
185     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(f). 
186     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(e) and (g). 
187     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(h). 
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 This decision hardly “resolves” the problem – the organization and the 
parties will be grappling with the predicament of lingering CW stocks for years to 
come, including at the treaty’s Third Review Conference, April 8-19, 2013.189   
Nonetheless, it does provide the United States and Russia with quite a favorable 
benchmark: it is a pragmatic, non-confrontational, almost-unanimous posture, 
avoiding stark legal sanctions and harsh political rhetoric.  It enables the United 
States and the OPCW to “declare victory” (or at least “success”) based upon a 
judgment about the United States’ “unwavering commitment” to complete the 
task.190  The organization’s Director-General, Ahmet Üzümcü, concluded that: 
States Parties have dealt with this issue with characteristic wisdom and 
sagacity.  Their decision to enable the major possessor States to complete 
the task within a reasonable period of time confirms the reputation of the 
OPCW as a cooperative and purposeful multilateral body.  Our members 
have remained focussed on the mission and what is best to accomplish 
it.191 
 
But is this, overall, the best way to address the problem? 
 
Section 5: Treaty Breach 
 This section invokes “black letter” international law standards to assess 
U.S. behavior regarding the CWC.  The primary document in this area is the 
                                                                                                                                  
188     December 1 Decision, supra note __, para 3(j). 
189     Alexander Kelle, Chemical Weapons Destruction Deadline Missed, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, April 24, 2012. 
190     Ahmet Uzumcu, Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) Closing Ceremony, remarks at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, May 17, 2012. 
191     OPCW, Statement by the Director-General at Remembrance Day for All Victims of 
Chemical Warfare, April 26, 2012. 
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1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),192 widely accepted as 
the authoritative international law source regarding the negotiation, 
implementation, interpretation, and termination of international agreements.  Four 
primary questions are presented: a) Does U.S. behavior amount to a “material 
breach” of the CWC? b) If so, may the U.S. actions nonetheless be excusable 
under any of several plausible doctrines available under general international 
law? C) In the alternative, is any relief available due to a peculiar tension 
between disparate obligations of the CWC? and d) If there is a breach, what 
remedies or responses may be available to other states who regard themselves 
as injured by the American failure to meet the treaty deadline? 
 
 The analysis begins with observance of the time-honored principle of 
pacta sunt servanda, requiring that agreements must be kept; binding treaty 
commitments must be honored.193  This maxim is perhaps the most fundamental 
proposition of the international community; the Restatement of the Law of 
Foreign Relations concludes that it “lies at the core of the law of international 
agreements and is perhaps the most important principle of international law.”194 
                                            
192     Vienna Convention, supra note __.  The United States has signed, but not ratified, the 
Vienna Convention, and has accepted many of its provisions as reflective of customary 
international law, binding even upon non-party states.  Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, p. 144-
45; see also Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia), 1997 
International Court of Justice reports, p. 7, 35, paragraph 46 (International Court of Justice 
accepts key provisions of the Vienna Convention as statements of customary international law). 
193     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 26.  See also Id. at Preamble, paragraph 3 
(noting that the rule of pacta sunt servanda is “universally recognized”); Mark E. Villiger, 
Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on  the Law of Treaties (2009), p. 361-68; Anthony 
Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2d ed., 2007), p. 178-81; Oliver Dorr and Kirsten 
Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2012) 
[hereafter Dorr and Schmalenbach], p. 427-451 (noting that the norm is “of paramount importance 
in international relations,” p. 430); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 659-85. 
194     Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 321, comment a. 
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 In furtherance of this notion, the Vienna Convention asserts that a treaty 
must be performed “in good faith”195 and that “A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”196  
Excuses for non-performance, largely akin to the excuses for non-performance of 
a contract under the domestic law of many states, are few and rarely invoked.197 
 
 Of particular note, the longstanding official American position regarding 
compliance with arms control agreements in general, and with the CWC in 
particular, stakes out an appropriately “high road”: “The United States believes 
that States Parties should be held to their obligations under the CWC, and places 
a high premium upon their compliance both with specific detailed declaration and 
implementation provisions (e.g., Articles III, IV, V, and VII) and with the “general 
obligations” of Article I.”198  
  
 a.  Is the United States in “material breach” of the CWC?     The United 
States has consistently declined to characterize its CWC behavior as a “breach,” 
“violation,” or “failure to comply,” favoring instead more gentle (and diplomatic) 
                                            
195     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 26.  See Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 677-
81; Villiger, supra note __, at 367; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 548-49. 
196     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27.  Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 688-701; 
Villiger, supra note __, at 369-75; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 453-73.  The CWC, 
however, does incorporate (in articles IV.10 and V.11) each party’s domestic law in requiring 
conformity to the highest national standards for safety of persons and protection of the 
environment.  See infra, text accompanying notes __. 
197     Vienna Convention, supra note __, Part V, section 2. 
198     State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 40. 
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vocabulary such as simple “inability to meet the deadline.”199  Likewise, the other 
CWC parties (with the conspicuous exception of Iran) have avoided critical or 
conclusory language, including dodging the issue in the December 1 Decision.  
No competent international authority – the ICJ, U.N. Security Council, or any 
organ of the OPCW – has reached a judgment on the applicability of the term 
“breach.” 
 
Despite these verbal gymnastics, however, nothing could be clearer than 
this prominent transgression: the Convention requires that all chemical weapons 
must be destroyed by April 29, 2012; the United States nonetheless continues to 
possess chemical weapons after that date – ipso facto, there is an ongoing 
violation. 
 
 International law, however, differentiates between a “material breach” of a 
treaty and other, less consequential violations; which variety is present here?  
The VCLT defines the relevant legal term with only a parsimonious measure of 
clarity: a material breach of a treaty consists in “[t]he violation of a provision 
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.”200  The 
VCLT offers no further elaboration of the term “object or purpose.” 
                                            
199     See, e.g., Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2 (noting “the likelihood 
that the United States and Russia will miss the 29 April 2012 final extended deadline for the 
complete destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles”); Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, 
supra note __, p. 2 (noting that “the United States does not expect to complete destruction by 20 
April 2012.”) 
200     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.3(b).  See also Restatement, supra note __, 
vol. 1, sec. 335; Gomaa, supra note __, passim; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (2d ed., 1984) p. 190 (explaining that to be “material,” the breach must concern a 
matter of fundamental importance to the treaty, but need not necessarily touch upon its “central” 
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Certainly, not every manifest or serious breach of a treaty rises to the level 
of “material”; it is an intensely fact-based judgment.  The United States, for 
example, has criticized other CWC parties for failing to comply with the 
Convention’s mandates to designate a “National Authority” as the responsible 
point of contact for the Organization; to adopt necessary domestic legislation to 
implement the Convention as part of their internal law; and to emplace 
appropriate administrative measures to control international transfers of 
regulated chemicals.201  Still, the United States has not applied the “breach” or 
                                                                                                                                  
purposes); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Some Lingering Questions about Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 Cornell International Law Journal 549, 552 (1989) 
(International Law Commission concluded that a provision considered by a party to be essential 
to the effective execution of the treaty may have been material in inducing that state to join the 
treaty, even if the provision was of an ancillary character); David S. Jonas and Thomas N. 
Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law No. 3, p. 565 (2010); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1350-78; 
Villiger, supra note __, at 742-46; Aust, supra note __, at 295-96; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra 
note __, at 545-49, 1029; Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties, 2007, p. 203-34; 
Richard K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, 2008, p. 189-202; International Court of Justice, 
Judgment in Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia v. Greece), December 5, 2011, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf, paragraph 162-63 (finding that Macedonia’s violation of the 
agreement with Greece did not amount to a material breach).  See also Kirgis, supra note __, at 
550 (treating article 60 as a reflection of customary international law). 
 Domestic U.S. contract law incorporates a similar distinction.  A “material breach” of a 
contract consists of a failure of performance that is sufficiently substantial to discharge the 
contract; a lesser violation would leave the contract intact, and afford the injured party a claim for 
damages or other compensation due to the shortcomings.  American Law Institute, Restatement 
of the Law, Second, Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 237, comment d and sec. 241. 
201     State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 39.  See also OPCW Today, Vol. 1, No. 1, April 
2012, p. 28 (reporting numbers and percentages of CWC parties who had not yet completed the 
required implementation steps); Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States 
Delegation to the OPCW at the 68th Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 
2012, p. 2 (saying the United States is “seriously concerned” that CWC requirements for national 
implementation have not been met by all parties).  Arguably, these violations could legitimately be 
characterized as “material,” especially if they resulted in behavior that contravened a central 
purpose of the CWC, such as by allowing a state to evade its treaty obligations through the 
subterfuge of operating through a private citizen or corporation, or by interfering with the OPCW’s 
ability to exercise its functions inside the territory of that state.  Moreover, these breaches are 
entirely within the political control of the state; there are no technical impediments that complicate 
compliance with these CWC obligations, as there are with the requirement to destroy the CW on 
time. 
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“material breach” designators to these violations, and has not sought to enforce 
the corresponding remedies.  This self-restraint reflects both political and legal 
strategy, but does not much inform a judgment about whether a persistent failure 
to meet the fundamental CW destruction deadline would appropriately be 
deemed “material.” (The consequences of the distinction between a material 
breach and a lesser violation, in terms of the legally available remedies, are 
considered further in section d, infra.) 
 
It is important to observe at this point that the United States and Russia 
are behaving in good faith, and are not seeking or attaining any military 
advantage by exceeding the 2012 deadline.  The two states are not being 
sneaky, are not attempting to nullify the CWC by subterfuge or evasion, and are 
not trying to retain operational CW arsenals for any longer than necessary 
(although Iran has expressed doubts about U.S. bona fides in this regard.202)  In 
this sense, their behavior is quite different – much less threatening and legally 
offensive – than that of Libya’s Gaddafi, who deliberately concealed militarily 
significant quantities of functional chemical weapons, with the intention of 
retaining a covert, illicit capability.   
 
But “good faith” alone is not a complete escape; indeed, no mens rea 
concept is included in the VCLT definition of “material breach.”  The fact that a 
treaty party is not being deliberately malicious, and is neither seeking nor 
achieving a significant benefit from its violation, is surely relevant.  But its 
                                            
202     See Iran’s statements, supra note __. 
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behavior may nonetheless amount to material breach, where it is sufficiently 
important, persistent, and large scale to defeat the original interests and 
legitimate negotiating expectations of its treaty partners.203 
 
Looking first to the importance of the provision in question, as directed by 
the Vienna Convention, the negotiators’ goals in creating the CWC, to preclude 
forever the possibility of use of CW by ensuring the complete elimination of all 
parties’ CW stocks, are manifest by:  
a) the title of the treaty (“Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
Their Destruction”204 (emphasis added));  
b) the inclusion in the treaty’s preamble of a concluding paragraph 
explaining that the parties are “Convinced that the complete and effective 
prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, 
transfer and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represent a 
necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives,”205 
(emphasis added); and 
                                            
203     Commentators have noted a drafting anomaly in the VCLT definition of material breach.  
That is, the concept is applicable, on its face, to a violation of a provision essential to the treaty – 
it appears that the critical element is not necessarily how important or fundamental the breach is, 
but whether it contravenes an especially important or fundamental portion of the treaty.  However, 
this oddity may not reflect the drafters’ true intentions, and has not proven to affect the outcome 
of any reported cases or controversies.  See Kirgis, supra note __, at 552-55; Corten and Klein, 
supra note __, at 1358-60; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1031 (stating that not only 
“central” provisions of a treaty, but also “ancillary” provisions, could be deemed “essential” for this 
purpose, and noting that an obstruction of the CWC’s inspection obligations could therefore 
qualify as a “material” breach). 
204     CWC, supra note __, title. 
205     CWC, supra note __, preamble, tenth paragraph.  See also Report 104-33, supra note __, 
p. 2 (asserting that “The goals of the CWC are to eliminate the possession of chemical weapons, 
to reverse chemical weapons proliferation, and to preclude any future use of these weapons.”) 
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c) the treaty’s very blunt mandate for,206 and the elaborate and detailed 
mechanisms governing, the destruction of parties’ CW,207 including the precise 
interim deadlines specified in the above-noted “order of destruction,”208 and the 
insistence that the final deadline for elimination of CW may be extended one 
time, but “in no case” any further.209 
 
In the same vein, the OPCW, responsible for implementing the CWC, has 
unambiguously affirmed that “The most important obligation under the 
Convention is the destruction of chemical weapons.”210  Even the United States 
has confirmed that “The destruction of chemical weapons is fundamental to the 
Convention.”211 
 
It might be argued, however, that the parties’ true intention was simply to 
accomplish the “elimination” of CW, not necessarily their “timely elimination.”  
Under this view, the specifics of the “order of destruction” would be of secondary 
                                            
206     CWC, supra note __, article I.2, 3, and 4. 
207     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A). 
208     CWC, supra note __, article IV.6. 
209     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26.   
210     OPCW website, Our Work: Demilitarisation, http://www.opcw.org/our-work/.  See also 
OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the Second Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(Second Review Conference), RC-2/4, April 18, 2008, paragraph 9.4, 
http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=1837 (Review Conference 
reaffirms that “complete destruction of chemical weapons…is essential for the realisation of the 
object and purpose of the Convention” and reaffirms “the importance of the obligation of the 
possessor States Parties to complete the destruction of their chemical weapons stockpiles within 
the final extended deadlines”); John Freeman (Deputy Director General of the OPCW), The 
Experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Lessons for the Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons, in Barry M. Blechman and Alexander K. Bollfrass (eds.), Elements of a Nuclear 
Disarmament Treaty (2010), p. 117, 140 (observing that among CWC parties “there has been a 
general, continuing and unsurprising preoccupation with the core objective of destruction (in 
terms of both verifiability and the prescribed timeframe for completion)”). 
211     Eric M. Javits, Statement to the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, April 7, 2008. 
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importance – they are merely a metric, not the goal.  From this perspective, the 
principal “object and purpose” of the CWC is to ensure that CW destruction is 
complete; dilatory performance may be accounted as a “breach” of the CWC, but 
not necessarily a “material breach.”212   
 
Certainly, the parties could have based the Convention on that sort of 
proposition; they could have exhibited a less fastidious concern with timing, and 
been more relaxed about compliance with a final deadline for CW destruction.  
But in reality, the negotiators devoted considerable energy and text to specifying 
a schedule.  They deliberately combined elements of rigidity (with precise 
benchmarks at the three, five, seven, and ten year points) with elements of 
flexibility (allowing extensions of specified duration, pursuant to prescribed 
justifications.)  They did as much as they could have to demonstrate that the 
cadence was fundamental to their bargain – it could “in no case” run beyond 15 
years.213 
 
                                            
212     See Oliver Meier, OPCW Chiefs Ponder Chemical Arms Deadlines, 40 Arms Control Today 
No. 1, January/February 2010 (quoting Rogelio Pfirter, then Director-General of the OPCW, 
saying that the CWC’s core purpose is to ensure the full, irreversible, complete and universal 
destruction of existing stockpiles by possessor states; but that “we need not…make the ultimate 
success of the treaty dependent on any particular date.”) 
 Domestic U.S. contract law incorporates a similar concept: parties to a contract may 
stipulate that “time is of the essence,” meaning that a failure to perform on time constitutes a 
material breach, allowing the aggrieved party to rescind the contract.  See Samuel Williston, A 
Treatise on Contracts, 4th ed., by Richard A. Lord (2000), chapter 46. 
213     See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 347, n. 34 (noting that a party may request only 
one extension of the ten-year deadline, to a maximum of five additional years; if a party 
requested, say, only a three-year extension, it could not thereafter request an additional two-year 
extension.  If such a state failed to meet the 13-year deadline, “it will become non-compliant with 
the Convention, which could trigger mechanisms under Article XII.”) 
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In this regard, even 90 percent compliance (which the United States 
achieved before April 29, 2012, and which Russia will reach some time 
thereafter) is insufficient.  Especially in the vital realm of arms control and 
national security, merely getting “close” to full conformity is inadequate, and the 
United States, in particular, has long been a vigorous leader in insisting upon the 
highest standards of fidelity to international weapons-related obligations.214  
Imagine, for comparison, how the United States would respond if, say, North 
Korea or Iran were to reply to complaints about their illegal nuclear weapons 
programs by explaining that they possessed only very small numbers of the 
contraband weapons – less than ten percent or even one percent of the nuclear 
stockpiles retained by the United States or Russia.215 
 
Moreover, even the last ten percent of the initial stockpile held by the 
United States and the last 40 percent or so of Russia’s original holdings – the 
overages by which they are now violating the treaty – are greater than the 
initially-reported CW inventories of any other CWC party.  And as noted, the 
infraction here is not a “near miss” – in the case of the United States, the 
violation will persist for 11½ years. 
 
                                            
214     See generally, State Compliance Report, supra note __; U.S. Department of State, 
Compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011.  
215  Under the 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 
U.S.T. 483, TIAS 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter, NPT], some countries (including the 
United States) are legally allowed to continue to possess nuclear weapons, while others 
(including Iran and North Korea) are not.  See State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 62-67 
(Iran’s violations of NPT), 72-76 (North Korea’s violations). 
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In short, this is surely a case of a continuous “breach” of the CWC, even 
though only one state, and no OPCW organ or international court, has labeled it 
as such.  The better view, moreover, is that it rises to the level of “material 
breach,” based upon the violence that the violation does to the accomplishment 
of an essential feature of the Convention.   
 
 b.  Are there applicable legal excuses under general international law for 
the U.S. material breach of the CWC?  If the failure to meet the April 2012 
deadline must be accounted as a breach or material breach of the CWC, can any 
constructive use be made of the traditional “excuses” for non-performance of 
treaty obligations?  Three related mitigation doctrines are considered: 
impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure. 
 
 The Vienna Convention establishes “supervening impossibility of 
performance” as a valid basis for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty.216  But 
the conditions for invoking this doctrine are quite restrictive: the central concept is 
                                            
216    Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61.  In the Vienna Convention, the doctrine is 
expressed as a basis for a permissible termination or withdrawal from a treaty, but the same 
concept would also be available as a justifying excuse for non-performance of a treaty obligation, 
in defense against an allegation of breach.  Cf Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 
51 and 101; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1249-54 (relationship between VCLT and 
rules of state responsibility).  See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 336, comment c 
and reporters’ note 3, and sec. 337-38; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1382-1408; Sinclair, 
supra note __, at 190-92; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1051-65; Kirgis, supra note 
__, at 566; VCLT, supra note __, article 73 (specifying that provisions of the VCLT are without 
prejudice to the international law of state responsibility).  The International Law Commission’s 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2001, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf [hereinafter, ILC 
Draft Articles] Part I, Chapter V, present six circumstances that preclude the wrongfulness of 
conduct that would otherwise amount to a breach of an international legal obligation; several of 
these are considered, infra.  The United States has no interest in terminating or withdrawing from 
the CWC – quite the contrary; the United States seeks to sustain and support the treaty, while 
resisting allegations that it is unjustifiably breaching it. 
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applicable when an impossibility arises from “the permanent disappearance or 
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.”217  Nothing 
of that sort is relevant here.  Moreover, a treaty party is not privileged to invoke 
impossibility when the situation is the result of that party’s own violation of the 
treaty or of another international law obligation.218 
  
 In the leading International Court of Justice (ICJ)219 case in the field, 
concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary vs. Slovakia) in 1997,220 
the court established a very high standard for claims of “impossibility.”  Ruling 
that Hungary was not justified in withdrawing from a joint project to construct an 
elaborate system of locks on the Danube River, the ICJ conceded that the 
project’s economic viability had greatly diminished over the years and that a new 
environmental consciousness had altered the prior appreciation of the desirability 
of the changes in navigation and flood control.  Nonetheless, the Court held that 
increased costliness did not make the project “practically impossible,” as 
Hungary had asserted, and the heightened environmental sensitivity did not 
provide an easy escape hatch, either.221  The ICJ also noted that the underlying 
agreement between Hungary and Slovakia had incorporated a provision dealing 
                                            
217    Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61.1.  See Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 
1387-94; Villiger, supra note __, at 755-58; Aust, supra note __, at 296-97; Dorr and 
Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1055-59 (considering concepts of “absolute” and “relative” 
impossibility, and “objective” and “subjective” impossibility). 
218    Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 61.2.  See Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 
1401-02; Villiger, supra note __, at 758-59; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1060-61. 
219     The International Court of Justice (ICJ) (sometimes referred to as the World Court) is the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations.  All U.N. members are parties to the treaty that 
creates the ICJ.  Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 
Bevans 1153, Chapter XIV; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179. 
220     Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __. 
221     Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 94, 102-03. 
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explicitly with changes or revisions that might become necessary in the life of the 
project; the existence of this clause demonstrated that the parties had originally 
envisioned the possibility for some alterations, but had deliberately determined 
not to allow others.222 
 
 Likewise, in the CWC context, the text of the treaty already contemplates 
a concept akin to impossibility and incorporates what the negotiating states 
considered an adequate response.   The standard for granting an extension of 
the early phases (for destroying 1, 20, and 45 percent of a party’s CW) is that “a 
State Party, due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, believes that it 
cannot achieve the level of destruction specified.”223  The Executive Council and 
the Conference of the States Parties may then agree to modulate these 
intermediate deadlines, as long as the ultimate deadline (to destroy all CW within 
ten years) remains intact.224  The criteria for requesting the one allowable 
extension of the ten-year standard is that the party “will be unable to ensure the 
destruction” as originally contemplated.225  In granting no more than five years of 
relief, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties shall set 
“specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its 
destruction programme.”226  Thus, the treaty-makers expressly anticipated that 
the process of fulfilling the goal of destroying CW on schedule could be difficult, 
expensive, and time-consuming, and that a state’s initial estimates of its ability to 
                                            
222     Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraph 103, 104. 
223     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.21. 
224     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.22-23. 
225     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.24. 
226     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26. 
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do the job could become inaccurate.  They agreed to provide a limited amount of 
“wiggle room,” but were unreceptive to any notion that rising costs or other 
emerging challenges might provide a valid basis for lengthier or repeated 
delay.227 
 
 In tacit acknowledgement of this reality, American officials in the past have 
been constrained not to assert that the United States is destroying the remaining 
chemical weapons “as quickly as possible” (because it would, in fact, have been 
quite possible to proceed even more quickly, if the United States were to devote 
additional funding to the task, to improve the management and oversight of the 
program, and/or to remove the self-imposed legislative barriers against 
employing the established incineration technology at the final two sites or against 
transporting the remaining CW inventory to already-functioning locations.)  They 
have, instead, resorted to more vague formulations, such as the insistence that 
                                            
227     See Report 104-33, supra note __, at 7 (noting that the CWC “does allow flexibility in the 
destruction process, permitting extension of the 10-year timeframe for up to 5 years.”)  The CWC 
negotiators also included another provision through which a party could indicate, at the early 
stage of submitting its “general plan for destruction of chemical weapons” that there might be 
“issues which could adversely impact on the national destruction programme.”  CWC, supra note 
__, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).A.6(h). 
A slightly different jurisprudential theory would assert that the timetable provisions of the 
CWC should be deemed invalid due to “error” or mistake.  VCLT article 48 confirms this remedy 
when “the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State to exist at the time 
when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of its consent to be bound by the 
treaty.”  VCLT, supra note __, article 48.1.  Perhaps the United States could contend that its 
projected (but ultimately mistaken) ability to destroy the CW stockpile within 10 (or 15) years was 
a “fact or situation” within the meaning of this provision.  However, the VCLT also specifies that 
this escape is unavailable “if the State in question contributed by its own conduct to the error or if 
the circumstances were such as to put that State on notice of a possible error.”  Id. at article 48.2.  
See also Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 331(1)(a) and comment b.  This doctrine would 
therefore be inapplicable to the CWC deadline, for the same reasons discussed in the 
accompanying text. 
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the destruction is occurring as rapidly as “feasible” or “practicable.”228  In short, 
this is not an “impossibility” situation. 
 
 A second kind of justification for non-performance, changed 
circumstances or rebus sic stantibus, is conceptually something of a “special 
case” of the impossibility argument.  It asserts that where something important 
and fundamental has altered the viability of an original agreement, a party may 
be allowed to vitiate its now-unappealing bargain.229 
 
 The Vienna Convention validates this concept, but confines it to situations 
in which: a) the change “was not foreseen by the parties”;230 b) the original 
circumstances “constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be 
                                            
228     See, e.g., Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 1, 2 (saying that the United 
States is committed to destroying its CW “as rapidly as practicable” and “as soon as practicable”); 
Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2, 5 (employing the phrase “as rapidly 
as practicable”); Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the 
OPCW at the 68th Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 1 (same). 
See also Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27 (“A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”) 
229     Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1411-33; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 
1067-1104). 
230     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1.  See also, Restatement, supra note __, vol. 
1, sec. 336 and reporters’ note 1 (identifying the “chief example of resort to rebus sic stantibus in 
United States practice” as the suspension of the 1930 International Load Line Convention due to 
the outbreak of World War II);  Sinclair, supra note __, at 192-96 (recounting negotiators’ 
apprehensions about the concept of rebus sic stantibus, and the limits upon it that they inserted 
into the Vienna Convention); Aust, supra note __, at 297-300 (noting that the doctrine has 
routinely been recognized by international authorities and frequently invoked by states, but never 
applied by an international tribunal); Villiger, supra note __, at 766-81; Richard D. Kearney and 
Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 American Journal of International Law, 1970, p. 495, 
542-44. 
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bound by the treaty”;231 and c) “[t]he effect of the change is radically to transform 
the extent of the obligations still to be performed under the treaty.”232 
 
 Here, regarding “foreseeability,” the negotiating states certainly did 
anticipate that unfavorable conditions might lead to the CW elimination process 
requiring more time than contemplated in a party’s original order of destruction.  
They explicitly provided for the possibility of extension of the three-, five-, and 
seven-year interim deadlines, and even of the final ten-year period.  But when 
the negotiators stared at the possibility that a party might request more than even 
the allowable 15 years, they balked.  They did “foresee” that hypothetical 
contingency, and they explicitly rejected it, writing that “in no case” could more 
than 15 years be tolerated.233 
 
 Likewise, what circumstances that “constituted an essential basis” for the 
treaty have changed?  Costs have certainly risen, but when the ICJ addressed 
changed circumstances in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, it concluded that 
even a stark diminution of the originally-estimated economic feasibility of the 
                                            
231     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1(a). 
232     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 62.1(b).  The Vienna Convention also specifies 
that the doctrine cannot be invoked to withdraw from a treaty that establishes an international 
boundary or where the changed circumstances are the result of the party’s own prior violation of 
its international legal obligations.  Id. at article 62.2.  See Villiger, supra note __, at 776 Dorr and 
Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1078-97 (identifying five conditions for invocation of the 
doctrine). 
233     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.26; Dorr and 
Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1086 (it would be “manifestly unreasonable” to invoke the 
doctrine of changed circumstances when the parties had foreseen the possible change of 
circumstances). 
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project was insufficient to vitiate the original consent to be bound.234  Here, 
satisfactory chemical neutralization technologies proved more elusive than 
originally hoped, but they were certainly in contemplation when the treaty was 
concluded in 1993.  At that point, incineration was almost the entire focus of the 
U.S. program, but Congress had already begun to require examination of 
alternatives.  The belated switch to new methods was wholly a unilateral U.S. 
choice, not one forced upon it by the Convention, by Nature, or by any other 
exogenous circumstances.235   
  
 Similarly, the “extent of the obligations still to be performed” by the United 
States under the CWC has not been “radically transformed” (except in the sense 
that 90 percent of the U.S. stocks have already been disposed of).  For example, 
there have been no new “discoveries” of additional operational chemical 
weapons that were surprisingly added to the pile to be destroyed (as did occur in 
both Libya and Albania).  So an argument about changed circumstances as a 
valid exoneration for the United States missing the CWC deadline is also 
unavailing. 
 
 Finally, the third related argument about legitimate non-performance of a 
treaty is force majeure.  Here, too, the notion is a variant of impossibility, but the 
focus is specifically on the intervention of an “irresistible force or unforeseen 
event,” beyond the control of the state, such as a major earthquake or tsunami, 
                                            
234     Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraph 104. 
235     See legislation, supra, note __, mandating pursuit of alternative technologies for CW 
destruction. 
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or the outbreak of a war, that suddenly renders the state physically unable to 
fulfill its legal commitments.236  This mitigation doctrine is also well-established in 
international law, but it has important limits, too -- in particular the condition that it 
is not applicable if the situation of force majeure is due to the conduct or neglect 
of the state attempting to invoke it, or if that state has assumed the risk of the 
situation occurring.237  There must be “no element of free choice” in the 
defaulting state’s behavior.238 
 
 In the CWC case, the United States, unfortunately, brought most of the 
compliance trouble upon itself.  The belated decision to employ neutralization 
technology at two sites, the earlier decision not to consolidate the CW inventories 
at fewer locations, and the questionable management and oversight practices at 
the sites were not inherent in the treaty.  Those are self-inflicted wounds, not 
ascribable to any external, uncontrollable agent, and not falling within the purview 
of the doctrine of force majeure. 
                                            
236     The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties does not employ the term “force majeure,” 
but the concept is familiar in international law, as recognized by the ILC Draft Articles, supra note 
__, article 23.  The ILC states that the doctrine is applicable when there is an “irresistible force” 
that is beyond the control of the state concerned and that makes it “materially impossible” to 
perform its obligations.  It is not available where the performance has simply become more 
difficult, as, for example, due to a political or economic crisis.  Id. at Commentary, paras 2 and 3.  
See also Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1396-98. 
See Rainbow Warrior arbitration, New Zealand/France, UNRIAA, Vol XX, Part III, April 
30, 1990, p. 217, 253 (establishing a high standard for a claim of force majeure, “absolute and 
material impossibility,” not including circumstances that simply render performance “more difficult 
or burdensome.”) http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XX/215-284.pdf  
237     ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23.2.  The doctrine of force majeure is inapplicable 
in situations created by the neglect or default of the breaching state, even if the resulting injury 
was accidental or unintended.  Id., Commentary, paras. 3, 9 (stating that the doctrine might be 
applicable where a state “may have unwittingly contributed to the occurrence of material 
impossibility by something which, in hindsight, might have been done differently but which was 
done in good faith.”) 
238     ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 23, Commentary, para. 1. 
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 Thus, the most plausible candidate excuses for mitigating U.S. non-
performance of the CWC destruction obligations will not suffice.239  More 
importantly, the United States should not want them to suffice.  If the CWC, and 
treaties in general, were so malleable, so subject to escape whenever conditions 
changed, they would not be worth very much.  It is decidedly not in the U.S. 
interest to cheapen the notion of pacta sunt servanda240 in international 
obligations in that way – even if doing so might help escape liability in this 
particular instance.  In the long run, the United States depends upon the 
reliability of international legal instruments and should endeavor to make them 
more secure, not enabling wrong-doers to slide blithely out of accountability. 
 
 c.  Does the CWC provide another kind of relief, due to its unusual 
combination of obligations?  Even if the excuses for non-performance found in 
general international law are unavailing, one peculiar feature of the CWC may 
seem to offer yet another possible legal strategy. 
 
                                            
239     The ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, discuss some additional circumstances precluding the 
wrongfulness of a state’s act that might be considered briefly.  Under articles 20 and 45, for 
example, a state may “consent” to the act of another state, or may waive any objection to that act.  
In the CWC case, however, the parties have expressly not agreed to or accepted the U.S. and 
Russian violations of the destruction timetable; the December 1 Decision reflects no such release 
or waiver of objection.  Likewise, ILC article 25, regarding the defense of “necessity,” establishes 
a very stringent benchmark, related to an act that “is the only way for the State to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; and does not seriously impair an essential 
interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international 
community as a whole”; the CWC case does not fit that description. 
240     Supra, note __. 
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 That is, it might be suggested that the 2012 deadline is “soft,” and that 
running well past it should not be deemed culpable because the excess time is 
due to fastidious adherence to other CWC obligations, namely the requirement to 
“assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the 
environment”241 and the requirement to conduct the destruction and other treaty-
mandated operations with full transparency, open to OPCW inspection and 
accountability.242   
 
 This argument has a certain facial attractiveness, and to some extent it is 
grounded in the reality that safety, security, and verifiability take time and carry 
costs.  But there is treachery in the concept that one treaty obligation may be 
traded off against others, and that a party has liberty to decide on its own which 
legal obligations to fulfill and which to skimp or defer.  The system of international 
law requires that a party to a treaty comply with all the obligations, even when 
there may be some unrecognized tension between them.  If the negotiators 
improvidently embrace genuinely conflicting obligations, so they cannot be 
simultaneously honored, then wise states should not join the treaty, should join 
subject to limiting reservations, or should pursue amendments to it.  But once a 
state has consented to a treaty such as the CWC, it must be obligated to find 
some way – difficult as it may be – to reconcile the obligations, not unilaterally 
cherry-picking the easiest among them.243 
                                            
241     CWC, supra note __, article IV.10 
242     CWC, supra note __, article IV.3. 
243    See CWC, supra note __, article VII.1 (“Each State Party shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this 
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 Still, the CWC requires carrying this analysis one step further, because the 
treaty explicitly imports national standards about safety and environmental 
protection into the international obligations.  Article IV.10 specifies that “Each 
State Party shall transport, sample, store and destroy chemical weapons in 
accordance with its national standards for safety and emissions.”244  Conformity 
with the full array of relevant federal and state laws, regulations, and judicial 
decisions is therefore built into the CWC.  If the applicable U.S. national 
standards simply do not allow the destruction to be accomplished within the time 
frame articulated in the order of destruction, then perhaps the general reference 
in article IV could be said to trump the specifics of the treaty’s Verification Annex.   
 
 That sort of outcome, however, should be inadmissible; standard maxims 
of treaty interpretation require parties to attempt to effectuate all provisions in a 
treaty simultaneously, to avoid constructions that contrapose different sections 
against each other.245  The different articles in the CWC – as with any lengthy 
and complicated treaty – establish mandates that are cumulative, not alternative.  
                                                                                                                                  
Convention.”)  See also Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation 
to the OPCW at the 69th Session of the Executive Council, EC-69/NAT.15, July 11, 2012, p. 2 
(arguing against “contentious and pointless arguments about whether one provision or another [of 
the CWC] is most important….All the provisions of the Convention must be effectively 
implemented.”) 
244    CWC, supra note __, article IV.10. 
245    Linderfalk, supra note __, at 107-08 (treaty interpretation should assume that different parts 
of a treaty were intended to be logically compatible).  Under domestic U.S. contract law, “where 
an integrated agreement has been negotiated with care and in detail and has been expertly 
drafted for the particular transaction, an interpretation is very strongly rejected if it would render 
some provisions superfluous,” American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, 
Contracts 2d, 1979, sec. 203, comment b, and  
“an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all the terms is 
preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect,” id., at 
sec. 203(a). 
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The treaty-makers should be understood to require each party to reconcile its 
various obligations – to find a way, somehow, to implement both the time-limited 
destruction and the adherence to national safety and environmental standards.246  
The United States would certainly not tolerate some other CWC party’s attempt 
to evade its fundamental treaty obligations via the simple expedient of drafting 
very restrictive national “safety” or “emissions” standards that, as a practical 




 d.  What are the available responses to a breach of the CWC?  If the U.S. 
failure to destroy its CW stockpile by the final extended April 29, 2012 deadline 
constitutes a breach of the treaty – indeed, a material breach -- and if none of the 
putative excuses offers a sufficient defense, what recourse is available to the 
aggrieved other parties to the treaty?  A leading criticism of the efficacy of the 
system of international law focuses on the paucity of effective restorative or 
compensatory remedies for violation,248 but both legal and political responses 
must be evaluated. 
                                            
246     See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, p. 75, 109 (agreeing that the CWC allows each 
party considerable discretion regarding the specific measures that will have to be adopted to fulfill 
its treaty commitments, but concluding that a party lives up to its obligations only “when its 
national measures ensure the implementation of the rather broad and complex field of diverse 
obligations contained in all parts of the Convention, especially those in the complex verification 
mechanism.”) 
247    See also Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 27 (“A party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”); ILC Draft Articles, 
supra note __, articles 3 and 32 (compliance with domestic law is irrelevant to a determination 
about compliance with international law); Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 692-95. 
248     See generally, David Luban, Julie R. O’Sullivan, and David P. Steward, International and 
Transnational Criminal Law (2010), p. 48-50; Barry E. Carter and Allen S. Weiner, International 
Law (6th ed., 2011), p. 22-44. 
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 First, consider the avenues specified in the CWC itself.  Here, the 
assessment is somewhat complicated by the fact that the treaty drafters did not 
expressly confer upon the OPCW organs any clear authority to make official 
findings about treaty compliance (as, for example, the Board of Governors of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency is empowered to do.249)  Indeed, during the 
CWC negotiations, the United States championed the concept that only individual 
states – not the organization as a whole or the Executive Council or the 
Conference of the States Parties within it – should exercise that important legal 
and political power.250  On the other hand, the CWC does contain numerous 
                                            
249     Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, signed October 26, 1956, entered into 
force July 29, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 1093; TIAS 3873; 276 UNTS 3, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html, article V.E (powers of General Counsel), VI (powers 
of Board of Governors); International Atomic Energy Agency, Report of the Director General to 
the Board of Governors, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant 
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 8, 2011, 
GOV/2011/65, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65.pdf  (noting 
that the IAEA Board of Governors has adopted ten resolutions regarding the implementation of 
nuclear safeguards in Iran); International Atomic Energy Agency, Board of Governors, Resolution 
on Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, November 18, 2011, GOV/2011/69, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-69.pdf; International Atomic 
Energy Agency, General Council, Resolution on Implementation of the NPT safeguards 
agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, GC(52)/21, 
October 4, 2008; International Atomic Energy Agency, Verifying Compliance with Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Undertakings, September 2011, 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguards0408.pdf 
250     See Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 228 (recalling that “The United States insisted during 
the negotiations that the decision on determining a state’s compliance was a sovereign right of 
individual state parties”); Department of State, Article-by-article analysis of Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Treaty Doc. 103-21, http://dtirp.dtra.mil/TIC/treatyinfo/cwc.aspx (in explaining article 
VIII.35-36, the Department of State observes “the Executive Council should address concerns 
and situations related to compliance, as opposed to actually deciding whether or not there has 
been compliance with the Convention”), Id. at article IX.22 (“the Executive Council is not given 
any special powers in regard to determining compliance or non–compliance…The language in 
paragraph 22 is a compromise between certain developing countries that wanted an international 
body to decide whether a violation had occurred, and other negotiating states, including the U.S., 
that wanted decisions on violations to be left up to each State Party itself to determine.”)  But see 
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact Sheet: 
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passages related to ensuring compliance with the treaty, redressing situations 
contravening its provisions, and settling disputes under it, which implicitly 
presume an ability to take official actions in deliberate response to recognized 
breaches. 
 
 The first, most basic, power the CWC confers upon its parties and the 
treaty organs is the ability simply to discuss compliance matters of any sort.  
Article IX contemplates “consultations” “on any matter” that may affect the object 
and purpose, or the implementation, of the Convention.251  The U.S. Department 
of State reports that “The United States has successfully used bilateral 
consultations under Article IX to clarify and resolve concerns about the 
compliance of various States Party.”252  In addition to those “direct” consultations, 
both the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties have the 
authority, in “regular” or “special” sessions to raise and debate issues affecting 
the life of the organization and the CWC.253  Conversely, no one has the 
                                                                                                                                  
Verification and Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, October 1, 2005, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57328.htm (U.S. Department of State acknowledges that 
the Conference of the States Parties “is authorized to “review compliance” with the CWC, and is 
to “[t]ake the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and 
remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention….”, quoting CWC, 
supra note __, article XII.1).  See also Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 220-21 (noting 
impasse among the CWC negotiators on the question of whether the Conference should be 
empowered to find a violation, and observing that “The actual wording [of article XII] does not 
require such a formal decision” as part of a determination about appropriate responsive 
measures.) 
251     CWC, supra note __, article IX.1.  See Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 171-98 
(discussing consultations features of CWC). 
252     U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact 
Sheet: Verification and Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, October 1, 2005, p. 
1, http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57328.htm  
253     CWC, supra note __, articles VIII.36 and IX.4.f. 
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automatic right to shut off debate arbitrarily, sweeping uncomfortable issues 
under the rug. 
 
 For example, CWC article XII (“Measures to redress a situation and to 
ensure compliance, including sanctions”) empowers the Conference of the States 
Parties to “take the necessary measures…to ensure compliance…and to redress 
and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this 
Convention.”254  If a party fails to take measures to “redress a situation raising 
problems with regard to its compliance,” the Conference may “restrict or suspend 
the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes 
the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.”255  
Furthermore, in “cases where serious damage to the object and purpose” of the 
Convention may result, the Conference “may recommend collective measures” to 
the parties,256 and “in cases of particular gravity,” the Conference may bring the 
issue to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and Security 
Council.257 
 
 In addition, under Article XIV (“Settlement of disputes”) parties to a 
disagreement about the interpretation or application of the treaty shall consult 
                                            
254     CWC, supra note __, article XII.1.  See Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 184-85 (rebutting 
critics who argued that the Convention’s regime for sanctions and penalties for non-compliance 
was too vague to constitute an effective deterrent, asserting that “the Convention’s sanctions and 
provisions are more comprehensive than those of any other similar agreement.”); Krutzsch and 
Trapp, supra note __, at 218-28. 
255     CWC, supra note __, article XII.2. 
256     CWC, supra note __, article XII.3. 
257     CWC, supra note __, article XII.4. 
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“with a view to the expeditious settlement of the dispute”258 and the Executive 
Council may contribute its good offices or other support to that effort.259  The 
Executive Council and the Conference are also empowered to request an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ on any legal question within the scope of the 
OPCW activities.260   
 
Each party has the right to request the Executive Council “to assist in 
clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise 
to a concern about the possible non-compliance of another State Party.”261  A 
series of short deadlines applies to communications and responses between the 
Executive Council and the party whose behavior is questioned.262  The 
concerned state may also call upon the Director-General to establish a “group of 
experts” from within the Technical Secretariat or outside it, “to examine all 
available information and data relevant to the situation causing concern.”263 
 
                                            
258     CWC, supra note __, article XIV.2; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 231-38. 
259     CWC, supra note __, article XIV.3. 
260     CWC, supra note __, article XIV.5.  Pursuant to the Agreement Concerning the Relationship 
Between the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 
concluded in 2000 and entered into force in 2001, the Conference of the States Parties and the 
Executive Council are authorized to transmit to the General Assembly of the United Nations a 
request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ.  Relationship Agreement, article VII, available at  
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/un-opcw-relationship/#c4064  
261     CWC, supra note __, article IX.3.  Iran has invoked this set of procedures to challenge the 
United States and United Kingdom regarding the validity under the CWC of those parties’ actions 
to recover, examine, and destroy older CW items recovered in Iraq in 2003-09, without 
application of the Convention’s transparency provisions.  See supra, text accompanying notes 
___.  Jonathan B. Tucker, Iraq Faces Major Challenges in Destroying Its Legacy Chemical 
Weapons, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Feature Stories, March 4, 2010.  
262     CWC, supra note __, article IX.4. 
263     CWC, supra note __, article IX.4(e).  
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 Finally, any party has the right to request a “challenge inspection” – an on-
site observation of a facility or location in another state, for the purpose of 
“clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance.”264  
Any such inspection would be conducted by the Technical Secretariat, and the 
CWC elaborates the procedures for authorizing and conducting the inspection.265  
(To date, no challenge inspections have ever been requested or conducted 
under the CWC.)  Notably, a requested challenge inspection may be blocked 
only by a three-quarters vote of the Executive Council, on the grounds that it 
would be “frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond the scope” of the CWC.266  In the 
case of the missed U.S. destruction deadline, there would be little that an 
inspection could reveal, beyond all the information that the United States has 
been self-reporting. 
 
 Beyond the avenues specified in the CWC itself, treaty parties may also 
take advantage of options available under general international law.  The most 
conspicuous category of these remedies is codified in article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention, which deals with responses to a material breach.  This therefore 
constitutes the most important consequence of a determination that the failure to 
destroy the CW on time constitutes a “material breach,” as opposed to a lesser 
transgression.267 
                                            
264     CWC, supra note __, article IX.8. 
265     CWC, supra note __, article IX.8-25 and Verification Annex, Part X. 
266     CWC, supra note __, article IX.17.  If the Executive Council determines that the request for 
a challenge inspection is abusive, it may require the requesting party to bear the costs of the 
inspection.  CWC, supra note __, article IX.22(c) and 23. 
267     See ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, articles 42 and 48; Gomaa, supra note __, p. 90-106; 
Corten and Klein, supra note __, p. 1361-66; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1021-41.  
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 Under the VCLT, three strands of response are available regarding a 
multilateral treaty such as the CWC: 
--the other treaty parties may, by unanimous consent, suspend the 
operation of the treaty in whole or in part, or terminate it (either among all 
the parties, or just with respect to the defaulting state);268 
--a party that is “specially affected” by the breach may suspend the 
operation of the treaty, in whole or in part, in its dealings with the 
breaching state;269 and 
--if the treaty is “of such a character that a material breach of its provisions 
by one party radically changes the position of every other party with 
respect to the further performance of its obligations,” then any party is 
entitled to suspend the treaty in whole or in part.270 
 
 There has been little operational experience in construing the key terms in 
these provisions.271  We cannot be confident, therefore, whether any individual 
CWC party could legitimately contend that it was “specially affected” by the U.S. 
                                                                                                                                  
Under the Vienna Convention, a material breach may be invoked by a party to suspend or 
terminate a treaty, but the breach does not automatically accomplish those effects by itself.  
Kearney and Dalton, supra note __, at 540. 
268     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.2(a). 
269     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.2(b). 
270     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 60.2(c). 
271     See Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 335; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1360; 
Villiger, supra note __, at 749; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 1071 (referring to the 
“scarcity of affirmative decisions” regarding the doctrine of changed circumstances).  Note that 
there is no requirement that a party’s response to a breach must be “proportional” to the 
provocation.  See Kearney and Dalton, supra note __, at 540; Gomaa, supra note __, at 120-21; 
Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1373-75. 
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delay in destroying its CW or that the CWC is of such a character that this 
particular violation “radically changes the position” of each of the other parties. 
 
 Commentators have suggested that these provisions might be particularly 
applicable to arms control treaties, where a breach by any party might undermine 
the entire treaty regime, even if the violation was not targeted at any particular 
state and none of them was deliberately “specially affected.”272 Moreover, Iran, 
for example, might assert that under the current conditions of political tension 
between itself and the United States, it is “specially affected” by its adversary’s 
retention, for an additional decade or more, of CW.273   
  
 The VCLT establishes obligatory procedures for a country wishing to 
vindicate its article 60 rights, including requirements for written notice of its 
intention;274 a “cooling off” period of at least three months;275 and recourse to the 
full panoply of U.N. conciliation and dispute resolution facilities.276  In the current 
instance, no CWC party has initiated any such procedures; indeed, the 
                                            
272     Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1365; Villiger, supra note __, at 745; ILC Draft Articles, 
supra note __, at article 42, comment 13; Aust, supra note __, at 294; Gomaa, supra note __, at 
104-05; Sinclair, supra note __, at 189.  
273     In this sort of situation, it is not clear what it would mean for Iran or any other state to 
suspend or terminate its CWC obligations only with respect to the United States, if its CWC 
obligations would nonetheless remain intact with respect to all the other parties. 
274     VCLT, supra note __, article 65.1, 67.1. 
275     VCLT, supra note __, article 65.2. 
276     VCLT, supra note __, article 65.3, 66.  See also ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 
43; Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1483-1568; Villiger, supra note __, at 799-850; Aust, 
supra note __, at 300-02; Gomaa, supra note __, at 157-73; Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note 
__, at 1131-76); Kirgis, supra note __, at 555-58.  See International Court of Justice, Judgment in 
Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia v. Greece), December 5, 2011, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/142/16827.pdf, 
paragraph 164 (finding that Greece’s response to Macedonia’s violation of their treaty was not 
justified under the doctrine countermeasures.) 
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December 1 Decision represents precisely the opposite tack, reflecting the 
parties’ near-consensus determination to sustain and strengthen the CWC, not to 
suspend or terminate it. 
 
 Aside from the VCLT, another category of legal response to a breach – 
material or otherwise -- arises from the general concept of “countermeasures.”  
Under this unusual self-help rubric, a state may legitimately initiate an action that 
would otherwise be illegal, if its step is a timely, temporary response to another 
state’s prior violation of a legal obligation, is intended to induce that other state to 
return to compliance with that original obligation, and is proportional to the gravity 
of the initial offense.277  Notably, a countermeasure need not be confined to 
responding to a “material” breach (even a non-material violation can provide an 
adequate predicate) and the responding state is not restricted to actions within 
the scope of the same treaty that was the subject of the triggering breach (the 
responding state may opt to derogate from some wholly different treaty or some 
other type of international legal obligation, so long as the effort is to motivate the 
first state to reform its behavior.)278  A countermeasure must be non-forceful, and 
directed solely at the state guilty of the original breach – the concept is that the 
responding state may attempt to induce the breaching state to right the wrong, 
but may not aim merely at inflicting retribution or imposing a penalty.  Ordinarily, 
                                            
277     ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 22 and Part III, Chapter II; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, 
supra note __, paragraphs 82-87; Aust, supra note __, at 362-66. 
278     Corten and Klein, supra note __, at 1376. 
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a state seeking to exercise countermeasures must implement good faith 
negotiation and dispute resolution procedures.279  
 
 Again, it is largely speculation to contemplate what countermeasures 
might be undertaken by CWC parties who were attempting to put additional 
pressure on the United States to accelerate its CW destruction.  But almost the 
entire realm of international legal responsibilities, including trade concessions, 
law enforcement cooperation, diplomatic relations, status of forces agreements, 
and other arms control accords might legitimately be put onto the table.280 
 
 Finally, it is worth noting that an aggrieved party could also respond to the 
U.S. breach via a host of random political, as opposed to legal, measures and 
policies.281  It may be difficult to imagine the United States being the target, 
instead of the protagonist, of economic or trade sanctions, or other types of 
political punishments, but at least in principle, something of that sort could be 
available. In a different vein, it is likely that the most grave ramifications of the 
U.S. breach may emerge in the form of diminished respect by other countries for 
the United States, for the CWC, for arms control efforts more broadly, and for 
                                            
279     ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, at articles 52-53. 
280     ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, article 50, specifies that countermeasures shall not affect 
certain types of obligations, such as to refrain from the use of force or to protect fundamental 
human rights.  See, e.g., Victoria Nuland, Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, November 22, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177630.htm (United States announces that it will cease 
carrying out certain obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, with regard to 
Russia, in response to Russia’s unjustified unilateral suspension of its performance under that 
treaty). 
281     The ILC Draft Articles, supra note __, Part III, Chapter II, uses the term “countermeasure,” 
instead of “reprisal” (which refers to actions undertaken during armed conflict) and “retorsion” 
(which refers to unfriendly conduct that is not inconsistent with a legal obligation.) 
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international law in general.  It may become harder for the United States to 
champion effectively the cause of scrupulous adherence to other vital 
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.  Other states could more readily 
dismiss as hypocrisy the exhortations and demands they may receive from 
Washington, D.C. about the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),282 the 
1972 Biological Weapons Convention,283 the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,284 or the 
CWC itself,285 when the United States has been so egregiously unable to keep 
its own house in order regarding the destruction demands of the CWC. 
 
 Indeed, Iran has already seized the moment to excoriate the United States 
for its CWC violation, in a transparent attempt to deflect attention from the U.S. 
charges that Iran is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapons program.286  
Iran’s apparent “offset” strategy has to date failed to gain any traction with the 
                                            
282     NPT, supra note __, is the most important instrument regulating the dissemination of 
nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and a cap on the nuclear 
arms race. 
283     The BWC, supra note __, was the first international agreement to outlaw an entire category 
of weapons of mass destruction and remains the single most important multilateral instrument 
regarding biological weapons.   
284     The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, TIAS No. 6347, 
610 UNTS 205, entered into force October 10, 1967, incorporates the foundational principles 
regarding arms control in outer space and peaceful exploration and use of space. 
285     See Rademaker statement, supra note __ (asserting that over a dozen countries possess or 
are actively pursuing chemical weapons, and exhorting that “If this Organization [the OPCW] is to 
fulfill its promise, it must not shrink from the task of confronting those States Parties that are 
violating the Convention.”) 
286     See supra notes __, regarding Iran’s complaints about US violating CWC.  See Mikulak 
November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5 (linking Iran’s attitude on nuclear and 
chemical treaties). 
 Regarding U.S. allegations that Iran is violating the NPT by pursuing a nuclear weapons 
capability, see State Compliance Report, supra note __, at 62-67; U.S. Department of State, 
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements 
and Commitments, August 2011, p. 20-21; U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and 
Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and 
Commitments, August 2005, p. 72-80. 
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other CWC parties and remains largely an isolated irritant to the OPCW’s attempt 
to deal with the 2012 issue in a businesslike fashion.  Still, the danger to the 
Convention, and to the integrity of arms control efforts in general, lingers 
ominously. 
 
Section 6:  Weapons Destruction Obligations under Other Arms Control Treaties 
 How unusual is the CWC’s rigid insistence that a relatively short deadline 
for destruction of regulated weapons may be extended only once?  How have 
other arms control treaties dealt with the balance between flexibility (to 
accommodate legitimate reasons for delay) versus finality (to ensure that the job 
does, in fact, get done on a meaningful timetable)? 
 
 Many (but not all287) arms control treaties do numerically limit or totally 
ban parties’ possession of particular types of weapons – that is, after all, often 
                                            
287     Many arms control treaties are designed largely to regulate the testing, use or deployment 
locations, rather than the possession, of the regulated arms, and do not require any destruction 
operations.  For example, the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 14 U.S.T. 1313, TIAS 5433, 480 
U.N.T.S. 43, signed August 5, 1963, entered into force October 10, 1963) and the 1996 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 35 I.L.M. 1439, 
signed September 24, 1996 (not in force)) restrict the conduct of nuclear weapons test 
explosions, but do not restrict continued possession of those weapons.  Likewise, the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note __, and the 1971 Seabeds Arms Control Treaty (Treaty on the 
Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on 
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 
7337, 955 UNTS 115, 10 I.L.M. 146, signed February 11, 1971, entered into force May 18, 1972) 
restrict parties’ deployment of weapons in outer space or under water, but do not require 
destruction of the weapons.  Other related non-legally-binding agreements are basically 
“confidence-building measures,” intended to reassure nervous countries that a neighbor’s 
ambiguous military deployment, training or other activities are not a prelude to a surprise attack; 
again, these instruments do not mandate actual cuts in weaponry.  See, e.g., 1975 Helsinki Final 
Act (Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki, 
August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975)); 1986 Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-
Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Document of the Stockholm Conference 
on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, adopted 
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the whole point of the exercise.  Surprisingly, however, many of the most 
important treaties do not incorporate any specifications about the weapons-
destruction process: some do not contain explicit mandates that countries must 
rid themselves of excess armaments, and some do not affix particular timetables 
for the necessary reductions.  Even when a particular destruction schedule is 
required, typically the “glide path” toward the obligatory end point is so gradual 
that no problems have emerged for countries that adhere. 
 
 For example, the NPT, the cornerstone of the global effort to preclude the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, forbids its non-nuclear weapon state parties 
from receiving, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons,288 but it 
does not explicitly address the question of what should happen if one of these 
countries is nonetheless discovered to possess a nuclear weapon.289  
Presumably, that state should destroy the device immediately (consistent with 
safety and security considerations), but the treaty is silent on the timing.  In 
contrast, the BWC, the most important instrument in the resistance to the 
scourge of biological weapons, requires parties never to “develop, produce, 
                                                                                                                                  
September 19, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 190 (1987)); and 1990 Vienna Document on the Negotiations on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, adopted in Vienna, January 17, 1989, 28 
I.L.M. 527 (1989)).  
288     NPT, supra note __, article II. 
289     The NPT allows “nuclear-weapon States Parties” to continue to possess nuclear weapons, 
while “non-nuclear-weapon States Parties” are prohibited from doing so.  “Nuclear-weapon State” 
is defined as a country that manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon before January 1, 
1967, NPT, supra note __, article IX.3.  Therefore, states such as India and Pakistan, which came 
to possess nuclear weapons after January 1, 1967, could not join the NPT as nuclear-weapon 
States Parties.  They would presumably have to abandon their nuclear weapons in order to join 
the NPT, but the treaty has no provisions for dealing with this scenario. 
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stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain”290 the relevant devices and agents.  The 
treaty includes a commitment to destroy or convert the contraband items “as 
soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the 
Convention,”291 and an injunction that in effectuating that process “all necessary 
safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the 
environment.292  Notably, there is no specification of verification measures or of 
an international authority to oversee the destruction process, despite the fact that 
at the time the BWC was concluded, several states were known to possess the 
newly-contraband items.  No country publicly reported any difficulties in meeting 
the nine-month destruction deadline.293 
 
 The 1981 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons294 offers a 
diverse menu of illustrations here.295  Its Protocol 1 (dealing with weapons that 
produce fragments that are not detectable in the human body by x-rays),296 
Protocol 3 (on incendiary weapons),297 and Protocol 4 (concerning blinding 
                                            
290     BWC, supra note __, article I. 
291     BWC, supra note __, article II. 
292     BWC, supra note __, article II. 
293     Defectors later revealed that the Soviet Union secretly violated the BWC by retaining and 
continuing to develop biological weapons.  Ken Alibek and Steven Handelman, Biohazard: 
(1999), The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - 
Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It, 1999. 
294     Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, signed 
October 10, 1980, entered into force December 2, 1983, entered into force for the United States 
September 24, 1995, 1342 UNTS 137,19 ILM 1523 (1980) [hereinafter, CCW]. 
295     The CCW has an unusual structure.  The main treaty itself contains only basic 
administrative provisions, as a chapeau for a series of five attached protocols dealing with 
selected topics; each state may decide to join any or all of the protocols independently.   
296     CCW, supra note __, Protocol 1. 
297     CCW, supra note __, Protocol 3. 
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lasers)298 ban the use (or particular types of uses) of the regulated armaments, 
but do not proscribe mere possession, and therefore do not address destruction.  
Meanwhile, amended Protocol 2 (regulating anti-personnel land mines)299 and 
Protocol 5 (about explosive remnants of war),300 although primarily concerned 
with use, also contain obligations to clear, remove, destroy or maintain the mines 
“[w]ithout delay after the cessation of active hostilities”301 and to clear, remove or 
destroy the explosive remnants of war “[a]fter the cessation of active hostilities 
and as soon as feasible.”302  But they do not describe any mandatory destruction 
process or specific timetable. 
 
 Numerous bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet 
Union or Russia regarding nuclear weapons have established numerical caps on 
various categories of treaty-limited items:  
--The first such effort, the 1969 SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic 
Offensive Arms303 was mostly a “freeze” on existing arsenals of Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), 
without any requirement for elimination of existing systems.304  The companion 
                                            
298     CCW, supra note __, Protocol 4. 
299     CCW, supra note __, amended Protocol 2. 
300     CCW, supra note __, Protocol 5. 
301     CCW, supra note __, amended Protocol 2, article 10.1. 
302     CCW, supra note __, Protocol 5, article 3.2. 
303     Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3462 (entered into force Oct. 3, 
1972) [hereinafter SALT I Interim Agreement]. 
304     SALT I Interim Agreement, supra note __, articles I, III. 
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Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty305 likewise capped, rather than reducing, ABM 
systems, but it did spawn a Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, 
Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their 
Components, and a series of exacting subsidiary agreements and statements.  
These did not establish overall timetables or deadlines, but did contain some 
time-bounded steps for the dismantling procedures.306 
--The 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty307 abolished the 
entire category of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in the 500-5500 
kilometer range; it required each party to eliminate all such missiles and their 
launchers and all related support structures and equipment within three years.308 
                                            
305     Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, 
signed May 26, 1972, entered into force October 3, 1972, no longer in force [hereinafter, ABM 
Treaty]. 
306     Article VIII of the ABM Treaty, supra note __, specifies that ABM systems and components 
in excess of those allowed “shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the 
shortest possible agreed period of time.”  Thereafter, the parties concluded a July 3, 1974 
Protocol on Procedures Governing Replacement, Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification 
Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their Components, and a October 28, 1976 Supplementary 
Protocol to establish certain timing standards, such as a requirement that destruction of excess 
missile launchers shall be completed within three months after its initiation, Protocol, Procedures 
Governing Dismantling or Destruction, and Notification Thereof, for ABM Systems and Their 
Components, Article I.3., and that destruction of ABM facilities at Malmstrom Air Force Base was 
to be completed within six months of the agreement on procedures.  Id., article II.5, available at 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/abm/dord.htm.  
307     Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, United 
States-Soviet Union, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988) [hereinafter INF Treaty]. 
308     INF Treaty, supra note __, articles I, II, IV.  There is also an interim deadline, requiring 
destruction of a significant fraction of the banned weapons within the first 29 months after the 
treaty entered into force.  Id. at article IV.2(a).  All the eliminations were completed by both 
countries on time.  Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty: A History of 
the On-Site Inspection Agency and INF Treaty Implementation, 1988-1991, 1993; U.S. General 
Accounting Office, Arms Control: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Implementation, 
GAO/NSIAD-91-262, September 1991. 
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--The 1991 START I Treaty309 obligated the two parties to reduce their 
holdings to no more than 1600 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and 
no more than 6000 warheads attributed to those weapons, in three sequential 
phases, with interim levels to be reached after three, five and seven years.310  
The 2002 Moscow Treaty311 then lowered the ceiling on strategic warheads to 
1700-2200 within another ten years.312 
--The 2010 New START Treaty313 reduced the number of deployed 
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to 700 and the number of associated 
warheads to 1550, within seven years.314 
 
Meeting these generous targets on time never proved especially 
burdensome for either superpower.  For example, Russia’s strategic nuclear 
inventory was already almost at the desired end-state when New START entered 
into force on February 5, 2011,315 and further reductions have continued on both 
                                            
309     Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-
USSR, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter The START I Treaty]. 
310     START I Treaty, supra note __, article II.  START I also included numerous other sub-limits 
on categories such as warheads attributable to deployed mobile ICBMs, deployed heavy ICBMs, 
and warheads on deployed heavy ICBMs, with fixed destruction timetables for each.  Id. 
311   Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, May 24, 2002, U.S.-Russia, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
107-8 (2002) [hereinafter Moscow Treaty].    
312     Moscow Treaty, supra note __, article I.  This treaty did not require actual destruction of the 
excess warheads; they could be removed from deployment and sent to storage. 
313     Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
U.S.-Russia., S. Treaty Doc. No. 111-5 (2010), 50 ILM 340 (2011), signed April 8, 2010, entered 
into force February 5, 2011 [hereinafter New START Treaty]. 
314     New START Treaty, supra note __, article II. 
315     The New START Treaty parties’ initial exchange of data revealed that as of February 5, 
2011, when the treaty entered into force, Russia possessed 521 deployed strategic delivery 
systems (700 are allowed by the treaty), 865 deployed and non-deployed systems (800 are 
allowed) and 1537 warheads on deployed systems (1550 are allowed).  The United States data 
were, respectively, 882, 1124, and 1800.  U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START 
Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, June 1, 2011. 
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sides.316  In fact, one of the perceived problems with the original START I accord 
had been that the treaty-established procedures for eliminating the weapons, to 
remove them from accountability, were so exacting, and therefore so expensive, 
that each country avoided performing them.  Instead, each state carried on its 
books numerous treaty-accountable items that were obsolete, unarmed, and 
non-functional, because each was comfortably below its allowable ceilings, and it 
was considerably cheaper to sustain these so-called “phantom weapons” than to 
complete the prescribed elimination steps.317  (The New START treaty 
considerably simplified the mandatory dismantling standards, ameliorating the 
problem.) 
 
 The multilateral 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty318 and 
its associated instruments319 may incorporate more separate numerical limits 
                                            
316     By March 1, 2012, the numbers were: for deployed strategic delivery systems, U.S. 812, 
Russia 494; for deployed and non-deployed systems, U.S. 1040, Russia 881; for deployed 
warheads, U.S. 1737, Russia 1492.  U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet: New START Treaty 
Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 6, 2012; Kingston Reiff, New START; One 
Year Later, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 2, 2012; Tom Z. Collina, Russia Back 
Below Treaty’s Warhead Limits, 42 Arms Control Today No. 4, May 2012, p. 39 (noting that 
reported numbers of weapons can fluctuate, as individual systems are removed from deployed 
status for maintenance or repair operations). 
317     See Amy F. Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions, 
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 7-5700, December 23, 2011, p. 6-9, 25 
(describing how the United States and Russia had avoided the difficulty and expense of 
complying with the exacting START I procedures for eliminating weapons from accountability, by 
continuing to count under the treaty many systems that were no longer operational).  Compare 
START I supra note __, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of 
Items Subject to the Treaty with New START, supra note __, Protocol to the Treaty, Part Three, 
Conversion or Elimination Procedures. 
318     Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 30 I.L.M. 1, signed November 19, 1990, 
entered into force July 17, 1992. 
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than any other arms control system.  They establish individual caps for each of 
the 30 parties, and for various combinations of them, on each of five categories 
of weaponry: tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and 
combat helicopters, all to be reached within 40 months.320  Most of the reductions 
were readily accomplished on time (where Russia failed to do so, it was not 
because of financial or other impediments to the destruction process, but 
because of political dissatisfaction with the operation of the treaty in the post-
Cold War environment, when the prior military bloc structure had unraveled).321  
Some of the CFE reductions in treaty-limited items were accomplished not 
through physical dismantling of excess systems, but through the simple 
expedient of moving them out of the treaty’s geographic area, such as Russia’s 
abrupt transfer of some 70,000 items to its military districts east of the Ural 
                                                                                                                                  
319     The CFE Treaty was negotiated on a bloc-to-bloc (NATO and Warsaw Pact) basis, and 
defined a series of concentric zones with specified numerical ceilings for each type of equipment.  
In addition, an associated non-legally-binding instrument provided national limitations on military 
manpower.  This original structure became outmoded when the Cold War ended; a 1999 
Adaptation Agreement focused on national, rather than bloc, limitations, but it has not entered 
into force.  Arms Control Association, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 
and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe; Tom Z. 
Colllina, CFE Treaty Talks Stall, 41 Arms Control Today No. 7, September 2011, p. 30, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/2011_09/CFE_Treaty_Talks_Stall; GlobalSecurity.org, Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cfe-treaty.htm 
320     CFE Treaty, supra note __, articles I-VII.  Reductions to meet the specified ceilings on 
military equipment are to be carried out in three phases, with interim deadlines at 16, 28 and 40 
months after the treaty entered into force.  Id., article VIII.4. 
321     Russia has objected to sustaining the original limitations on military equipment in the 
various zones, now that the Warsaw Pact has collapsed and many of the Soviet Union’s former 
allies have joined NATO.  The 1999 Adaptation Agreement was designed to provide the 
necessary adjustments, but it has not entered into force.  See U.S. Department of State, 
Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements 
and Commitments, August 2005, p. 32 (regarding CFE generally), p. 38-47 (regarding Russian 
activity under the CFE Treaty); U.S. Department of State, Condition (5)(C) Report, Compliance 
with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, August 2011. 
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Mountains, and thus out of Europe.322  Still, the treaty incorporates excruciatingly 
detailed procedures for severing, welding, removing, explosively detonating, 
deforming, smashing, or otherwise disabling each type of limited equipment,323 
and has accounted for the destruction of some 52,000 pieces of military 
hardware.324 
  
 The most conspicuous example of a recent treaty for which the mandatory 
dismantling timetable has proven problematic is the 1997 Ottawa Convention on 
Anti-Personnel Land Mines (APL).325  The Ottawa Convention has 160 parties, 
including most members of NATO, but not the United States.326  It incorporates 
two different destruction obligations, with interestingly different schedules.  First, 
regarding stockpiled mines (those held in a warehouse, not yet deployed into an 
operational minefield), each party is obligated to destroy all the APL that it owns 
or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, “as soon as possible but 
not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State 
                                            
322     While the CFE Treaty negotiations were being concluded, Russia suddenly moved a large 
quantity of soon-to-be-regulated military equipment from its European bases to Asian locations 
east of the Ural Mountains, and therefore out of the treaty’s geographic coverage.  Many 
considered this to be a dangerous circumvention of the treaty (since the equipment could 
presumably be returned to the European theater just as quickly); much of it was later destroyed.  
GlobalSecurity.org, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/cfe-treaty.htm 
323     CFE Treaty, supra note __, Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of 
Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty. 
324     Arms Control Association, The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the 
Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe. 
325     Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter Ottawa 
Convention]. 
326     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Parties.  
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Party.”327  There is no provision for extension of that four-year period.  Second, 
regarding mines already emplaced in minefields, each party must destroy all 
mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no 
later than ten years after the treaty becomes operational.328  If a party “believes 
that it will be unable” to accomplish that objective, it may request an extension for 
up to another ten years, and a Meeting of the States Parties may vote (by simple 
majority) to grant the request.329  Moreover, such an extension may be renewed, 
via the same process, apparently without limit.330 
 
 The Ottawa Convention specifies that a request for an extension shall 
contain: a) the duration of the proposed extension; b) a detailed explanation of 
the reasons for it, including the status of the work already conducted, the 
financial and technical means available to the country to conduct the necessary 
destruction activities, and the “[c]ircumstances which impede the ability” of the 
state to complete the process; c) the “humanitarian, social, economic, and 
environmental implications of the extension”; and d) any other relevant 
information.331 
 
 To date, compliance with these two deadlines has been inconsistent.  
Most Ottawa parties do not currently possess stockpiles of APL (64 parties 
declared that they had never owned any such mines).  But four states – Belarus, 
                                            
327     Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 4. 
328     Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.1. 
329     Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.3, 5.5. 
330     Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.6. 
331     Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 5.4. 
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Greece, Turkey and Ukraine – are in violation of their Ottawa obligations, due to 
failure to meet the four-year timetable, and only Turkey appears to be moving 
close to compliance.  (For Belarus, Greece and Turkey, the deadline was March 
1, 2008; Ukraine joined the treaty later, and started violating this provision on 
June 1, 2010.)332 
 
 Regarding destruction of mines fielded in mined areas, 44 states have 
declared themselves to be (or are otherwise considered to be) subject to the 
treaty’s obligation to clear the mines within ten years, but 22 of these have 
already requested and received one or more extensions, and several additional 
petitions are pending.333  Many of these countries are registering precious little 
progress in the clearance task, and are falling behind their own generous 
schedules.334  At the treaty’s second Review Conference, in 2009, the parties 
adopted the Cartagena Action Plan, which included Point 13, urging states to 
work toward rapid implementation of their obligations to clear mines within ten 
years (plus extensions), but little acceleration in the pace has been noted.335  
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, responsible for overseeing 
implementation of the Ottawa Convention, concludes that even the states that 
                                            
332     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 4-5, http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf 
333     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 22,  http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf 
334    International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 23, http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf      
335     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 22,  http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf 
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have been granted extensions have made “disappointing progress,”336 and that 
“deadline extension requests are becoming the norm rather than the 
exception.”337   
  
 The bifurcated Ottawa Convention structure was adapted in the 2008 Oslo 
Convention on Cluster Munitions.338  There, each party undertakes, first, to 
destroy all its stockpiled cluster munitions as soon as possible and no later than 
within eight years (and “to ensure that destruction methods comply with 
applicable international standards for protecting public health and the 
environment.”)339  Unlike the Ottawa Convention, here the stockpile destruction 
deadline may be extended, upon request to a Meeting of States Parties, for four 
years, and “in exceptional circumstances,” for additional periods of four years, 
where doing so is “strictly necessary” to complete the destruction.340 
 
                                            
336     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 22,  http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf 
337     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 30, http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf 
338     Convention on Cluster Munitions, signed December 3, 2008, entered into force August 1, 
2010, available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2011/01/Convention-ENG.pdf [hereiafter 
Oslo Convention].  
A cluster munition is an explosive weapon that releases or disperses multiple, small sub-
munitions, allowing it to strike numerous targets simultaneously over a wider area.  Oslo 
Convention, supra note __, article 2.2; Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, Cluster Munitions: 
Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 
RS22907, June 27, 2012. 
339     Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 3.2. 
340     Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 3.3.  The request for an extension is to specify the 
duration of the requested extension, the exceptional circumstances justifying it, the plan for 
destroying the cluster munitions, the financial and technical resources available to the party to 
complete the destruction, and the quantity of munitions and sub-munitions to be destroyed.  Id. at 
article 3.4. 
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 Second, regarding the cluster munition remnants in the field, the Oslo 
Convention requires each party to clear and destroy all such items within ten 
years; that period may be renewed for successive five-year increments.341  
 
What are the lessons to be learned from all this collective experience with 
different forms of destruction obligations under arms control agreements?  How 
could conscientious treaty makers find the “sweet spot” that avoids both: a) the 
excessive rigidity of an immoveable deadline that throws into a situation of 
breach a country that behaves in good faith but simply cannot meet a projected 
calendar that may have seemed perfectly reasonable when it was originally 
established and b) the opposite danger of a too-squishy timetable that cavalierly 
allows recalcitrant countries to defer indefinitely their obligations, cynically 
appearing to honor the treaty while not truly pursuing one of its key desiderata?  
 
The answer cannot be an automatic preference for either long deadlines 
or short ones, or for waivable or immutable targets.  Likewise, it is too simplistic 
merely to call for negotiators to be “more realistic” in setting their timetables or for 
countries to be “more responsible” in carrying out their destruction obligations.  
With hindsight, it is abundantly clear that a 10- or even 15-year target for 
destroying all U.S. and Russian chemical weapons was ambitious, perhaps 
foolishly so.  But in the early 1990s, when the time frame was picked, the experts 
                                            
341     Oslo Convention, supra note __, article 4.  The request for an extension is to specify the 
proposed duration, the reasons for the extension, the work already conducted under national 
clearance programs, the total area remaining to be cleared, the circumstances that have impeded 
the party’s ability to complete the clearance, and the humanitarian, social, economic, and 
environmental implications of the proposed extension.  Id. at article 4.6. 
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were confident; they regarded the single five-year extension as a probably-
unnecessary extra margin of safety.  What they apparently did not adequately 
take into account was the inevitability that political factors, as well as technical 
factors, would come into play.  If NIMBY had not intervened, the deadline could 
probably have been met. 
 
 
It is clear that the political dynamics of modern arms control will not 
tolerate asymmetric deadlines.  That is, it would not be generally acceptable to 
require countries with relatively small inventories of the regulated weapons to 
destroy them immediately, while providing a significantly longer period for those 
laboring under a larger legacy of now-excess armaments.  Whatever freedom of 
action is available to one will probably have to be extended to all.342 
 
Perhaps part of the solution may lie in drafting standards that allow 
extensions, and renewals of extensions, but that specify the particular criteria 
that the requester must satisfy, as well as procedures to ensure that applications 
are well-vetted.  Some may view the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions as providing 
useful models here, but others are less sanguine, concluding that even strict-
sounding language may be susceptible to exploitation and endless delay. 
                                            
342     The NPT, regulating nuclear weapons, is “discriminatory,” in that it allows the five states that 
tested nuclear weapons first (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) 
to retain nuclear weapons, while outlawing possession for all other parties.  NPT, supra note __, 
articles I, II, VI, IX.3.  In contrast, the treaties regulating chemical and biological weapons are 
“non-discriminatory,” treating all states identically, regardless of their history as possessors (or 
not) of the regulated weapons.  BWC, supra note __, article I; CWC, supra note __, article I. 
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Section 7: Possible Paths Forward on the CWC 
Returning now to the analysis of the CWC destruction mandate, what tools 
and tactics may be available for resolving the U.S. and Russian 2012 violations?  
Five clusters of options are considered. 
 
a. Change the treaty obligations. The first obvious kind of response would 
be to alter the mandate of the treaty – if the leading parties are unable to change 
their behavior to conform to the treaty’s terms, then possibly they could change 
the treaty’s terms to match better what those two chemical leviathans could 
actually accomplish.  The CWC provides three possible avenues. 
 
First, the formal amendment provisions of the CWC outline the “front door” 
mechanism for altering the text.  Article XV of the treaty provides that any party 
may propose an amendment, which is circulated to all parties.343  If one-third of 
the parties support it, an Amendment Conference is convened.344  To be 
adopted, the proposal must receive “a positive vote of a majority of all States 
Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.”345  It must then be ratified by 
all the parties who voted in favor of it at the Amendment Conference; 30 days 
later, the amendment enters into force for all treaty parties.346 
 
                                            
343     CWC, supra note __, article XV.1 and 2; Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 239-47. 
344     CWC, supra note __, article XV.2.  With 188 states party to the treaty, 63 would have to 
support the convening of an Amendment Conference. 
345     CWC, supra note __, article XV.3(a).  A majority vote would require 95 parties. 
346     CWC, supra note __, article XV.3. 
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As a formal matter, this procedure carries the notable virtue that an 
amendment supported by a majority (and not opposed by any party) can enter 
into force for all parties simultaneously – it avoids the irregularity that might occur 
if a state that does nothing (neither supporting nor opposing the amendment) 
would not be bound by it, while other parties would be.  However, as a practical 
matter, this mechanism makes amendments extremely difficult; it provides each 
party two separate opportunities to veto any proposal – it may vote against the 
amendment at the Amendment Conference, or it may vote in favor, but then 
decline to ratify.  Moreover, as a political matter, the United States and like-
minded parties have been reluctant to propose any amendments to the CWC, 
fearing that if the treaty text were opened up to alteration, other parties might 
take the occasion to propound their own ideas for refinement of the obligations, 
many of which would be unwelcome.  The CWC has never been amended. 
 
The second potential mechanism for modifying the treaty is the “changes” 
procedure, also found in article XV.  This provides an expedited mechanism to 
“ensure the viability and effectiveness”347 of the CWC, and is applicable only to 
“matters of an administrative or technical nature.”348  Under it, a proposal is 
circulated to all parties, with an evaluation by the Director-General of the 
Technical Secretariat, and the Executive Council makes a recommendation.349  If 
the Executive Council’s recommendation is favorable, the proposal is considered 
                                            
347     CWC, supra note __, article XV.4. 
348     CWC, supra note __, article XV.4. 
349     CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(a)-(c). 
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approved unless a party objects within 90 days,350 and it enters into force for all 
parties 180 days later.351 
 
This streamlined vehicle allows minor alterations in the CWC to be 
implemented more quickly (in particular, it does not require an act of “ratification” 
by the parties, thereby dodging the necessity of returning to national legislatures 
for consent).  But it again relies upon the absence of any objection, and it is 
applicable only to relatively minor provisions in the Annexes of the CWC, not to 
the text of the treaty itself.352   
 
In the current situation, oddly, the obligation to destroy all chemical 
weapons within ten years is contained in article IV.6 of the treaty,353 but the 
provision for the one limited extension is housed in the Verification Annex, Part 
IV(A).C.24-26.354  It is not clear, therefore, whether the expedited procedure 
could be legitimately implemented to address this matter. 
 
Moreover, in CWC experience, this “viability and effectiveness change” 
procedure has been employed only twice, regarding quite minor matters: to adapt 
                                            
350     CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(d).  If the Executive Council recommends that the 
proposal be rejected, it is considered rejected unless a party objects within 90 days.  If a party 
disagrees with the recommendation of the Executive Council, the matter is referred to the 
Conference of the States Parties.  CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(d) and (e). 
351     CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(g). 
352     Some parts of the annexes are also exempt from the changes procedure, reflecting the 
negotiators’ judgment that those particular passages were too important to be subject to the 
expedited change operations.  CWC, supra note __, article XV.4. 
353     CWC, supra note __, article IV.6 (destruction “shall finish not later than 10 years after entry 
into force of this Convention.”) 
354     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part IV(A).C.24-26. 
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the timetable for consideration of proposals to “convert” to benign applications, 
rather than to “destroy,” a former chemical weapons production facility, in the 
case of a state that joins the treaty after the initially-specified timetable for such 
conversions;355 and to allow international transfers of very small quantities (5 
milligrams or less) of saxitoxin for medical diagnostic purposes to proceed with 
notification at the time of transfer, rather than 30 days in advance.356 
 
It seems extremely unlikely that a change to the 15 year destruction 
deadline (even though expressed in the Verification Annex, instead of in the 
treaty text) would pass muster as an “administrative or technical” question.  If 
even a single party objected to the gambit, the matter – including the question of 
whether the proposal truly meets the criteria for a “change” – would be referred to 
the Conference of the States Parties, where it would be addressed as a matter of 
substance, again affording any party the power to block an amendment.357  
 
A third, possibly less onerous or restrictive, option for altering the CWC 
destruction obligations would rely upon an emergent pattern of practice among 
the parties in interpreting or implementing the accord.  That is, the Vienna 
Convention contemplates that in construing a treaty text, there shall be taken into 
account “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
                                            
355     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part V.D.72bis (added in 
2005) 
356     CWC, supra note __, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.B.5bis (added in 
1999 and corrected in 2000). 
357     CWC, supra note __, article XV.5(e). 
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establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”358  If the 
observed “practice” of the leading CWC parties is to careen past the 15-year 
timetable, without strenuous objection from others, perhaps that pattern could, de 
facto amount to a revised understanding of the legal obligations.359 
 
Notably, this passage in the Vienna Convention relates to “interpretation” 
of a treaty, rather to “alterations” in it, but perhaps it may be possible in practice 
to fuzz the dividing line between ordinary implementation and modification – if the 
parties were unanimous in their intentions.360  However, it is a stretch to describe 
the December 1 Document as a tacit “waiver” or foregiveness of the U.S. and 
Russian violations, or as a consensus to alter the treaty’s demands.  The 
December 1 Document was not labeled or described in those terms, and it 
seems unlikely that a general loosening of the 15-year deadline would have 
commanded such universal assent.  Even if most parties were disinclined to 
pound the table about the major powers’ failures, some, at least, would continue, 
                                            
358     Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 31.3(b).  See also Restatement, supra note __, 
vol. 1, sec. 325, comment c; Gardiner, supra note __, at 225-49; Villiger, supra note __, at 431; 
Dorr and Schmalenbach, supra note __, at 552-60.  It would also be possible for the CWC parties 
to conclude an overt “subsequent agreement” “regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions” Vienna Convention, supra note __, article 31.3(a).  However, it 
seems extremely unlikely that all CWC parties would join in the negotiation and conclusion of 
such an instrument. 
359     The Albania case, discussed supra, text accompanying notes __, could be instructive as a 
data point in helping to establish a possible pattern of precedents for this approach. 
360     See Restatement, supra note __, vol. 1, sec. 334, reporters’ note 4 (concluding that “[t]he 
question of modification by subsequent practice tends to merge into that of interpretation by 
subsequent practice”), sec. 102, comment j, and reporters’ note 4 (new rule of customary 
international law may supersede a prior treaty); Gardiner, supra note __, at 243-45; Aust, supra 
note __, at 241-43; Georg Nolte, Third Report for the International Law Commission Study Group 
on Treaties Over Time, Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice of States Outside of 
Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, ILC(LXIV)/SG/TOT/INFORMAL/1/REV.1, May 2, 2012, p. 
43-45 (common practice among treaty parties can indicate agreement on non-application of the 
treaty). 
 111 
with reason, to regard this chain of events as simply a “violation” of the CWC, not 
as a covert consensual “re-interpretation” of one of its key provisions.  In that 
connection, OPCW organs have explicitly stressed that no action should be 
taken, regarding some parties’ difficulties in meeting the revised deadlines for 
destruction of chemical weapons, that would “lead to the rewriting or 
reinterpreting of the Convention’s provisions.”361 
 
b.  Escape the treaty obligations.  A second device for addressing the 
destruction problem would be to exercise the CWC’s withdrawal provision; this 
approach could be contemplated either by the United States and Russia or by 
any other party aggrieved by the prolongation of the CW destruction process. 
 
Like many other modern arms control agreements,362 the CWC allows its 
parties to escape the obligations in an extreme situation, providing: 
Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the 
right to withdraw from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary 
events, related to the subject-matter of this Convention, have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country.  It shall give notice of such withdrawal 
90 days in advance to all other States Parties, the Executive Council, the 
Depositary and the United Nations Security Council.  Such notice shall 
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests.363 
                                            
361     OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 15th Session, December 3, 2010, C-
15/5, paragraph 9.8; Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to 
the OPCW at the 15th Session of the Conference of the States Parties, C-15/NAT.3, November 
29, 2010, p. 4. 
362     Cf. ABM Treaty, supra note __, article XV.2; NPT, supra note __, article X.1; BWC, supra 
note __, article XIII.2; New START Treaty, supra note __, article XIV.3. 
363     CWC, supra note __, article XVI.2.  Such a withdrawal would not affect a state’s obligations 
under the Geneva Protocol, supra note __ or under customary international law.  CWC, supra 
note __, article XVI.3. 
Withdrawal from an arms control treaty is rare; the only two instances are North Korea’s 
2003 withdrawal from the NPT and the United States’ 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.  See 
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 First, regarding the United States and Russia, it would be a stretch for 
those states to characterize their own (or each other’s) violations of the treaty as 
events that have jeopardized their supreme interests.  A somewhat better 
rationale might be to cite the unforeseen technical, financial, and organizational 
difficulties that generated those breaches as “extraordinary events,” and assert 
that withdrawal was preferable to overtly violating the CWC, because committing 
a material breach could lead to adverse implications, as described above, casting 
into disrepute the CWC, other vital arms control agreements, and by extension, 
all of international law.364 
 
 Notably, the concept of the withdrawal provision in arms control treaties 
allows each state to be entirely “self-judging” in evaluating whether its supreme 
interests have been jeopardized.  It must express the reasons why it regards 
withdrawal as necessary, but as long as it is behaving in good faith, there is no 
                                                                                                                                  
Arms Control Association, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile; Wade Boese, Missile Defense Five 
Years After the ABM Treaty, 37 Arms Control Today No. 5, June 2007, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_06/MissileDefense. 
364     This provision allows only for a complete “withdrawal” from a treaty, not for a temporary 
“suspension” of its obligations.  Russia has asserted an ability to suspend, not terminate, its 
participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the United States and other 
parties have resolutely rejected that interpretation.  Statement by the United States of America to 
the Joint Consultative Group, 682nd Plenary Meeting, Agenda item 2(b), December 9, 2008; U.S. 
Department of State, Condition (5)(C) Report, Compliance with the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe, August 2011; Victoria Nuland, Implementation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, U.S. Department of State Press Statement, November 22, 
2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177630.htm (United States announces that it will 
cease carrying out CFE obligations with regard to Russia, in response to Russia’s suspension). 
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mechanism for the other parties to object effectively or to compel the state to 
remain inside the treaty regime.365 
 
 Here, to mitigate the political fallout from a withdrawal, the United States 
and Russia might negotiate a new bilateral agreement committing themselves to 
expeditious destruction of their CW inventories (perhaps akin to the 1989-90 
bilateral agreements noted above366) and they might conclude some sort of 
agreement with the OPCW to apply the verification and related measures to their 
prolonged extra-CWC functions.  And they could make clear their intentions to re-
join the CWC as soon as their destruction operations reached fruition.  
 
 But any such defection, under any terms, would surely shake the CWC to 
its core.  Where the objective is to sustain the concept of an effective 
international law prohibition against chemical warfare, any decision by the United 
States and Russia to abandon the leading instrument in the field would hardly be 
appreciated as a constructive approach. 
 
 Conversely, it is possible that other parties, perturbed by the failure of the 
United States and Russia to comply with the mandatory destruction timetable, 
would exercise the right to withdraw.  The exiting state might, or might not, 
                                            
365     Aust, supra note __, at 281-82.  In 2006, after North Korea withdrew from the NPT and 
conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion, the United Nations Security Council deplored the 
withdrawal and demanded that North Korea rescind its action and rejoin the NPT.  United Nations 
Security Council, Resolution 1718, October 14, 2006, paragraphs 3-4.  North Korea has not done 
so. 
366     Wyoming MOU and Bilateral Destruction Agreement, supra note __. 
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decide to resume production of CW; perhaps it would announce an intention to 
return to the Convention when the United States and Russia complete their 
destruction operations.  No state has yet insinuated that it might consider such 
recourse, and in any neutral assessment, the prolonged possession of these 
quantities of to-be-destroyed munitions and agents by the United States and 
Russia does not pose any genuine threat to the security or other supreme 
interests of any other party.  The prospect that either the United States or Russia 
would brandish or use any of these loathsome devices in combat is virtually nil, 
and even if the U.S. chemical neutralization process consumes another decade 
or more, no other state is genuinely threatened thereby.   
 
Still, an outlier state may see things differently, and as noted, the 
operation of the withdrawal power does not afford other states the opportunity to 
gainsay that option.367  One or more such defections would hardly “solve” the 
destruction problem in any sense, but it cannot be dismissed as a possible 
response by states that wanted to protest the U.S. and Russian dilatory behavior, 
to punish them for it, or perhaps to incentivize them to improve it. 
 
c.  Excuse the violation.  A third approach would be to convince the CWC 
parties to waive or simply overlook the violation.  At the most elementary level, 
this could be a low-key political enterprise, to persuade other states that the 
                                            
367     After North Korea withdrew from the NPT and conducted a nuclear weapons test explosion, 
the United Nations Security Council deplored the withdrawal and demanded that North Korea 
rescind its action and rejoin the NPT.  United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1718, October 
14, 2006.  North Korea has not done so. 
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United States and Russia were behaving in an eminently reasonable fashion – 
even if they were contravening the terms of the CWC, they were devoting so 
much money, expertise and innovation to the effort, and were not seeking or 
achieving any military, diplomatic or other benefit from the prolongation, so no 
one else should care very much.  The hoped-for response would be “nothing” – 
not a whimper of protest or a wiggle of serious contrary action – in recognition 
that pressing further on this issue would be both futile and unnecessary.   
 
The world might thus appreciate this situation as a variation on the 
concept of “efficient breach,”368 the notion that strict conformity with the exact 
terms of a binding legal obligation could become wasteful, if the breaching party 
stands to gain so much by the violation that it could compensate the innocent 
parties for the loss of their expectations, and still come out ahead.  Here, there 
would be little tangible benefit to the other CWC parties, even if the United States 
and Russia were now to pour even more billions into a largely futile effort to 
somehow further accelerate their CW destruction processes.  A more relaxed, 
flexible attitude may therefore be deemed more appropriate. 
 
In a more formal vein, the Executive Council, the Conference of the States 
Parties, or the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat could go overtly on 
the record with similarly benign conclusions.  None of those bodies has any 
                                            
368     Under the modern “law and economics” theory of “efficient breach,” a party may be excused 
from performing a contract if breach would be economically more efficient – provided that it pays 
compensatory damages to the injured party.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th edition, 2009, p. 592.  In 
the case of the CWC, there is no specific injured party, and there is no procedure for assessing 
compensatory damages. 
 116 
express power to expunge treaty violations, and the CWC dispute resolution 
provisions do not contemplate a “Good Housekeeping seal of approval” for 
breaches, but discretion and judgment might lead in that direction.  The 
Executive Council has the general authority “to promote the effective 
implementation of, and compliance with, this Convention”369 and to make 
recommendations “regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure 
compliance.”370  The Conference of the States Parties has even broader 
responsibilities; it may “take decisions on any questions, matters or issues 
related to this Convention”371 and “act in order to promote its object and 
purpose.”372  If those organs determined that little or no response was necessary 
or appropriate in reaction to the 2012 issue, that wisdom could not be 
overturned.373 
 
                                            
369     CWC, supra note __, article, VIII.C.30. 
370     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.36(c). 
371     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.19. 
372     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.20. 
373     The organs of the OPCW are not themselves parties to the treaty; they are merely the 
agents of the states parties.  Any legally operative determination to waive or forgive a violation 
would have to be a decision of the parties themselves, perhaps expressed through the Executive 
Council and the Conference of the States Parties.  The Director-General has even less express 
authority to bind the parties, but has used his “bully pulpit” to try to promote a consensus, low-key 
solution.  See OPCW, Executive Council, Opening Statement by the Director-General to the 
Executive Council at Its 61st Session, EC-61/DG.17, June 29, 2010, paras. 10, 11 (saying that the 
United States and Russia “will not be able to meet the 29 April 2012 deadline,” without labeling 
that failure as a “breach” or “violation,” and opining that those two countries have shown an 
excellent track record and firm commitment to the CWC, so “the key goal of achieving the total 
and irreversible destruction of their declared stockpiles is, in my view, not in question….I have no 
doubt that they will continue to stay on track.”)  See also Georg Nolte, Third Report for the 
International Law Commission Study Group on Treaties Over Time, Subsequent Agreements and 
Subsequent Practice of States Outside of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 
ILC(LXIV)/SG/TOT/INFORMAL/1/REV.1, May 2, 2012, p. 71-88 (surveying different types of 
treaty implementation bodies and the powers they may wield in treaty interpretation and 
modification). 
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The closest precedent for the current situation arose in April 2007 
regarding Albania’s small CW stockpile.  There, the OPCW, in effect, closely 
monitored Albania’s tardiness in meeting the deadline, but took no formal action, 
despite the facts that Albania had clearly violated the treaty’s requirements 
(albeit, by a very small margin) and that Albania had done so without even 
bothering to request an extension (which would have easily fixed the problem.)  A 
pragmatic “watch and wait” posture by the Executive Council (it “reiterated its 
concern”374 about the delays, but never addressed the possibility of any 
sanctions) seems to have led to a satisfactory outcome. 
 
The resolution of the Albania contretemps was found in the power of the 
Executive Council to negotiate a viable response plan under article VIII.C.36: 
In its consideration of doubts or concerns regarding compliance and cases 
of non-compliance, including, inter alia, abuse of the rights provided for 
under this Convention, the Executive Council shall consult with the States 
Parties involved and, as appropriate, request the State Party to take 
measures to redress the situation within a specified time. To the extent 
that the Executive Council considers further action to be necessary, it shall 
take, inter alia, one or more of the following measures: 
(a) Inform all States Parties of the issue or matter; 
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference; 
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference regarding measures to 
redress the situation and to ensure compliance.375 
 
 While this passage does not expressly authorize the Executive Council to 
conclude, on behalf of the OPCW or the parties to the treaty, a binding 
                                            
374     OPCW: Executive Council, Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its 
Activities in the Period from 8 July 2006 to 29 June 2007, EC-50/3, C-12/3, September 26, 2007, 
para. 2.16. 
375     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.C.36. 
 118 
agreement, still less to waive a serious act of non-compliance, it may be 
sufficient to provide a practical basis for reconciliation. 
 
 The Executive Council, in grappling with the Albania situation, 
“emphasized the exceptional nature of this case, and stressed that it shall not set 
a precedent for the future, nor in any other way affect the legally binding 
obligations of the possessor States Parties to destroy their chemical weapons in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention, and within the deadlines as 
extended by the Conference of the States Parties.”376  Of course, the small 
quantities of CW at stake in Albania, together with the very short duration of that 
country’s overage in missing the deadline, are immensely different from the 
situations of the United States and Russia.  Still, in a context so starved of 
authoritative legal guidance, even a remote bit of prior state practice may be 
illuminating. 
 
 The Iraq case may also suggest a whiff of similar flexibility.  There, 
because Iraq joined the CWC after the original ten-year period for CW 
destruction had already expired, it is bound by a different, more indeterminate, 
set of rules.   Under article IV.8, such a latecomer is to destroy its CW “as soon 
as possible,” pursuant to an order of destruction to be determined by the 
Executive Council.377  Iraq has not yet begun, or even created a plan for, the 
                                            
376     OPCW: Executive Council, Report of the Executive Council on the Performance of Its 
Activities in the Period from 8 July 2006 to 29 June 2007, EC-50/3, C-12/3, September 26, 2007, 
paras. 2.17.   
377     CWC, supra note __, article IV.8. 
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recovery and destruction of its bunkered CW.378  The United States and Russia 
are not, of course, in that situation; the analogy suggests both that the concept of 
flexibility is not entirely alien to the CWC, so perhaps it could be borrowed for 
application here -- and conversely, that the negotiators knew how to modulate 
the destruction timetable when necessary and they knowingly decided not to do 
so for states that had joined the treaty at the outset. 
 
 A different procedural tack would be to convene a “special session” of the 
Conference of the States Parties to address the issue.  In addition to its annual 
meetings and its every-five-years review sessions,379 the Conference may 
convene at any time in special session to evaluate the operation of the CWC, 
taking into account “any relevant scientific and technological developments.”380  
The powers of a special session do not exceed those of a regular session, but 
the extraordinary, sole focus may help concentrate the minds of the participants 
and generate additional possibilities.  Likewise, a party may request a special 
session of the Executive Council;381 such a conclave would have no greater 
powers than a regular session, but might carry an extra dollop of political visibility 
and clout.  To date, there have been no CWC special sessions regarding the 
                                            
378     See discussion of Iraq’s damaged CW caches, supra, note __. 
379     The CWC provides for special sessions of the Conference of the States Parties at five year 
intervals to review the operation of the Convention.  CWC, supra note __, article VIII.22; see 
generally, OPCW, Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the 
Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (Second Review Conference or RC-2), 7–18 
April 2008, http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/conference-states-parties/second-review-
conference/  
380     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.B.22.  The Executive Council may request a special 
session.  Id. at article VIII.C.33. 
381     CWC, supra note __, article IX.4(f). 
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2012 deadline, and the United States has resisted that recourse, favoring the 
more low-key alternatives, but the option remains on the table. 
 
 The December 1 Decision has already begun the implementation of this 
type of strategy.  In that instrument, the Conference of the States Parties 
balanced the competing political, legal, and operational considerations, and 
determined – nearly unanimously – a path forward.  The resolution does not 
“forgive” the U.S. and Russian transgressions, but neither does it rebuke them or 
invoke a litigious or enforcement-oriented approach.  It demonstrates a strikingly 
flexible, pragmatic approach to “law as politics,” rather than an insistence upon 
strict compliance with the letter of the law.  Whether this act solves the problem, 
or merely kicks it further down the road, remains to be seen. 
 
 d.  Go to a higher authority.  The CWC contemplates that some especially 
serious compliance issues may not be amenable to resolution within the context 
of the treaty itself, but may benefit from referral to outside authorities.  Under 
article XII, “[t]he Conference shall, in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, 
including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United 
Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.”382  A 2/3 
vote of the Conference of the States Parties would be required for any such 
referral.383 
 
                                            
382     CWC, supra note __, article XII.4 and VIII.36. 
383     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.18. 
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 Such a referral has never occurred under the CWC, and the experience 
under the cognate provisions of other treaties is hardly promising.  If the matter 
were sent to the Security Council, the United States and Russia would, of course, 
be immunized by their veto power against any unwelcome outcomes.384  In the 
General Assembly, in contrast, the superpowers are not guaranteed of the ability 
to control the vote, but the General Assembly lacks the power to enforce legally-
binding results.385  The question is whether any useful political gain could be 
achieved by opening these fora to a discussion – in whatever structured way that 
could be managed – of the CWC compliance issues. 
 
 The other form of “higher authority” is the International Court of Justice.  
Unlike many treaties,386 the CWC does not incorporate a direct referral of 
disputes to the court, and the other avenues for lodging a contentious case seem 
unlikely.387  However, the CWC does contemplate a mechanism for seeking an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ “on any legal question arising within the scope of 
                                            
384     UN Charter, supra note __, art. 27 (requiring the concurring votes of all permanent 
members of the Security Council to adopt a substantive decision). 
385     UN Charter, supra note __, art. 25 (all U.N. members “agree to accept and carry out” 
decisions of the Security Council; there is no comparable undertaking regarding decisions of the 
General Assembly). 
386     Many treaties do contain provisions referring disputes to the ICJ.  See, e.g., Genocide 
Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277, 28 ILM 754, signed December 9, 1948, entered into force January 12, 1951, 
entered into force for the United States February 23, 1989), article IX; Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination, 660 UNTS 195, 5 ILM 352 (1966), signed December 21, 1965, entered 
into force January 4, 1969, entered into force for the United States November 20, 1994), article 
22; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980), signed December 18, 1979, entered into force September 3, 1981, article 
29.1. 
387     Neither the United States nor Russia currently accepts the “compulsory jurisdiction” of the 
ICJ pursuant to article 36 of the ICJ Statute, and a specific referral to the court of this matter by 
those states is also unlikely.  See ICJ Statute, supra note __, article 36; International Court of 
Justice website, Jurisdiction: Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as 
Compulsory,  http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3   
 122 
the activities of the Organization.”388  A variety of such legal questions might be 
posed in this situation, either mischievously or in an honest attempt to reach 
consensus – such as whether the U.S. and Russian defaults do rise to the level 
of “material breach,” and whether any of the theoretical excuses surveyed above 
would provide partial mitigation.  The ICJ has recognized that sometimes, 
resolution of the legal aspects of a controversy can help contribute to a larger 
political solution.389 
 
 Additionally, perhaps some creative use could be made of another CWC 
organ, the Scientific Advisory Board.  This Board, a relatively under-exploited 
feature of the OPCW infrastructure, comprises 25 prominent experts, mandated 
to provide scientific and technical advice to the Conference of the States Parties, 
the Executive Council, and the Director-General.390  Perhaps the Scientific 
Advisory Board could be tasked to study independently the U.S. CW destruction 
operations, evaluate the progress and problems encountered to date, and 
provide “red team” analysis and recommendations to the OPCW.  Such an 
“outside” audit might be unlikely to generate revolutionary insights about the U.S. 
activities, but might nonetheless provide another form of corroborating 
                                            
388     CWC, supra note __, article XIV.5. 
389     Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua vs. United States), 
International Court of Justice, Preliminary Objections Judgment, 1984 ICJ p. 433, paragraphs 93-
97 (quoting from the ICJ’s earlier ruling in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Teheran case, “resolution of such legal questions by the Court may be an important, and 
sometimes decisive, factor in promoting the peaceful settlement of the dispute”). 
390     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.21(h) and VIII.45.  See OPCW website, 
http://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/ (terms of reference 
for the Scientific Advisory Board). 
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reassurance that all avenues for alleviating the problem have been honestly 
evaluated. 
 
 e.  Negotiate a plea agreement.  The final category of approaches would 
be for the United States and Russia to “confess error” in missing the CWC 
deadline, overtly apologize, and attempt to negotiate a package of responses 
that would be more or less satisfactory to all concerned, even if they involved 
some pain.  Many of the steps noted below have already been incorporated into 
the U.S. approach and the December 1 Decision; one key item that has been 
conspicuously missing to date is a certain humility about the nation’s failure to 
comply with its treaty obligations, and a willingness to “pay a price” to help set 
things straight.   
 
One element in the package, therefore, would be a public recital that 
forthrightly accepts responsibility for the material breach of the CWC, and 
commits to do what we can to clean up the current mess and to reform our 
behavior in the future.  This confession/apology/promise could come in the form 
of a joint statement by the United States and Russia, or separate undertakings 
from each of them.  Valuable elements to stress could include: 
 
--A renewed commitment to complete destruction of the remaining CW.  
The United States and Russia have no interest in retaining chemical weapons; 
this lagging destruction is not a treacherous abuse of the dismantling operation, 
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designed to lull other states into disarming while the large powers sustain a 
unique military advantage.  Therefore, it should be easy to emphasize the two 
countries’ good will and their unswerving allegiance to the object and purpose of 
the CWC.  They can affirm that they regard the CW as essentially toxic detritus, 
an unwelcome legacy of an earlier era, providing no military benefit.  The June 
28, 2011 statement from outgoing Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and the 
equally emphatic October 3, 2011 comments by Secretary of State Hillary 
Rodham Clinton are solid illustrations of the necessary rhetoric; a presidential 
statement, even if brief, would be even better.  In any event, these are the type of 
reassurances that will need to be reiterated frequently at senior levels in the 
decade to come.391 
 
--A promise to destroy the remaining stockpiles promptly.  Of course, the 
issue remains: how prompt can we realistically be?  At this point, it is probably 
too late to revise the misbegotten decisions about employing the alternative, non-
incineration technologies and about not transporting the chemicals to centralized 
destruction facilities – reversing those choices now would likely cost more money 
and take even more time than sticking resolutely to the current still-bumpy 
course.  But the United States should be earnest about avoiding any further 
delays, and should undertake whatever oversight and management initiatives are 
necessary to sustain or even accelerate the enterprise.  Ironically, it may now be 
                                            
391     See Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW 
at the 68th Session of the Executive Council, EC-68/NAT.15, May 1, 2012, p. 1 (reassuring 
OPCW Executive Council that the U.S. “commitment to complete chemical weapons destruction 
remains unwavering.  We will faithfully implement this treaty obligation as well as the additional 
measures contained in [the December 1 Decision].” 
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appropriate for the United States to employ, once again, the rhetoric that it is 
destroying the CW “as rapidly as possible” – because it may now, in fact, not be 
possible to rearrange things and proceed any more quickly (but it should also 
avoid the pitfall of going any more slowly.)  
 
--A commitment to sustained high levels of funding.  One obvious way in 
which the United States could grievously compound its earlier failure would be to 
relax its financial contribution to the destruction operations.392  This is a particular 
danger in the current economic emergency, but to date, the CW demilitarization 
campaign has been spared the worst ravages of the budget cutting zeal.  That 
immunity needs to continue; otherwise, the promise to meet even the current, 
quite extended, timetable will quickly prove illusory.  
 
--Establishment of realistic, detailed deadlines.  The most recurrent 
feature of the U.S. campaign to destroy its CW has, unfortunately, been repeated 
delays; if one were making prognostications, the safest (albeit, cynical) bet would 
be that the current projections, like most of their predecessors, would fall by the 
wayside.  (The one conspicuous exception to this sorry record is the fact that in 
2006, when requesting the five-year extension, the United States predicted that it 
would be able to incinerate approximately two-thirds of its stockpile by April 29, 
2012; in fact, the program reached the 90 percent level by that point.)  It is hard 
                                            
392     See Sustained Leadership, supra note __, p. 21 (explaining how the need to meet 
previously unfunded expenses for augmented community protection equipment at some CW 
destruction sites resulted in reprogramming funds that had been allocated for systemization and 
other activities at other sites, delaying work there.) 
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to mandate that anyone should “be more realistic” in predicting the future; on 
each occasion, those who issued the projections sincerely believed they were 
doing the best they could.   
 
At this point, the estimates (that the Pueblo facility will commence CW 
destruction operations in 2015 and finish in 2019 and that Lexington will start in 
2020 and finish in 2023) incorporate a margin of safety, to adapt to currently-
unforeseen contingencies; whether that “fudge factor” is sufficient remains to be 
seen.  Certainly, the long track record of disappointed expectations counsels 
against trying to establish now a “firm” or “final” timetable for completing the 
destruction – although some have called for such a definitive endpoint, it is 
simply unrealistic to over-promise.  At the same time, it might well be appropriate 
to publish quite detailed incremental timetables for the two remaining CW 
destruction facilities, so the world would receive “early warning” about any 
additional slippages, not being again blindsided when a major, abrupt revision to 
the announced schedule is suddenly unveiled. 
 
--Submit to enhanced monitoring by the OPCW.  The organization is 
already observing the U.S. and Russian destruction operations quite closely, but 
if there are any possibilities for even tighter monitoring, that is a price worth 
paying.  The inspected party is generally responsible for meeting the costs of 
CWC verification operations,393 and those are costs that the two possessor 
countries should not try to shuck.  Closer monitoring would not, in any practical 
                                            
393     CWC, supra note __, article IV.16, V.19. 
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sense, alter the reality on the ground, but in redressing a situation of messy non-
compliance it is important to “look good,” as well as to “be good.”  Perhaps a 
permanent OPCW presence inside the facilities at the two sites, in addition to the 
episodic leadership visits, would help provide appropriate reassurance to the 
world community. Perhaps creative use of social media could assist in projecting 
a favorable image of thorough transparency – a website or Facebook page with 
live 24-hour closed-circuit TV coverage of construction activities, for example.  
Perhaps a non-adversarial, even friendly, “challenge inspection” of U.S. CW 
destruction facilities would be in order – it would not illuminate much information 
that has not already been provided, but it could be a vehicle for exercising one of 
the treaty’s main (and so far, never used) verification mechanisms.394 
 
The United States has already demonstrated a firm commitment to this 
sort of transparency – it would not be quite accurate to call it “verification” or even 
“confidence building,” because all parties should already enjoy 100% confidence 
that the United States is dedicated to authentic compliance with the Convention 
(just later, rather than now).  The U.S. acceptance of the December 1 Decision 
by the Conference of the States Parties promises even more accommodation.  
But such good faith measures will assume even greater importance in the 
decade to come – especially during the “gap year” periods (2012-2015 and 2019-
2023) when construction and systemization of the final two neutralization facilities 
are proceeding at Pueblo and Lexington, but when no actual destruction 
                                            
394     CWC, supra note __, article IX.8-25. 
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operations are yet underway, and no CW is then being destroyed for years at a 
stretch. 
 
--Protect the security and safety of the remaining CW stocks.  Because 
quantities of these terribly lethal substances will now linger for another decade 
beyond their originally planned lifespans, it is essential that they be adequately 
protected against the dangers of leaks, accidents, theft, attack, tornados, and 
other misfortunes.395  To date, most of the mishaps at the eight U.S. CW storage 
and destruction sites have been minor, with minimal harm, but this would be a 
good occasion to review again the security and safety procedures, to pre-empt 
potential disasters (of the real, or the public affairs, varieties). 
 
--Ensure adequate outreach to affected communities – both international 
and local.  The U.S. program is already quite transparent – the eight local 
communities around the destruction sites and the leadership of the OPCW have 
been regularly kept up to date via briefings, on-site visits and public 
presentations.396  But outreach is never “finished,” and the appetite for more 
                                            
395     See Andy Mead, Madison County Tornado Was an F3, Kentucky.com, May 12, 2009 
(reporting tornado that crossed the Lexington chemical weapons facility); U.S. Department of 
Defense, Annual Status Report on the Destruction of the United States Stockpile of Lethal 
Chemical Agents and Munitions for Fiscal Year 2011, September 30, 2011, p. 8 (noting that there 
was no damage to CW storage igloos at the Pueblo facility from a 2011 earthquake nearby.) 
396     See OPCW, Executive Council, Note by the Director-General, Modalities for Implementation 
of the Obligation of States Parties to Report on Their Destruction Activities During the Extension 
Period After 29 April 2007, EC-49/DG.1, March 8, 2007; Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, 
supra note __, p. 2 (describing reports made by U.S. officials every 90 days; presentations at 
informal meetings of the Executive Council; briefings for delegates of the Conference of the 
States Parties; and hosting members of the Executive Council at the U.S. destruction sites); 
Mikulak July 12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 2.  The U.S. Army has also established Public 
Outreach Offices in three communities and Citizens’ Advisory Commissions in each of the states 
where CW are stored, to inform and engage the local populations.  U.S. Army Chemical Materials 
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information is almost insatiable – and this is a function at which the U.S. program 
should be able to excel; it should display the zeal and efficacy of the program 
with clarity and pride. 
 
Beyond those sorts of public undertakings, what additional terms and 
conditions could be worth considering, as possible parts of a potential “plea 
bargain”?  Here are some more unconventional variants: 
 
--Pay a fine.  There is no precedent in modern arms control practice for a 
country paying a financial penalty for violating a treaty, but it could be 
considered.  Numerous questions would emerge: How much money?  (This 
would be more in the nature of punitive damages, rather than measuring an 
amount to “compensate” a particular “victim.”)  To whom would the reparations 
be paid?  (If the OPCW received it, what would be appropriate applications of the 
windfall?)  What is the scope of the precedent created in this way?  (Is it 
appropriate to allow a country to “buy its way out” of a treaty that implicates 
global security concerns?)  One variant could be for the United States to 
compensate the OPCW fully for the additional costs of extending the 
Organization’s inspection capabilities for the period beyond their anticipated 
expiration of April 29, 2012.  That is, the United States could recompense the 
                                                                                                                                  
Agency, Fact Sheet: Public Outreach and Participation, 
http://www.cma.army.mil/fndocumentviewer.aspx?docid=003674289; National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 1993, Public Law 102-484, sec. 172 (legislation directing the Army to 
establish Citizens’ Advisory Commissions). 
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OPCW for salaries, overhead, travel and other expenses that the Technical 
Secretariat would not have incurred, but for the U.S. violation. 
 
--Enlarge the scope of existing security assurances and provide greater 
financial support to international programs that oppose CW.  CWC Article X 
already commits the parties to facilitate “the fullest possible exchange of 
equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning 
means of protection against chemical weapons.”397  Each party undertakes to 
provide assistance through the OPCW, in the form of contributions to an 
international fund, negotiation of a standing agreement to provide assistance 
upon demand, or a declaration of the types of assistance it might be able to 
provide in response to an appeal.398  In addition, each party has the right “to 
receive assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical 
weapons.”399 
 
 But these commitments are vague, and the level of financial support is 
unspecified.  The question is whether the United States and Russia could 
contemplate providing even more voluminous assistance than already required – 
as the treaty’s developing countries have regularly solicited.400  This could take 
                                            
397    CWC, supra note __, article X.3 Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 199-212. 
398    CWC, supra note __, article X.7.  
399    CWC, supra note __, article X.8. 
400    Republic of Cuba, Statement on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and China at the 65th 
session of the OPCW executive council, EC-65/NAT.12, July 12, 2011, paras 15-16; Mikulak July 
12, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 3 (U.S. position regarding article X); Statement by 
Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the OPCW at the 66th Session of the 
Executive Council, EC-66/NAT.19, October 4, 2011, p. 3; OPCW, Executive Council, Draft Report 
of the OPCW on the Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
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the form of donating more money to the international fund, providing a more 
comprehensive pledge to assist any victim of a CW attack, and assembling a 
robust capability to dispatch promptly effective CW sensors, alarms, and 
analytical equipment; protective and decontamination equipment and supplies; 
and medical countermeasures.  Additional assistance to other countries that are 
(or may one day be) in the process of destroying their own CW residues might 
also be put on the table. 
 
 --Provide additional economic, technical and development assistance.  
Related to that concept, CWC article XI requires that the parties “Undertake to 
facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of 
chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the 
development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under this 
Convention.”401  Again, this rather vague language has not inspired a wellspring 
of generosity, and economically developing states have complained that the 
wealthier parties have not fulfilled the expectations about genuine assistance in 
economic and technological growth.402  In the same vein is the treaty’s 
requirement that parties “Not maintain among themselves any restrictions, 
including those in any international agreements, incompatible with the obligations 
undertaken under this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the 
                                                                                                                                  
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction in 2011, EC-
69/3, July 11, 2012, p. 15-22 (summarizing assistance programs undertaken in 2011). 
401    CWC, supra note __, article XI.2(b); Krutzsch and Trapp, supra note __, at 213-17. 
402     Statement of Cuba, supra note __, paras. 12-14.  See generally OPCW, Executive Council, 
Report by the Director-General, The Status of Implementation of Article XI of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention as at 31 December 2010, EC-64/DG.6, April 11, 2011. 
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development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field 
of chemistry for industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or 
other peaceful purposes.”403  Again, developing states had hoped this provision 
would promote the dissolution of export control regimes that impede the 
commerce in dual-use chemicals, but it has not.404  Perhaps this would be the 
time for the United States to pony up greater international economic and 
chemical technological assistance to the developing world, and consider anew 
whether the existing restraints on chemical trade could be relaxed somewhat. 
 
 --Lose some organizational privileges.  CWC article XII.2 contemplates 
that where a party fails to fulfill a request from the Executive Council that it take 
particular measures to redress a situation raising problems about its compliance, 
the Conference of the States Parties may “restrict or suspend the State Party's 
rights and privileges under this Convention until it undertakes the necessary 
action to conform with its obligations under this Convention.”405  Here, the 
Executive Council has not made any such requests that the United States and 
Russia have failed to honor, but the concept of suspending institutional privileges 
may have some applicability.   
 
                                            
403     CWC, supra note __, article XI.2(c). 
404     The most important institution in this field is the Australia Group, an informal collection of 40 
economically developed countries that meet periodically to align their respective national export 
control regimes regarding the international transfer of materials and equipment that could be 
relevant to chemical and biological weapons.  Some developing countries had hoped that the 
creation of the CWC would lead to a general relaxation of Australia Group activity, and have been 
disappointed at the vigor with which the institution still operates.  See generally Australia Group 
website, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html; Daniel H. Joyner, International Law and the 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2009, p. 116-21. 
405     CWC, supra note __, article XII.2. 
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The Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties both 
need the active participation of the United States and Russia in order to function 
optimally, but perhaps a temporary suspension of some membership privileges 
might have a salutary effect.  Among the membership benefits that might be 
reviewed for this purpose are: the right to vote in OPCW policy organs;406 the 
right to serve on the Executive Council;407 the opportunity to have nationals of 
your state be recruited to work in Technical Secretariat positions;408 the right to 
request clarification of ambiguous compliance situations in other states;409 the 
right to request a challenge on-site inspection;410 the right to request assistance 
under programs of international cooperation;411 and the right to participate in 
largely unrestricted international trade in chemicals.412  In the extreme case, 
article XII.3 contemplates that in cases “where serious damage to the object and 
purpose of the Convention may result,” the Conference may recommend 
unspecified “collective measures” to the parties.413    
 
 --Admit the breach and apologize.  To date, the United States has 
declined to call a spade a spade and overtly admit that it has breached (or 
violated or failed to comply with) the treaty.  At this point, a frank admission and a 
                                            
406     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.17 (voting rights in Conference of the States Parties), 
article VIII.29 (voting in Executive Council). 
407     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.23 (each party has the right to serve on the Executive 
Council). 
408     CWC, supra note __, article VIII.44 (staff of the Technical Secretariat must be citizens of 
treaty parties.) 
409     CWC, supra note __, article IX.3 (party’s right to request assistance from the Executive 
Council in clarifying a situation that may be considered ambiguous). 
410     CWC, supra note __, article IX.8 (party’s right to request a challenge on-site inspection). 
411     CWC, supra note __, article X.3 (party’s right to participate in international exchanges 
concerning means of protection against CW use). 
412     CWC, supra note __, articles VI and XI. 
413     CWC, supra note __, article XII.3. 
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willingness to employ the more direct language would not alter the objective 
facts, but might appeal as a more forthright acceptance of international 
responsibility.  Political considerations, more than legal requirements, would push 
the United States and Russia in the direction of humility and contrition, but any 
vocabulary would be welcome that avoids any impression that those states are 
attempting to minimize the significance of the transgression or to dismiss it as 
some sort of “technical” or non-substantive anomaly.  Sometimes, a sincere 
confession and apology, not mincing words, can work wonders. 
 
 Overall, the general purpose of remedies for breach of a legal obligation is 
to wipe out the effects of the illegal act, to restore the parties to the situation they 
anticipated in the original bargaining.414  In the criminal law context, the 
comparable aphorism is to “make the punishment fit the crime.”  Unfortunately, 
both those objectives are largely inapplicable here – no one wants to return to 
any variant of the pre-CWC status quo ante; it is just not possible to destroy the 
lingering CW stocks more rapidly; and there is no “punishment” that truly 
compensates other parties or inflicts a justifiable amount of suffering upon the 
United States and Russia. 
 
 Section 8:  Where Do We Go from Here? 
                                            
414     Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note __, paragraphs 148-50 (citing the 1928 judgment of the 
Permanent Court of International Judgment in the Chorzow Factory case, asserting that the 
purpose of reparations is, to the extent possible, to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act.) 
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 What is the path forward for chemical weapons disarmament efforts?  
How do we minimize the damage done by the large, obvious and continuing U.S. 
and Russian failures to complete the CW destruction mission on the original 
timetable, and what can be done to prevent the harm from spiraling further? 
 
 A useful first step is to honestly acknowledge – to ourselves and to the 
world at large -- that this is a treaty violation, that it is a “big deal,” and that we 
should not attempt to minimize or shirk it.  The overshoot on the destruction 
timetable – especially when the United States will miss the promised 10 or 15 
year commitment by an additional 11½ years or more – goes to the heart of the 
CWC and undercuts the “object and purpose” of the treaty.  The United States 
has been parsimonious about talking publicly about this misjudgment, especially 
when the train wreck was merely looming in the future – but now that it is upon 
us, we have to acknowledge it and begin to pick up the pieces. 
 
 It is absurd that the politics of NIMBY have so delayed destruction of the 
last ten percent of the U.S. CW stockpile, and it is absurdity on steroids that 
elimination of the final 1.7 percent will sustain the United States in a position of 
continuous breach of a solemn international law obligation until 2023.  Now that 
we know how safe and environmentally clean the incineration methodology has 
been, it becomes doubly ironic that the local communities that had so 
successfully insisted upon employment of a neutralization alternative technology 
will be the sites at which the hazardous materials, vulnerable to leakage, 
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tornadoes and other mishaps, are sustained for more than a decade beyond their 
incineration-based peers. 
 
 On the other hand, this violation does not genuinely affect the national 
security of any other CWC party – they are in no greater danger of being 
victimized by U.S. or Russian chemical warfare, and the persistence of this 
noxious stockpile for the additional years poses a greater threat to the workers at 
the Lexington and Pueblo facilities and to the denizens of the neighboring 
communities than it does to any potential U.S. enemies.  The world will surely get 
to zero chemical weapons at some point – the lurching toward that goal has not 
been pretty, but the extended timetable should not be mistaken for ambivalence 
about the ultimate achievement.  U.S. Ambassador to the OPCW Robert Mikulak 
has denied as “patently false” the Iranian “political rant” to the contrary and has 
rightly dismissed as “poppycock” the notion that the United States intends to 
retain an operational chemical warfare capability.415 
 
 Critically, this issue should not become an excuse for the CWC to unravel.  
That treaty has already performed a marvelous service for mankind, in 
crystalizing the world’s rejection of chemical warfare and substantiating that 
taboo by prompting a massive global CW disarmament campaign.  The treaty 
faces its own challenges (the incessant march of new technology, the fears of 
                                            
415     Mikulak November 29, 2011 Statement, supra note __, p. 5; Chris Schneidmiller, Russia, 
U.S. Under Microscope at Chemical Weapons Pact Meeting, Global Security Newswire, 
November 30, 2011. 
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covert violation, the failure to reach complete universal membership, etc.416) but 
it should not also suffer defections – other states should not exercise their right to 
suspend or withdraw from the regime, even though the two largest participating 
states will stand in persistent, conspicuous violation.  Instead, the two giants, and 
all other parties, should take the occasion to reaffirm their enduring commitment 
to the enterprise and help protect the treaty. 
 
 As a political matter, it would be far preferable for the United States and 
Russia to stand tightly together on this matter.  Neither could get much political 
mileage out of trying to highlight the other’s violations – the United States had 
destroyed a larger percentage of its inventory at the time the 2012 deadline was 
reached, but Russia will probably manage to come into complete compliance 
years sooner than the United States.  Each state’s greater interest is in 
sustaining the CWC and surviving this whirlwind; neither could deflect 
international criticism by pointing the finger of blame at the other.  Moscow and 
Washington, D.C. should therefore develop a common approach and implement 
common tactics.  At the same time, the United States should not simply waive its 
longstanding concerns about Russia’s CWC compliance, including the question 
of the completeness of Russia’s neutralization process (ensuring that the 
chemical reaction is practically irreversible) and ascertaining that the funds 
                                            
416     Walker, supra note __; Daniel Feakes, Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for 
CWC Universality, 38 Arms Control Today No. 2, March 2008; Kyle M. Ballard, Convention in 
Peril? Riot Control Agents and the Chemical Weapons Ban, 37 Arms Control Today No. 7, 
September 2007; Jonathan B. Tucker, Verifying the Chemical Weapons Ban: Missing Elements, 
37 Arms Control Today No. 1, January/February 2007; Daniel Feakes, Advances in Science and 
Technology and the Chemical Weapons Convention, 38 Arms Control Today No. 2, March 2008. 
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supplied by the United States and other foreign donors are being conscientiously 
applied. 
  
 The world needs a political, not a legal, solution to this problem.417  That 
means not relying essentially upon the textual remedies built into the CWC itself 
or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Political accommodation, not 
formal invocation of the dispute-resolution mechanisms, offers the path forward.  
Most CWC parties – Iran is the conspicuous, and perhaps the sole, exception – 
have anticipated a pragmatic, non-judgmental compromise.  But legal 
mechanisms can play a facilitative role, too.  The Executive Council and the 
Conference of the States Parties should not be barred from adopting the 
language of legal obligation – including use of the powerful verb “shall” – in their 
decision-making documents, and even measures that some might regard as 
“punitive” should not be presumptively off the table. 
 
 To start, the Executive Council and the Conference of the States Parties 
should expressly find that each of the tardy parties has committed, and is 
continuing to incur, a breach of the Convention, and should formally invoke the 
compliance mechanisms of Article XII.  The breaching parties should apologize, 
admit their violations, and reimburse the organization for all the incremental costs 
                                            
417     This concept – that the 2012 problem requires a political solution, not invocation of the 
CWC dispute-resolution mechanisms or an amendment to the treaty – has been a frequent theme 
for U.S. spokespersons.  See, e.g., Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States 
Delegation to the OPCW at the 61st Session of the Executive Council, EC-61/NAT.10, June 29, 
2010, p. 2. 
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of the monitoring and inspection activities, which would have largely expired by 
now, but for the violations. 
 
 These confessions and criticisms will be embarrassing; in the short run, it 
might be far preferable to finesse an issue of this sort via quiet diplomacy.  But in 
the long run, the continuing vitality of international law requires its vigorous 
exercise.  Among the few truly useful enforcement tools for the international 
community are “naming and shaming” – public condemnation of violations and 
censure of the guilty parties.  In a perverse way, the United States should 
welcome this ordeal, because it enhances the power of international law, making 
arms control treaties including the CWC more reliable and meaningful.  When 
even the superpowers are called into account for treaty breaches, others will be 
deterred from future non-compliance. 
 
 Certainly, the current impasse should not offer the occasion for the United 
States or Russia to relax their destruction vigilance or to retrench their financial 
commitments to the enterprise.  Some might be tempted to propose, “Since we’re 
going to miss the deadline anyway, and pay the associated political price, we 
might as well slow down the process and proceed more cheaply.”  But this is 
decidedly not a situation in which “a miss is as good as a mile”; the only way to 
escape global opprobrium is to demonstrate that we are, in truth, proceeding as 
rapidly as possible. If anything can be done to accelerate the destruction 
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operations at the last two sites, Pueblo and Lexington, that would be money well 
spent. 
 
 There will, undoubtedly, be a political price to pay for the U.S. neglect of 
this legal duty.  It will diminish our ability to attract holdout states to join the CWC.  
It will weaken U.S. credibility in challenging suspected violators of the treaty’s 
primary and secondary obligations.  It will undercut U.S. leadership in helping to 
adapt the treaty to new technological challenges.  More broadly, it will constitute 
a lingering stain on the Obama Administration’s theme of “constructive re-
engagement” in multilateral affairs.418  As the United States seeks to repair the 
diplomatic damage of prior years, by becoming more positively involved in a 
variety of international fora and agreements (the International Criminal Court, the 
Ottawa Convention on land mines, and the U.N Human Rights Council, for 
example) disquiet about violating the CWC will send an unwelcome, 
contradictory message. 
 
Most fundamentally, this unexcused violation will soil the U.S. reputation 
as an advocate for the rule of law, for punctilious compliance with the CWC and 
other arms control treaties, and for fealty to international law in general.  How, for 
                                            
418     The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Advancing U.S. Interests at the United 
Nations, September 20, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/20/advancing-
us-interests-united-nations; Howard LaFranchi, Historic Myanmar Trip for Hillary Clinton, 
Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-
Policy/2011/1130/Historic-Myanmar-trip-for-Hillary-Clinton-Enough-focus-on-human-rights-video; 
Cary Fraser, In the Shadow of Failure: Obama’s Quest for Constructive Engagement, Janaury 26, 
2010, http://www.shafr.org/2010/01/26/in-the-shadow-of-failture-obamas-quest-for-constructive-




example, will the United States retain the moral high ground necessary to 
effectively rebut Iranian challenges that seek to juxtapose the acknowledged U.S. 
violation of the CWC with the alleged Iranian violation of the NPT?  The two 
cases are not, in any measure, equivalent, but a good deal of the favorable 
diplomatic posture for insistence upon the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda has 
been sacrificed amid Teheran’s stage thunder. 
 
 Even more importantly, what are the lessons for the future?  How can the 
international community develop a formula for insisting upon genuine 
disarmament (compelling countries to follow through effectively on those rare 
occasions when they accept a treaty commitment to destroy weaponry) without 
creating a straightjacket in situations where good faith efforts simply fall short?  A 
timetable is often necessary to convert what could otherwise be simply an 
abstract agreement in principle into a reliable, actionable undertaking, against 
which government officials will be driven to commit funds and labor.  Without 
some rigidity in the deadlines, it would be too easy to postpone forever any real 
(i.e., expensive) operations – but as the current problem illustrates, too much 
rigidity is unsuitable, too. 
 
 One lesson would be to review any such treaty schedules with a jaundiced 
eye, wary about unforeseen difficulties in the destruction process, especially 
where large quantities and unproven technologies are at issue.  The Ottawa 
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Convention419 on anti-personnel land mines offers a current example.  The 
United States is not a party to this treaty, but has undertaken a thorough review 
of the desirability of acceding.420   That treaty requires parties to destroy their 
inventories of stockpiled mines within four years; no extensions are possible.421  
For the United States, this provision could require the abrupt destruction of up to 
10 million mostly quite old mines.422  These devices were not constructed with an 
eye toward their eventual orderly disposal, and there are no existing processes, 
equipment, or facilities for safely and expeditiously destroying them, at least not 
on the scale contemplated by the Ottawa drafters.  In these circumstances, it 
would hardly be prudent for the United States to join the Ottawa Convention until 
it had developed and at least initiated a suitable destruction procedure – until it 




 Section 9:  Conclusion 
 Under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty is “the supreme Law of the Land,”423 
and the president has the obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
                                            
419     Ottawa Convention, supra note __. 
420     See Arms Control Association, Mine Ban Treaty, Time for a Positive U.S. Decision, volume 
2, issue 2, February 28, 2011, http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/MineBanTreatyUSDecison 
(Obama Administration has undertaken a year-long review of policy regarding land mines). 
421     Ottawa Convention, supra note __, article 4.  The Ottawa Convention does not allow 
reservations, which could exempt a party from application of the deadline, Id., article 19. 
422     International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor 2011, p. 14  http://www.the-
monitor.org/lm/2011/resources/Landmine%20Monitor%202011.pdf (estimating that in 2002, the 
United States was thought to possess 10.4 million landmines, but this inventory may have been 
significantly reduced). 
423     U.S. Constitution, article VI. 
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executed.”424  Successive administrations have conspicuously failed in this duty 
with respect to the dismantling obligations of the CWC.   
 
At the same time, treaties are the “coin of the realm” in international law, 
and the United States is the leading practitioner of international agreements, 
relying upon treaties to pursue its interests in the full range of global affairs, from 
trade to human rights to environmental protection to war and peace.  It hardly 
makes sense to degrade this vital resource through neglect of our own legal 
responsibilities. 
 
Iran will likely seek to depict the United States as a “serial violator” of the 
CWC, stapling together its accusations about U.S. and U.K. handling of the 
obsolete CW devices uncovered in Iraq in 2003-09 with the complaints about 
blowing past the April 29, 2012 deadline.  There are enough shreds of truth in 
that characterization that it might have legs; the obvious attempt to deflect 
attention from Iran’s own violations of the NPT is unmistakable. 
 
In truth, there is no real legal or moral congruence between the U.S. 
posture regarding the CWC and Iran’s or North Korea’s violation of their 
obligations to refrain from developing or possessing a nuclear weapons 
capability.  The United States is not being “sneaky,” is not attempting to retain 
any viable CW military capacity, and has a transparent pathway toward complete 
(if late) performance of its obligations.  The United States is attempting (if poorly) 
                                            
424     U.S. Constitution, article II, section 3. 
 144 
to conform to the treaty, and is not deliberately defying the will of the international 
community.  The cases, therefore, are more unlike than like; one size of 
response by the rest of the world would not fit all. 
 
 
 Still, the persistent U.S. and Russian violations of the CWC are not 
“victimless offenses”; there is significant, if diffuse harm.  Proceeding from the 
aphorism that one should “never let a crisis go to waste,” the United States 
should use this occasion to model how a good state should behave when it finds 
itself, unfortunately, in a situation of materially breaching a treaty.  A state that 
wants to reassert its bona fides, wants to retain as much as possible of the 
respect of its peers, and wants to strain the fabric of international law as little as 
possible, would not try to dodge responsibility, not minimize the significance of its 
wrongdoing, and not seek simply to deflect attention.  It would forthrightly 
acknowledge its misjudgments and take its medicine.  That would be the tiny 
silver lining on this otherwise miserable cloud – showing the world how a 
dignified, law-abiding state attempts to restore its respectability.425 
 
  
 The United States has invoked the “example setting” imagery to good 
effect elsewhere in arms control.  In 2006, when Libya’s notorious Muammar 
                                            
425     See Global Security Newswire, NATO Panel Urges Nations to Eradicate All Chemical Arms, 
October 11, 2011 (NATO Parliamentary Assembly Science and Technology Committee urges 
United States and Russia to destroy their CW stocks “soon,” rejecting a Russian proposal to 
substitute the term “in due time,” because the committee felt the two largest CW possessing 
states “should act as positive role models” for other nations). 
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Gaddafi appeared to abandon decades of quixotic support for terrorism and 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the George W. Bush Administration 
welcomed his volte face with a cautious embrace.  The United States removed 
Libya from the official roster of state sponsors of terrorism, and restored full 
diplomatic relations with the country (ending a 30 year hiatus).  Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice announced these “tangible results that flow from the 
historic decisions taken by Libya’s leadership in 2003,” saying that the world was 
witnessing “the beginning of that country’s re-emergence into the mainstream of 
the international community.”426  Rice then proceeded to commend Gaddafi’s 
example as a prototype for other pariah regimes that, she urged, should emulate 
Libya’s renunciation of policies and practices that violate international legal 
norms and embrace a new respect for international law, saying, “Just as 2003 
marked a turning point for the Libyan people, so, too, could 2006 mark turning 
points for the peoples of Iran and North Korea.  Libya is an important model as 
nations around the world press for changes in behavior by the Iranian and North 
Korean regimes – changes that could be vital to international peace and 
security.”427   
 
                                            
426     U.S. Restores Diplomatic Relations with Libya, May 15, 2006, 
http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/2006/06-194EN.shtml  
427     U.S. Restores Diplomatic Relations with Libya, May 15, 2006, 
http://archives.uruguay.usembassy.gov/usaweb/paginas/2006/06-194EN.shtml.  See also 
Interview with Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter, 34 
Arms Control Today No. 3, April 2004 (the United States believes “Libya serves as a good model” 
for how Iran and North Korea should behave regarding their nuclear weapons programs.  The 
Libya example demonstrates how a country should conduct itself when it wants to abandon illegal 
arms, re-join the international community, and reap the benefits of greater security and 
integration); Jonathan B. Tucker, The Rollback of Libya’s Chemical Weapons Program, 16 
Nonproliferation Review No. 3, November 2009, p. 379 (“Bush administration officials often 
pointed to Libya’s WMD rollback as a model for how other proliferators could make a “strategic 
choice” to shift course and become accepted members of the international community.”)  
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 Beyond that rhetoric, the United States is right to focus attention on treaty 
compliance, particularly in the security realm.  The United States has been the 
self-appointed leader in monitoring other states’ behavior under arms control 
treaty regimes, publishing detailed assessments of questionable, or flat-out 
illegal, activities.428  These have sometimes generated considerable 
controversy,429 but holding states to an exacting standard is the right thing to do 
– and the United States should not allow accusations of hypocrisy, even when 
they are well-grounded in the CWC experience, to deter it from continuing to 
press the point.  Reciprocity is a key principle in international law and 
international politics, and the United States must take seriously the assertions of 
its treaty partners about possible non-compliance.430  
 
In the addressing the CWC specifically, in 2005 – before the CWC 
compliance issue had come to roost in the United States itself -- the Department 
of State expressed the sentiment with robust clarity: 
                                            
428     State Compliance Report, supra note __; U.S. Department of State, Compliance with the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Condition (10)(C) Report, August 2011. 
429     In response to the 2010 U.S. compliance report, Russia issued its own comparable 
document, complaining about numerous alleged U.S. violations of arms control agreements.  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, The Facts of Violation by the United States 
of its Obligations in the Sphere of Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms 
Control, August 8, 2010, 
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cc9c7d192f0ebc5ac325777a
0057e1ae?OpenDocument (alleging U.S. violations of the CWC, START I, the BWC and other 
arms control agreements); Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russian Report Faults 
U.S. Compliance with Arms Control Treaties, August 8, 2010, http://csis.org/blog/russian-report-
faults-us-compliance-arms-control-treaties. 
430     State Compliance Report, supra note __, p. 5 (noting “There are processes within the U.S. 
executive branch that operate to ensure U.S. plans and programs remain consistent with U.S. 
international obligations….When U.S. treaty partners have raised compliance questions regarding 
U.S. implementation activities, the United States has carefully reviewed the matter to confirm that 
its actions were in compliance with its treaty obligations.”) 
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Detecting a violation [of the CWC] is not an end in itself; it is a call to 
action.  Without strict compliance and without the concerted action of all 
States Party to insist upon strict compliance – and to hold violators 
accountable for their actions – the national security of all nations will erode 
and global stability will be undermined.431 
 
 President Obama put the matter more concisely in his celebrated April 5, 
2009 Prague speech, “Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. 
Words must mean something.”432  That is true, even for the United States. 
 
                                            
431    U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact 
Sheet: Verification and Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, October 1, 2005, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57328.htm.  See also U.S. Department of State, Bureau 
of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Fact Sheet: The United States’ Approach to 
Verification, Compliance Assessment and Compliance Enforcement, October 1, 2005, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/prsrl/57241.htm (concluding that “Detecting violations is not 
enough.  What really counts is to ensure that there are sufficient consequences to a violation 
once it has been detected.  Only by making violators face consequences for their violations, 
especially denial of the benefits of their noncompliance, can they be expected to take compliance 
seriously, and only by enforcing consequences will other would-be violators be deterred.  These 
consequences may be political, economic, or ultimately military, and may be undertaken by 
international organizations or nations acting individually or together.  If arms control, 
nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments are to support the security of all 
nations, then all nations must respond when confronted with noncompliance.”) 
 See also Report 104-33, supra note __, p. 228 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
concludes “Ultimately, the willingness of state parties to act in the face of noncompliance, more 
than the sophistication of its inspection provisions or the extent of its data reporting requirements 
will determine the CWC’s effectiveness. If the political will does not exist to make these 
agreements important instruments of international policy, they are not worth the paper on which 
they are written.  If the political commitment to action is absent, all of the inspections they 
mandate are so much unproductive frenzy.  If the political strength to take on those who will not 
abide by the rules has vanished, the penalties have the impact of a mosquito – inconvenient and 
irritating perhaps, but no deterrent.”) 
 See also U.S. Department of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, August 2005, p. 5-9 (stressing 
the importance of full compliance with arms control treaties as “a bedrock norm of international 
relations,” and describing the organizations and programs of the U.S. government that are 
designed to ensure U.S. compliance.) 
432     Remarks by President Barack Obama, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-
As-Delivered/.  See also Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University, Seoul, Republic of 
Korea, March 26, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-
president-obama-hankuk-university (“For the global response to Iran and North Korea’s 
intransigence, a new international norm is emerging: Treaties are binding; rules will be enforced; 
and violations will have consequences.”) 
